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SUMMARY
Despite nearly 50 years of attempts at reform, the US defense acquisition
system continues to deliver weapon systems over budget, behind schedule, and with
performance shortfalls. A parade of commissions, panels, and oversight organizations
have studied and restudied the problems of government acquisition with the objective
of transforming the defense acquisition enterprise, yet the resulting legislative and
procedural changes have yielded little, if any, benefit. Thus, the obvious question
is why has acquisition reform failed? Three potential contributors were identified
in the literature: misalignment of incentives, a lack of a systems view, and a lack
of objective evaluation criteria. This dissertation attempts to address each of these
problem areas.
First, I consider the issue of incentivization in the context of defense technol-
ogy policy. A frequent criticism of defense acquisition programs is that they tend
to employ risky, immature technology that increases the cost and duration of ac-
quisition efforts. To combat this problem the Department of Defense rewrote their
acquisition regulations to encourage a more evolutionary approach to system devel-
opment. Nominally, this requires the use of mature technologies, but studies have
revealed that acquisition programs continue to use immature technologies in spite of
the new policies. To analyze this issue, the defense acquisition cycle was modeled as
a stochastic process. Then, assuming that each acquisition program serves a diverse
set of stakeholders, game theory was applied to show that the stable solution is to
employ immature technology. It turns out that there is a tragedy of the commons
at work in which the acquisition program serves as the common resource for each
of the stakeholder groups to achieve its objectives. Since there is no cost to using
xii
the resource, there is a tendency to overexploit it. The result is an outcome that is
worse than if there had been a coordinated solution. Thus, the rational actions of
stakeholders will lead to a contradiction of acquisition policy. Consequently, if the De-
partment of Defense expects adherence to its evolutionary acquisition policy it must
either strictly enforce technology maturity requirements or else realign incentives with
desired outcomes.
Second, I evaluate cost and performance implications of the most recent defense
acquisition transformation initiative, evolutionary acquisition. Proponents suggest
that evolutionary acquisition will lower acquisition program costs, shorten delivery
times, and improve the performance of fielded systems through the use of shorter
and more incremental acquisition cycles. Supporting arguments focus on the impact
of evolutionary acquisition on individual programs but fail to consider the defense
acquisition enterprise as a system. To address this shortcoming, I analyze the impact
of evolutionary policies through the use of a discrete event simulation of the entire
defense acquisition system. It was found that while there should be an increase in
the performance of fielded systems under evolutionary acquisition policies, the cost of
operating the defense acquisition system as a whole does not inherently decrease. This
is because the shorter acquisition cycles created by evolutionary polices mean that
the overhead costs of each acquisition cycle are incurred more frequently. If these
overhead costs do not decline sufficiently, the net cost to operate the acquisition
system rises. This finding demonstrates the importance of considering the entire
acquisition system before implementing a new policy.
Finally, I address the lack of objective evaluation criteria by developing a method
to value acquisition process improvements monetarily. This is accomplished through
the combination of price indices and options analysis. Since the US government is a
non-profit entity, traditional cash flow based valuation methods are not applicable.
Instead, the use of price indices captures the changes in the government’s buying
xiii
power induced by acquisition reforms. This may be converted into an equivalent
augmented budget stream that allows traditional investment evaluation tools to be
applied. An additional advantage of the buying power method is that it captures the
impact of the economies of scale inherent in the production of military systems. The
augmented budget stream serves as the basis for applying options analysis, which
properly accounts for the risk mitigating effects of staging. A comparison of this
new method with more traditional methods reveals that only considering cost savings
can significantly undervalue acquisition improvement opportunities, and even small
improvements can have large returns.
xiv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Despite nearly 50 years of attempts at reform, the US defense acquisition system
continues to deliver weapon systems over budget, behind schedule, and with perfor-
mance shortfalls. A parade of commissions, panels, and oversight organizations have
studied and restudied the problems of government acquisition with the objective of
transforming the defense acquisition enterprise. Despite some variation in the find-
ings, several common threads have emerged. First, the Department of Defense (DoD)
tends to pursue overly aggressive performance goals that require the use of immature
technology. Maturation of technology can be quite unpredictable, and thus, early
commitment to immature technology tends to lead to higher costs and longer devel-
opment times. Second, acquisition decision making is decentralized, uninformed, and
subject to the influence of multiple, diverse groups of stakeholders. This tends to
lead to starting more programs than can be funded, duplicated work, and failure to
consider potentially more cost effective alternatives. Third, program managers lack
the authority and incentives to manage programs in a cost effective manner.
Pursuant to the identification of the aforementioned issues, acquisition reform
panels and oversight groups typically make a number of recommendations to reme-
diate acquisition failings. Often these recommendations are drawn from the study of
private industry. The rationale is that market competition has honed the efficiency
of private firms, and the DoD would do well to imitate their behavior. The Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative agency of Congress, has been
particularly aggressive in pushing the reform of the defense acquisition system using
commercial practices. More specifically, they recommend the strict enforcement of
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technology maturity requirements; a staged, knowledge-based acquisition process; a
centralized acquisition authority that manages the entire acquisition portfolio; and re-
aligning the incentives, tenure, and authority of program managers with best interests
of the acquisition system.
While the recommendations of the GAO and other reform entities are often nomi-
nally embraced by all relevant parties, including the DoD, there has really been little,
if any, improvement. There are several key issues that contribute to this outcome.
First, there is a failure of implementation. In many cases the DoD has reformed its
acquisition policies only to allow programs to bypass them, or it implements only
parts of a multipart recommendation resulting in ineffective outcomes. Second, the
suggested reforms, while reasonable on the surface, are really just assertions. There
is typically no systematic analysis of the impact of reforms in a defense context.
Since there are important differences between the nature of the defense acquisition
system and a commercial product development process, these fundamental structural
differences may result in unexpected outcomes. Finally, commercial operations can
reduce most decisions to a single objective, maximization of cash flow. This provides
a universal standard of comparison for all policy alternatives. Government programs,
however, are non-profit. They do not generate cash flows, and they attempt to satisfy
multiple, non-commensurate objectives for multiple, diverse constituencies. Thus,
there is no common measure on which to evaluate and compare acquisition policy
alternatives. Consequently, a debate over the implementation of a policy reform es-
sentially devolves into competing assertions without any objective means of resolving
the situation.
This thesis attempts to address these three implementation issues through the use
of systems engineering principles and economic theory, and one chapter is devoted
to each of these issues. First, I consider the possibility that the underlying incen-
tive structure of the defense acquisition system may lead participants to attempt to
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bypass acquisition policies and recommended procedures. Second, I take a systems
view of reform initiatives to evaluate their impacts within the context of the acqui-
sition system. Third, I devise a valuation scheme that allows for the evaluation and
comparison of acquisition process improvements.
To provide context for the first two issues, I have chosen a single acquisition reform
effort to analyze, evolutionary acquisition. Evolutionary acquisition is an approach
recently embraced by the DoD and committed to acquisition policy. Traditional
acquisition programs attempt large leaps in capability in a single acquisition cycle.
Hence, they are sometimes referred to as revolutionary acquisition programs. They do
so by utilizing immature technology, and, as a result, often tend to take on the order of
10-20 years and incur significant costs. Evolutionary acquisition, on the other hand,
sets more modest performance goals and utilizes more mature technology. Proponents
argue that it will shorten cycle times, reduce cost, and increase the performance of
fielded systems. Despite the fact that the DoD has embraced evolutionary acquisition
as its preferred approach, a recent survey by the GAO has found that almost none
of the DoD’s current acquisition programs are evolutionary [32–34]. It turns out
that programs are routinely exempted from the technology maturity requirements
necessary to maintain an evolutionary acquisition system.
In Chapter 2, I consider why, if evolutionary acquisition is supposedly superior,
DoD continues to pursue a revolutionary approach to acquisition? To address this
issue, I model the defense acquisition cycle as a stochastic process. Then, assuming
that each acquisition program serves a diverse set of stakeholders, I apply game theory
and find that the stable solution is a revolutionary acquisition policy. It turns out that
there is a tragedy of the commons at work in which the acquisition program serves as
the common resource for each of the stakeholder groups to achieve its objectives. Since
there is no cost to using the resource, there is a tendency to overexploit it. The result
is an outcome that is worse than if there had been a coordinated solution. Thus,
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evolutionary acquisition should theoretically provide superior system performance,
but the rational actions of stakeholders will lead to a revolutionary acquisition policy.
The policy implication is that if the DoD wishes to employ evolutionary acquisition,
technology maturity requirements must be strictly enforced or else incentives must
be realigned.
Chapter 3 evaluates the assertion that evolutionary acquisition reduces costs and
increases performance. In theory, acquisition program costs should be lower under
evolutionary acquisition because the use of mature technology reduces technology
development costs. However, this assertion fails to consider the entire acquisition
system. Unlike commercial firms, the DoD is effectively the developer, the manu-
facturer, and the sole customer of its product. Thus, the question is really whether
evolutionary acquisition is still cost effective when total ownership of the entire system
life-cycle is considered?
To answer this question, I developed a discrete event simulation that models both
the acquisition system and the defense R&D system. I then consider as my key ex-
perimental variable the maturity at which a technology is transferred from the R&D
system to an acquisition program. What I found is that the overall costs do not
necessarily decrease under evolutionary acquisition, and this is primarily a result of
the shorter acquisition cycles. Each acquisition program incurs large system devel-
opment and production costs. When acquisition cycles become shorter, these costs
are incurred more frequently. If these costs do not decline sufficiently under under
evolutionary acquisition, the overall result is a higher acquisition system operating
cost. Despite the potential for higher net operating costs, evolutionary acquisition
still results in higher performance from fielded systems, and, thus, there is a direct
trade-off between cost and performance. However, it is not necessary to vary the
technology policy to achieve a particular cost/performance trade-off. If one inserts
a delay interval between evolutionary acquisition cycles to artificially lengthen them,
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one can achieve the full range of cost/performance combinations. Of course, the re-
sulting gaps in production may lead to difficulties in the defense industrial base, but
this is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, evolutionary acquisition may not be a
free lunch, but it does create the opportunity to trade cost and performance rather
than simply accepting an expensive and slow acquisition system.
Chapter 4 addresses the issue of valuing process improvements to the defense ac-
quisition system. As mentioned previously, the government does not generate profits,
and it serves a diverse constituency. Thus, it is difficult to employ traditional deci-
sion analysis tools to evaluate policy alternatives. A common approach is to employ
cost savings as a figure of merit and utilize NPV analysis. However, this approach
misrepresents value in two ways. First, it fails to consider that the market for defense
systems is essentially a monopsony. As such, the per unit price that the government
pays is heavily dependent upon economies of scale. Since most defense industries have
excess productive capacity, they exhibit increasing returns to scale. Thus, when costs
on a defense program rise, the government is forced to cut the size of the production
run. This increases the per unit costs further, and the production quantity decreases
even more. On the positive side, however, a decrease in program cost produces the
opposite effect. As a result, nominal cost savings will understate the gain from a pro-
cess improvement. Second, NPV analysis fails to consider the staged nature of most
investments. Staging reduces downside risk exposure, and thus, an NPV analysis will
understate the value of a risky investment.
To address the first issue, I develop a method to value a process improvement as
a change in buying power through the use of a pricing index similar to those used
to measure inflation. This allows for the monetary valuation of process improve-
ments and facilitates addressing the second issue through options analysis. Options
analysis appropriately considers contingencies in the implementation of a process im-
provement. Through the combination of these two approaches, I show that failure to
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consider production economics and staging can significantly understate the value of
a potential process improvement and could lead to an inappropriate rejection of the
option. Finally, the method developed allows decision makers to objectively compare
a portfolio of acquisition process improvements.
This dissertation is organized in the following manner. The remainder of this
chapter discusses background and issues associated with defense acquisition reform.
Chapter 2 is entitled “A Game Theoretic Analysis of Defense Acquisition Technol-
ogy Policy” and reveals a tragedy of the commons at work in the defense acquisition
system. Chapter 3, “ A Systematic Analysis of the Cost and Performance Impact of
Acquisition Technology Policy,” presents the simulation study that reveals that evolu-
tionary acquisition does increase performance, but it may also increase cost. Chapter
4, “A Method For Valuing Defense Acquisition Process Improvements,” discusses
the application of buying power and real options to value process improvements for
the defense acquisition system. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this
dissertation and discusses avenues for future research.
1.1 The Defense Acquisition Enterprise
The United States defense acquisition system is one of the largest and most com-
plicated business enterprises in the world. The budget wielded by the Department
of Defense is greater than the gross domestic product of many nations. Its nominal
purpose is to develop and acquire systems for the US military, but like any public
institution, it serves a diverse set of constituencies and purposes. Thus, the defense
acquisition system differs from a commercial enterprise in several key aspects as noted
by Cancian [9]:
• There is only one buyer.
• There are very few suppliers.
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• The user is concerned with performance not price.
• Contracts are signed years before the product is available, and consequently,
must be based on estimates for cost, performance, and schedule.
• Performance is difficult to judge and often subjective.
• The enterprise operates with public funds. The use of public funds is held to a
different standard than private funds.
• Decision making power is diffused throughout the executive and legislative
branches of government.
• Decisions are made under public scrutiny.
Furthermore, it attempts to satisfy a number of conflicting goals including maxi-
mize performance, minimize cost, minimize acquisition time, minimize risk, maximize
program control, maintain jointness and interoperability, preserve the industrial base,
maintain fairness and propriety, and advance national socioeconomic goals [9]. Con-
sequently, the defense acquisition system faces challenges that no private enterprise
ever would. This has made it impossible to operate at the same standards of efficiency
that one would expect from a private firm.
Given these difficulties, legislation and acquisition regulations attempt to enforce
a rational and transparent process that provides justification for the systems being
acquired. Fox enumerates the basic steps in the process as follows [26]:
1. DoD identifies a security threat or defense operational mission.
2. DoD, usually with assistance from contractors, designs an engineering develop-
ment program to meet the mission need and draws up an acquisition strategy
and budget.
3. Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for the program.
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4. The administration releases funds for the planned program.
5. DoD and interested contractors develop detailed technical approaches to the
program.
6. DoD prepares a contract statement of work, with formal or informal assistance
from contractors.
7. DoD issues requests for proposals to interested contractors and arranges pre-
proposal conferences for bidders.
8. Contractors submit proposals to DoD, where they are evaluated.
9. DoD selects one contractor (or more), and the parties sign a contract for devel-
opment of the weapon system.
10. The contractor begins work under the contract and each party initiates negoti-
ated changes and modifications where required or deemed desirable.
11. The contractor delivers items to DoD for testing and evaluation while the work
is in progress.
Following successful evaluation and approval by the relevant authorities, the sys-
tem enters the production phase. To support this process, the DoD has estab-
lished three overlapping systems: the Joint Capabilities Integration and Develop-
ment System (JCIDS), the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Sys-
tem (PPBE), and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). JCIDS is used to identify
military needs. PPBE is used to allocate resources, and DAS is for managing product
development and procurement. To further complicate issues, each of these systems is
operated by a different organization. JCIDS is managed by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC). PPBE is operated by the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense (OSD), and the DAS is run by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions,
Technology, and Logistics (USD/AT&L).
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The Defense Acquisition System is where the bulk of the work of developing and
acquiring a system takes place. It is operated via the Defense Acquisition Manage-
ment Framework (Figure 1.1). The framework divides the life-cycle of an acquisition
effort into five phases: Concept Refinement, Technology Development, System Devel-
opment, Production & Deployment, and Operations & Support. Ideally, warfighter
needs are identified by the military services and proposed solution concepts are iden-
tified through the JCIDS process. Once the JROC approves a system concept, it
moves into the Concept Refinement phase of the acquisition management framework.
There are three decision points in the framework called milestones. At each milestone,
a program must demonstrate it has met the requirements to move from one phase
to the next. The purpose of these milestones is to provide decision makers with the
opportunity to make an informed decision regarding the future of a program.
Concept
Refinement
Technology
Development
System Development
& Demonstration
Production &
Deployment
Operations &
Support
Concept
Decision
Design
Readiness
Review
FRP
Decision
Review
User Needs &
Technology Opportunities
A B C IOC FOC
Figure 1.1: The Defense Acquisition Management Framework [19].
On the surface it would seem as if the DoD has established a rational and trans-
parent means to acquire military systems. In practice, however, the system rarely op-
erates as intended. Practically speaking, the military services (the Army, Air Force,
Marines, and Navy) disproportionately influence the decision making process [41].
The services individually identify warfighter needs, and while these needs should be
evaluated at the joint level, there are insufficient resources to adequately analyze
service recommendations [36]. In the past, this has led to duplication and a lack of
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interoperability. Furthermore, the JCIDS operates the continuously while the PPBE
operates on a two-year cycle. This lack of synchronization means that OSD may
not evaluate a proposed program for several years after the JROC’s review. Thus,
in practice, proposed programs are difficult to terminate following approval by the
JROC because the sponsoring service begins budgeting and programming work im-
mediately [36]. Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible for OSD to manage or
balance the acquisition portfolio through the PPBE process.
In yet another departure from the official process, acquisition programs often skip
milestone requirements, and there is often significant concurrency between the phases
of the defense acquisition framework [33]. Concurrency is used as a tool to shorten
what would otherwise be a much longer acquisition cycle, but it is often at the price
of increased cost and performance shortfalls. Beyond that, it has been suggested
that concurrency works to advantage of the military services since it tends to shield
programs from scrutiny until the system undergoes testing [41]. Once a program
reaches this late stage, it is highly unlikely that it will be canceled.
The performance of the defense acquisition system has been decidedly mixed.
Ultimately, the US military has acquired superior systems, but often well over budget
and much later than expected. Cost overruns complicate budget allocation problems
in several ways. Both defense contractors and the DoD systematically underestimate
the cost to develop and acquire military systems [2, 10, 23]. This means that the
DoD starts more programs than it can fund. Once a program begins to exceed
its budget, authorities are forced to decide whether to underfund the program or
reallocate funding from other programs. In particular, underfunding programs can
take the form of stretching the program out over a longer time period and can lead to
a higher total cost, or performance requirements may be loosened or dropped. This
leads to funding instability that complicates efficient program management as well
as delay or loss of anticipated military capability. The result is that it is difficult,
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if not impossible, to rationally allocate the budget to meet military objectives, and
the acquisition system is often criticized for producing a portfolio of weapons systems
that does not meet national military objectives [41].
Schedule slippage also leads to poor options for decision makers. If a delinquent
program is allowed to continue, warfighters will have to make due with their current
and possibly obsolete equipment for longer than anticipated. Alternatively, perfor-
mance objectives could be sacrificed in order to field the system faster. But that,
once again, leaves warfighters with less capability than anticipated.
Because of these persistent problems with defense acquisition, transforming the
defense acquisition enterprise has been a perennial objective of both the Presidency
and the Congress for nearly fifty years. There have been a number of commissions,
panels, and studies that have attempted to ascertain the cause of these problems
and make recommendations to remedy the situation. The next section describes the
history and substance of the efforts to transform defense acquisition.
1.2 Transforming the Acquisition Enterprise
Defense acquisition reform as it is thought of today began with the start of the Cold
War. Persistent problems with inaccurate cost estimates and schedule slippage led
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to spearhead a long list of reforms during the
Kennedy Administration. McNamara’s initiatives fell into three broad groupings:
program planning, source selection and contracting, and program management [66].
The purpose of these initiatives were to bring systems analysis and industrial practices
to defense acquisition as well as multi-year planning and budgeting and an objective
means of selecting contractors. The innovations introduced by McNamara yielded
mixed results, and acquisition programs continued to exhibit the usual cost, schedule
and performance problems.
Since McNamara there have been a host of initiatives and regulations designed to
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Table 1.1: Timeline of Acquisition Reform Efforts. (Compiled from Christensen, et
al., 1999 [10] and Rogers and Birmingham, 2004 [61].)
Year Initiative, Legislation, or Regulation
1969 Packard Initiatives
1971 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission)
1972 DoD Directive 5000.1, Commission on Government Procurement
1973 DoD Directives 5000.3 and 5000.4
1975 DoD Instruction 5000.2, DoD Directive 5000.28
1976 OMB Circular A-109
1978 Defense Science Board Acquisition Cycle Task Force
1979 Defense Resource Management Study
1981 Carlucci Initiatives, Defense Acquisition Improvement Program
1982 Nunn-McCurdy Amendment
1983 Grace Commission
1985 DoD Directive 5000.43
1986 Packard Commission
1987 DoD Directive 5134.1 and 5000.49
1989 Defense Management Review
1991 Revision of DoD Instruction 5000.2
1993 National Performance Review
1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, Perry Memo
1995 Federal Acquisition Improvement Act
1997 DRI Report
2000 The Road Ahead
2001 Rumsfeld’s Transformation Vision
2002 Cancellation of 5000 series regulations
2003 Revision of DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2
improve defense acquisition. Table 1.1 provides a timeline of these acquisition reform
efforts. One of the most notable attempts at acquisition reform was the Packard
Commission report issued in 1986 [59]. The recommendations made by the Packard
commission centered around such concepts as streamlining, better planning, better
retention of quality personnel, and the adoption of commercial best practices. Despite
attempts to implement the recommendations of the Packard Commission, a study on
cost overruns found that changes made based on the Packard Commission report did
not result in any reductions [10]. In fact, the same study revealed that from 1960 to
1990, there has been essentially no improvement in cost overruns.
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A constant voice in the push for acquisition reform has been the Government
Accountability Office (GAO). For years they have analyzed the performance of the
defense acquisition enterprise and made recommendations for improvement. Most
recently, they have pushed for the adoption of an acquisition enterprise comparable
to a commercial new product development process. Commercial product development
cycles are much shorter and more incremental that those found in defense acquisition.
New commercial products tend to be evolutionary while new military systems tend to
be revolutionary. The thought is that if the DoD adopted shorter, more incremental
acquisition cycles, they would reduce risk, which would in turn reduce cost overruns
and schedule slippage. Furthermore, warfighters would receive up-to-date equipment
more frequently. This would make the entire system more adaptable to the ever
changing threats to US national security.
To implement evolutionary acquisition, the GAO has suggested a number of com-
mercial best practices including centralized management of the acquisition portfolio, a
staged and centrally managed technology development process, technology maturity
requirements, strict enforcement of milestones with knowledge-based requirements,
reduction of concurrency between phases, and an improved incentive and retention
structure for program managers. The DoD has taken steps to implement evolution-
ary acquisition. In particular, acquisition regulations DoD Directive 5000.1 [18] and
DoD Instruction 5000.2 [19] were revised in 2003 to make evolutionary acquisition
the preferred approach. However, the GAO has found that even under the new reg-
ulations, most defense programs are still revolutionary rather than evolutionary, and
they continue to experience cost overruns and schedule slippage [33].
Thus, thus the ultimate question is why has nearly 50 years of attempts at reform
yielded little or no improvement? Regarding the most recent initiatives, the GAO
feels that the DoD has not sufficiently implemented commercial best practices to
effectively transform the way it acquires systems [30–32,34, 36]. Implementation has
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certainly always been an issue. During the Reagan adminstration Defense Secretary
Casper Weinberger and Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci pushed a comprehensive
set of acquisition reforms, but the GAO found that despite the strong support from
upper level leadership, these, too, were never fully implemented [29].
Why does implementation falter? Table 1.1 would seem to indicate that it is
not from a lack of initiative. In his paper “Acquisition Reform: It’s Not as Easy as
It Seems” [9], Cancian points out that the defense acquisition system represents a
series of trade-offs among diverse constituencies, each with differing objectives. One
person’s waste is another person’s essential requirement. Even minor reforms will
create winners and losers, and losers may actively attempt to thwart reforms. Thus,
there are often disincentives to follow through on acquisition reforms. Chapter 2 of
this dissertation analyzes this aspect of implementation failure.
Furthermore, Cancian discusses the cyclical nature of acquisition reforms. They
tend to vacillate between extremes. For example, a commission will find that exces-
sive regulation and oversight leads to an additional cost burden for the government.
Regulations will be altered to “streamline” the defense acquisition system. After a few
years of operating under these rules several major programs will post major cost over-
runs because they were not adequately monitored and controlled. Of course, there is
an outcry and a demand for more oversight, and the cycle repeats. Cancian has noted
this behavior with such acquisition issues as cost-plus versus fixed-price contracts,
system testing requirements, and the use of MILSPEC versus COTS equipment. Ul-
timately, this vacillation is related to a failure to understand and acknowledge the
tradeoffs inherent to any changes in a system as complex as the defense acquisition
enterprise. For example, using Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment instead
of equipment built to military standards may reduce acquisition costs, but in some
cases it will lead to reliability issues since many commercial products are not built
to the demanding standards that military field use requires. This is not to suggest
14
that there is no place for COTS equipment in the DoD. Instead, the question is what
is the appropriate balance. This viewpoint is further supported by Hanks, et al. [38]
whose interviews with program mangers reveal that the current trend in streamlining
and employing performance based approaches has gone too far and leads to vague
contracts that are difficult to manage. Unfortunately, policy makers do not fully un-
derstand these trade-offs when they alter acquisition regulations, and thus, there is
a tendency to cycle between the extremes. Chapter 3 of this dissertation attempts
to provide a better understanding of these tradeoffs for the most recent acquisition
initiative, evolutionary acquisition.
Finally, Cancian also notes that there are “few objective criteria by which to judge
defense activities and outcomes” [9]. Consequently, it is difficult to apply commercial
practices for evaluation and control to defense acquisition. Furthermore, it compli-
cates the comparison of acquisition policy alternatives since much of the perceived
benefit of military systems is subjective. Chapter 4 of this dissertation provides a
partial solution to this problem by providing a method for valuing acquisition process
improvements monetarily.
1.3 Acquisition Research
Given the size, complexity, and level of import of the defense acquisition system,
there has been surprising little academic research on the topic. Some work is being
performed by government affiliated organizations such as internal DoD organizations
and the Federally Funded Research and Development Corporations (FFRDCs), but
it tends to be limited in scope [27]. Examples include topics such as whether or
not to use lean manufacturing during military aircraft acquisition [13] or whether
competitive sourcing is a cost effective means of purchasing services [60]. While these
topics are important, there is little work on the acquisition enterprise itself and the
policies and organizations that drive it. As Gansler and Lucyshyn state, the work
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being performed is “not a substitute for dedicated, replicable academic research” [27].
To address this research vacuum, the Naval Postgraduate School has begun an
Acquisition Research Program to sponsor research at academic universities, and in
2004 it began hosting an annual acquisition research symposium. However, these
initiatives are still in their infancy. A survey of the conference proceedings revealed
that the vast majority of the work is still limited in scope and supported by anecdotal
evidence [57]. Even so, the quality of work is improving. A system dynamics analysis
of spiral development presented by Dillard and Ford [16] is one such example of how
academic research methods can be applied to defense acquisition to achieve informed
policy recommendations. Even so, little research has been done on the acquisition
enterprise as a system.
Two notable exceptions are a paper by Clark, Whittenberg, and Woodruff [11] and
a PhD dissertation by Burgess [8]. Both works take a systems dynamics approach
to modeling the complex macroscopic interactions between the defense acquisition
system, the US economy, the US government, and the threat posed by the Soviet
Union. While both are excellent examples of taking a systems approach to studying
defense acquisition, neither attempts to perform policy analysis with their respective
models. Thus, they make no real recommendations as to how to improve defense
acquisition. Furthermore, the models that they developed are so high-level that it
may be difficult to link the impact of actionable policies to model components without
expanding the models to include the behavior of lower level sub-systems.
While most research has not taken a systems approach, there have been some
noteworthy academic works that cover certain aspects of the acquisition problem.
The economics of the defense industry, in particular, has drawn some attention from
the academic community. Notable works include Peck and Scherer’s economic anal-
ysis of the structure of the defense industry and acquisition process [56], Scherer’s
analysis of contract incentives between the government and defense contractors [68],
16
and Baldwin’s analysis of the market features of the defense industry [3]. In particu-
lar, Peck and Scherer’s work correlated with the early attempts at acquisition reform
championed by Robert McNamara that were discussed above. Fox considered his
widely cited work Arming America to be a successor to Peck and Scherer’s work, and
he focused on the management of the acquisition process [25]. Weida and Gertcher
considered the interaction of politics and economics in national defense and in partic-
ular why defense decisions may not be economically efficient [74]. Gansler provides an
extensive analysis of the state of the defense industry in the post-Vietnam era [28].
In particular, he emphasized the importance of intelligently managing the defense
industry because of the lack of the traditional market forces that ensure economic
efficiency. Finally, Sandler and Hartley provide a broad coverage of the application of
macro and microeconomic theory to the concept of national defense covering issues
such as alliances and arms races, the industrial base, disarmament, and the arms
trade [67].
Much of this previous work deals with the unusual industrial economics of pro-
ducing military systems, and, in particular, the interaction between government and
industry. One common issue is the way in which defense contracts are written and
administered impacts the efficiency of the defense industry. Scherer extensively con-
siders the nature of contract incentives, and Sandler and Hartley note that game
theory has been applied to interactions between contractors and the military.
Thus, while there has been some academic research on the topic of defense ac-
quisition, there has not been nearly enough considering the size and import of the
problem. The primary output of past work has been recommendations to improve
or reform the defense acquisition system. Perhaps the most important difference be-
tween this dissertation and past academic work is that it considers why reforms have
failed at the implementation stage. In particular, this dissertation takes the approach
that the defense enterprise is a system that can be analyzed to better understand the
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implementation issues surrounding defense acquisition reform. Consideration of how
the components of the enterprise interact is necessary to understand why a policy,
however well-intentioned, fails to realize its intended objective. By treating an enter-
prise as a system [62], the entire suite of approaches and tools developed to support
systems engineering, industrial engineering, and operations research is available to
analyze the impact of changes to the defense acquisition system. Such a systematic
approach also provides the opportunity to adapt economic principles and investment
analysis to a domain where, traditionally, they have been considered inapplicable.
Thus, while many possible causes of implementation failure have been postulated,
the methods developed in this dissertation provide a means to analyze them.
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CHAPTER II
A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE
ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY POLICY
Chapter 1 asserted that participants in the defense acquisition system may be disin-
centivized to implement or follow proposed acquisition reforms. This chapter tests
that assertion regarding one of the most contentious issues of defense acquisition,
technology maturity policy. As was mentioned previously, the consistent use of im-
mature technology in acquisition programs has often been cited as a key driver of
cost overruns, schedule slippage, and performance shortfalls. But if the use of im-
mature technology is so widely recognized as a causal factor in the failure of defense
acquisition, why does the practice continue?
There have been repeated calls for the Department of Defense to use evolutionary
rather than revolutionary acquisition strategies. As mentioned previously, evolution-
ary acquisition relies on shorter acquisition cycles and mature technologies to achieve
more modest goals. Supporters believe that this approach will lead to an overall
improvement in the level of capability deployed as well as lower cost acquisition pro-
grams.
In fact, the DoD has revised its acquisition polices to that end [30]. Despite these
new policies, recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports have indicated
that most major acquisition programs are still revolutionary rather than evolutionary
and do not follow current DoD guidelines for knowledge-based acquisition [32–34]. It
seems that every program is an exception. Why is this?
Two questions logically follow: What level of maturity is acceptable for a tech-
nology to be included in a major acquisition program, and what has been preventing
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the DoD from practicing an evolutionary acquisition process?
The analysis presented in this chapter will show that the answers to these ques-
tions are more broad than the evolutionary vs. revolutionary acquisition debate. It
turns out that given the risks and structure of each acquisition program, there is a
performance optimal technology policy that will maximize the gain in capability over
time. However, when acquisition programs attempt to serve a diverse set of stake-
holders, a tragedy of the commons arises where each stakeholder is incentivized to
push for technology that is more immature than is optimal. The result is that all
stakeholders in the acquisition program end up worse off.
Thus, there is a natural tendency towards revolutionary acquisition, and any ac-
quisition strategy that advocates the use of more mature technology is inherently
unstable. The policy implication for the US Department of Defense is clear; either
technology maturity requirements must be strictly enforced or incentives must be
realigned.
2.1 Background
A common criticism of the defense acquisition process is that it tends to emphasize
large leaps in capability achieved by utilizing promising but immature technology.
Changes to defense acquisition policy over the last several years have attempted to
reverse this trend by creating a milestone process where programs must meet certain
requirements before proceeding from one phase to the next [18, 19] (See Figure 1.1).
Part of this milestone process is an assessment of the maturity of technologies to be
employed in an acquisition program as well as a plan to manage their development.
Technological maturity is typically assessed using the Technology Readiness Level
(TRL) scale (See Appendix E). The TRL scale is a qualitative assessment scale that
is designed to aid decision makers by providing some sense of a given technology’s
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level of risk. In general, one assumes that the higher the TRL level, the less uncer-
tainty a technology brings to a program. It is important to note that the TRL scale
evaluates a technology in isolation and does not consider the integration risks [71].
Regardless, the aforementioned policy changes encourage programs to utilize more
mature, demonstrated technologies (i.e., higher TRL levels) rather than more imma-
ture and consequently, more risky technologies. For example, entering the system
development phase nominally requires all critical technologies to be at TRL level 6
or higher (Though the GAO recommends at least TRL level 7 [19]).
What is the rationale behind a policy that requires a relatively mature level of
technology? The issue is that development of immature technology is fairly unpre-
dictable in terms of cost, schedule, and efficacy. When a program contains multiple
immature technologies, it tends to delay the program and add cost. If technology
development is done in concurrence with system development, the problem can be
exacerbated because unforeseen outcomes can lead to significant rework. The net
result is that, on average, programs with immature technologies will take longer and
cost more. Consequently, warfighters must make due with obsolete equipment longer
and, thus, increasing the chances that they will engage in combat operations with
less capability than they could have had otherwise.
As a result, it would seem that a superior approach would be to reduce cycle time
by setting more modest goals for each deployed increment of capability. This is what
the GAO refers to as an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary acquisition process,
and there are several ways to achieve such a process. First, one can make use of open-
architecture design and spiral development. The idea behind spiral development is
that the system can be deployed with an initial mature technology, which can then
be upgraded over time [43]. This approach can work well for technologies that are
loosely coupled to the system design. In other words, there is a clear, well-defined
interface such that changes in the implementation of the subsystem or technology to
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be upgraded do not interfere with the rest of the system. Open architecture design
is perfect for a technology such as a software algorithm. Assuming that the software
interface has been standardized, it is comparatively straightforward to replace an old
software component with a new one. This approach, in fact, has been demonstrated
successfully on submarine acoustic systems [7].
When technologies or subsystems are tightly coupled to the overall system, how-
ever, any changes to the design of the subsystem will impact the design of the whole
system [12, 24]. Thus, spiral development is not always a feasible alternative. An
extreme example would be the hull-form of a surface combatant. If some critical
issues were to arise with the hull design, it is likely that a significant portion of the
ship would have to be redesigned. Of course, hull form is a rather obvious case, but
there are many mission critical systems in any modern military system that exhibit
varying degrees of interaction with the rest of the system design. Since changes to
these systems would require substantial rework, it is imperative that they be mature
prior to system integration, hence the appeal of evolutionary acquisition.
Under evolutionary acquisition, system acquisition cycles are more rapid and make
use of mature, available technology. The development of new technologies is detached
from the acquisition process, so that the fate of a program does not hinge on the suc-
cess or failure of any one risky technology. The evolutionary approach is enforced via
a knowledge based acquisition process. The program contains a number of evalua-
tion points or milestones. At each milestone the program must demonstrate that it
has met certain developmental requirements in order to proceed to the next phase.
For example, Milestone A entails requirements such as an Initial Capabilities Doc-
ument, an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), a Systems Engineering Plan (SEP), and
Technology Readiness Assessment.
Despite the fact that the DoD acknowledges evolutionary and knowledge-based
acquisition as best practices and has committed them to policy, recent GAO reports
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have indicated that most major acquisition programs do not follow these polices
[32–34]. Consequently, these major acquisition programs have continued to experience
significant cost overruns and major delays. In particular, these reports have indicated
that most major acquisition programs are revolutionary rather than evolutionary, and
they are permitted to bypass major milestone requirements. Most rely on multiple
immature technologies that are not fully developed before overall system development
begins. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has acknowledged that this is
a common practice [33].
One example in particular that makes the consequences of this acquisition ap-
proach clear is the case of WIN-T and JNN-N. The Warfighter Information Network-
Tactical (WIN-T) is the next generation tactical communications network for the US
Army and will provide a major leap forward in battlefield communications. However,
when the program moved into the system development phase, 9 of the system’s 12
critical technologies were immature [34]. As a result, WIN-T has been unavailable
for both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Because it was
determined that there was an urgent need for better battlefield communications to
support these two operations, the Joint Network Node-Network (JNN-N) program
was created. To address this urgent need, the JNN-N program bypassed many of the
normal acquisition procedures to accelerate fielding of the system. While this may
be understandable given the urgency of the situation, acquisition procedures are in
place to ensure that acquired systems function properly and are cost effective. As the
GAO points out,
When the Army opted to pursue large technology advances in network-
ing capabilities to support the future forces through WIN-T, rather than
pursuing a more incremental approach, it accepted a gap in providing tac-
tical networking capabilities to the warfighter . . . If the Army had followed
23
DOD’s acquisition policy preferences, which emphasize achieving capabil-
ities in increments based on mature technologies to get capabilities into
the hands of the user more quickly, it might have been able to get needed
communications capabilities to the warfighter sooner. [34]
Thus, a more evolutionary approach to acquisition may have reduced the risks to the
warfighter by avoiding capability gaps as well as mitigating the need for emergency
programs that bypass the usual acquisition procedures.
To summarize, the Department of Defense claims to favor evolutionary acquisition,
but does not follow through in practice. The GAO asserts that there are a number
of causes, one of which is the lack of mandatory controls on the milestone process
[30,32–34]. But if evolutionary acquisition is superior, why would the DoD not follow
its tenets even without the mandatory controls? Or to put it more broadly, why does
the DoD appear to be working against its own best interests?
2.2 Modeling Approach
To address the questions at hand, we must reduce an acquisition program to its most
basic and essential features. The objective here is not to produce a predictive model,
but instead to better understand the underlying forces that drive the behavior of
participants in the acquisition system. To that end, this analysis is predicated on
three assumptions about the defense acquisition system.
1. Acquisition programs are dependent upon the development of multiple critical
technologies.
2. There are multiple parties that have differing interests with regard to the out-
come of an acquisition program.
3. The requirements process for acquisition programs is negotiable, or at least open
to influence from the aforementioned parties.
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Anyone familiar with the defense acquisition system will likely find these assump-
tions apt. The underlying hypothesis of this chapter is that because acquisition
programs are government programs, they are subject to the influence of multiple
groups of stakeholders. These stakeholders may have different demands for the ca-
pabilities provided by an acquired system. This influences the technology policy of
the acquisition program and, consequently, the cost and duration of the program.
When the requirements process is not tightly regulated, competing demands from
stakeholders will lead to an overly aggressive technology policy that results in longer
acquisition programs and lower fielded system performance over the long-run. Es-
sentially, this a tragedy of the commons where the acquisition program serves as the
common resource.
To investigate this hypothesis, we must develop a model of an acquisition program,
and if we wish to find the basic underlying forces that drive acquisition technology
policy, we must reduce an acquisition program to its most essential features. In that
vein, several simplifying assumptions are required.
First, it is assumed that each acquisition program consists of two phases: a tech-
nology development phase and an integration phase. In the technology development
phase, critical technologies are matured to the point that they can be utilized in the
final system. Once this phase is complete, system integration can move forward. It
is further assumed that each critical technology can be developed in parallel, but all
must be complete before system integration can begin. This is an admitted simpli-
fication that works both for and against the acquisition program. The assumption
of parallel technology development is somewhat optimistic as the outcome of each
critical technology may be somewhat interdependent. The assumption that all devel-
opment must be completed is somewhat pessimistic because some integration work
can be done based on the estimated outcome of technology development. However,
in should be noted that since unanticipated outcomes in the technology development
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phase can lead to substantial rework in the integration phase, too much concurrency
can undermine any time savings. Ultimately, there is a limit to how much time can
be saved through phase concurrency. Thus, if we were to weaken the no concurrency
assumption, it would serve to somewhat dampen the impact of development risk, but
it would not materially change the results of this analysis.
Given these assumptions we can structure each acquisition program as shown in
Figure 2.1. The purpose of each acquisition program is to improve upon a set of
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual model of a defense acquisition program.
capabilities provided by one or more existing systems. While this model treats ca-
pabilities in an abstract sense, notionally one could consider performance in areas
such as target detection, survivability, and lethality as examples of capabilities pro-
vided by a deployed system. So the presumption is that a successfully completed
acquisition program would improve upon what is currently provided. To account for
performance improvements, the metric of interest will be the percent improvement of
each capability an acquired system provides over what is currently fielded.
It is assumed that each technology development activity is independent, and there
is a one-to-one mapping between technology development activities and the set of
capabilities provided by an acquired system. (It is assumed that if multiple develop-
ment activities are required to achieve a particular capability, these are consolidated
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into a single activity.) With this linkage established, it is clear that the technolo-
gies selected will have an impact on the level of capability improvement achieved.
Presumably, larger improvements in capability require more immature technologies.
Unfortunately, immature technologies typically take longer to develop and entail more
risk. Thus, the technology development activities are inherently stochastic.
We can model the time to complete an acquisition program as
P = max(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) + I (2.1)
where P is the time to complete the acquisition program, Xi is the time to complete
technology development activity i, and I is the time required for the integration phase.
Since technology development is stochastic, each Xi is a random variable governed by
a non-negative distribution function. From Equation (2.1) it is immediately apparent
that the maximization of several random variables will drive the behavior of this
model. Any stochastic behavior of I will not materially affect the results of this
analysis. So, for simplicity, it is assumed that I is deterministic.
The next crucial feature of the model is the linkage between the distribution of
each Xi and the maturity of the technology selected. Keeping in line with the previous
discussion, it is assumed that there is a relationship between the percent increase in
capability provided by the system to be acquired and the time required to develop the
requisite technologies. In particular, for this analysis, the desired level of capability
improvement is always achieved, but the time required is uncertain. More specifically,
it is assumed that the expected time to complete a development activity increases
as the required capability improvement increases. Furthermore, it is assumed that it
requires zero time to achieve zero improvement.
But there is really more to this relationship. It is certainly not linear. In fact, one
would expect a diminishing return to scale. In other words, there is some benefit to
developing technologies in steps since one learns from each step. Similarly, we would
also expect there to be less risk with a smaller step. Thus, there is a price to pay for
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attempting one large leap in capability all at once. Graphically, we would expect a
relationship such as that depicted in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Notional relationship between the targeted percent increase in capability
versus the expected time to develop the required technology.
Of course, when a program involves the development of multiple technologies to
improve multiple capabilities, the expected duration of the program will depend on
the distribution of the maximum of all development efforts. Because of this interaction
effect, one must consider the level of improvement desired for each provided capability.
Thus, a technology policy for an acquisition program consists of the targeted level of
improvement for each of the capabilities to be provided by the acquired system.
Unfortunately, considering one acquisition program in isolation is not particularly
useful. Instead, it is the long-term performance of a technology policy that is of inter-
est. There is some notion that there is an optimal target for capability improvement.
Too low, and we loose too much time due to the overhead inherent in an acquisition
program. Too high, and time is wasted chasing overly difficult or technically infeasible
approaches to improving capability. This behavior is only realized, however, when
we consider the compounding effects of a sequence of programs. To that end, it is
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assumed that as one acquisition program completes, another is begun immediately to
provide the next upgrade in capability. This yields a stair-step capability trajectory
as depicted in Figure 2.3.
Deployed Capability Trajectory
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
0 10 20 30 40 50
Time (years)
C
a p
a b
i l i
t y
Figure 2.3: Sample capability trajectory.
To measure the performance of a particular technology policy, say a capability im-
provement of 10% for each acquisition cycle, we consider the long-run effective annual
capability growth rate. To better understand this metric, consider the accumulation
of interest in a bank account. For example, assume that a bank account pays 1.25%
interest every quarter. With the compounding effect, that is equivalent to receiving
5.1% annually. The effective capability growth rate is analogous. It translates the se-
quence of discrete improvements in capability provided by acquisition programs into
an equivalent annual rate of growth. Since the outcome of the programs is stochastic,
however, we are concerned with the long-run behavior of this metric.
There is one final point to note regarding this modeling approach. That is that the
compounding effect of repeated technology development efforts implies a perpetual
exponential increase in the level of capability provided by acquired systems (Some-
thing akin to Moore’s law for microchips). This is admittedly an assumption but, a
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reasonable one. While particular technologies certainly reach points of diminishing
returns, a particular capability may be provided by a variety of technologies. For
example, when aircraft speeds became limited by piston engine technology, switch-
ing to jet propulsion allowed speeds to continue to rise. Of course, no capability
can continue to improve indefinitely, but for the time horizons that most decision
makers in government would consider, the assumption of compounded growth is not
unreasonable.
That being said, in the following section we will translate the conceptual model
described above into a mathematical model. That will allow us to better understand
what factors influence technology policies in defense acquisition.
2.3 Analysis
In order to construct our model, we must first define some notation. The most basic
description of the model was expressed in Equation 2.1, except now we recognize that
program duration is dependent upon the number of technologies and the technology
policy. To that end, we define the following:
Xi is the duration of development for capability i.
gi ≥ 0 is the targeted percent increase in capability i.
n is the number of capabilities provided by the system to be acquired.
XM = max(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) is the duration of the technology development phase
where each Xi is independent.
P = XM + I where I is an exogenous integration time, and P is the total program
time.
Xi ∼ Fi(x; gi) where Fi(x; gi) is a non-negative, continuous, and differentiable prob-
ability distribution function and gi is a parameter.
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It is a well known result that the distribution of the maximum of several indepen-
dent random variables is the product of the respective distribution functions.
XM ∼ F1(x)F2(x) · · ·Fn(x)
Thus, we can readily describe the distribution of program duration, P . To capture the
behavior of technology development activities with regard to the selected technology
policy, we define the following:
Let g be the vector of the n capability targets, gi.
Let Y (g, n) = E[P ] = E[XM ] + I be the expected duration of the program.
Let Wi(gi) = E[Xi] be the expected time to develop capability i.
We must also make some assumptions about the behavior of Wi(gi), and how
it relates to the distribution of Xi. First, we assume Wi(0) = 0, W
′
i (gi) > 0, and
W ′′i (gi) ≥ 0 for gi ≥ 0. These assumptions assure that it takes zero time to do
nothing, that the expected activity duration strictly increases as a larger leap in
capability is attempted, and that the expected duration increases at increasing rate.
All of these assumptions are consistent with the discussion in Section 2.2.
Second, we must define how changing g affects Fi(x; g). This is accomplished by
utilizing an affine transformation on the random variable. If we have a particular
non-negative random variable, X, its expectation can be altered through the affine
transformation Y = aX + b. A nonzero value for b essentially translates the distri-
bution of X but does not change the spread. As mentioned previously, however, we
would expect the risk to increase with g, so a pure translation would not be appropri-
ate for this analysis. If a is not equal to one, then the distribution will be stretched
asymmetrically. Thus, both the expected value and the spread of the distribution will
change. For this analysis, it is assumed that b = 0 to both simplify the analysis and
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leave open the possibility that a technological breakthrough, though unlikely, would
allow development to proceed quickly even for an aggressive capability goal.
Returning to our model, if we know the distribution of Xi for some particular
value of g, say g′ , we can determine the distribution of Xi for every other value
of g. Let us define the random variable D such that D = Xi when g = g
′. Thus,
Xi = a(g)D where the affine transformation is a function of g. If we define g
′ such
that Wi(g
′) = 1, then we know that E[D] = 1, and consequently, a(g) = Wi(g).
Thus, our affine transformation becomes Xi = Wi(g)D and has the requisite property
E[Xi] = Wi(gi). In this manner we can relate the change in g to the change in the
distribution of a technology development activity. While this approach to defining the
relationship between the distribution of Xi and g may seem arbitrary, it is equivalent
to changing the λ parameter for an exponential distribution or the µ parameter for a
lognormal distribution. Thus, it is merely a generalization of the impact of changing
the parameters for several common distributions and avoids tying the results of the
analysis to any one distribution type.
As stated previously, the objective of this analysis is to find the long-run effective
annual capability growth rate for a given technology policy. The technology policy is
determined by selecting a targeted percent increase in each capability over the next
acquisition cycle. Since each acquired platform may provide more than one capability,
outcomes of the realized capabilities are interdependent.
In this model, acquisition programs occur in sequence with uncertain durations.
This constitutes a renewal process where P is the inter-arrival time and N(t) is the
number or arrivals (i.e., completed programs) at time t. In this framework, the
effective annual growth for a given capability is
(1 + gi)
N(t)
t − 1.
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Note that N(t)
t
is the annual arrival rate (assuming t is in years). Of course, we are
interested in the long-run, so by the strong law of the renewal process,
N(t)
t
→ 1
E[P ]
as t→∞.
Therefore, the long-run effective annual capability growth rate is
(1 + gi)
1
E[P ] − 1.
Let V (g, n) = 1
E[P ]
where g is the vector of technology policies. Then the optimal
policy is
max
g
(1 + g1)
V (g,n) − 1, (1 + g2)V (g,n) − 1, . . . , (1 + gn)V (g,n) − 1.
Thus, we are faced with a multi-objective optimization problem. If we assume that
all technologies are symmetric (i.e., W1(g1) = W2(g2) = · · · = Wn(gn) = W (g) and
F1(x) = F2(x) = · · · = Fn(x) = F (x)), then we can make some general statements
regarding the relationship between the long-run effective annual capability growth
rate and the behavior of acquisition stakeholders. These are captured in the following
theorems with the proofs provided in Appendix A.
First, let us consider the optimal technology policy when we assume that there is
central control of the technology policy. We would like to know the behavior of the
optimal symmetric technology policy with regard to the number of capabilities, n,
provided by the system to be acquired.
Theorem 2.1 (Performance Decreases with Multi-mission Platforms). Given the
above assumptions and assuming symmetric technologies, there exists a single opti-
mal symmetric technology policy, g∗ ≥ 0, that decreases as the number of system
capabilities, n, increases. Consequently, the effective capability growth rate declines
as well.
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What this tells us is that there is an optimal technology policy that maximizes the
growth in capability over time. However, there is a price to be paid for acquiring multi-
mission platforms. The more technology development activities required, the greater
the probability that one or more will delay the acquisition program. Consequently,
all else being equal, the expected duration of the acquisition program increases. To
compensate, the optimal target for each capability must be decreased versus a system
that provides only a single capability. This is not to suggest that there are not
other benefits to multi-mission or multi-capability platforms. It just means that
some performance will have to be sacrificed to achieve the benefits of a multi-mission
platform be it cost savings or otherwise.
Immediately following from Theorem 2.1 is a corollary regarding the impact of
the integration time, I.
Corollary 2.1. As I increases, g∗ increases and the long-run effective annual growth
rate decreases.
Essentially, the presence of overhead in the form of system integration time di-
minishes the benefit of faster cycles. As this overhead increases, a greater leap in
capability is required to compensate for the delay. This suggests that for very com-
plex systems that require extensive integration time, it may, in fact, be preferable to
set higher capability targets than for simpler systems.
Next, we reach the key finding. When there are independent stakeholders that
have influence over the program requirements, a tragedy of the commons occurs.
Defense acquisition programs, as with any public program, typically serve a number
of stakeholders. Each of these stakeholders may have different objectives and, hence,
different requirements for the acquisition program. The acquisition program serves as
a common resource for stakeholders to achieve their individual objectives. Since there
is essentially no cost to the stakeholder (the program is funded with public money),
they are incentivized to demand more aggressive capability targets than is optimal.
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This is stated more precisely in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 (Acquisition as a Tragedy of the Commons). Assuming that the tech-
nologies are symmetric and each capability is supported by an independent group of
stakeholders, the open loop equilibrium results in a technology policy that is more ag-
gressive than the optimal policy (i.e., g > g∗), and consequently, the long-run effective
annual capability growth rate is less than optimal.
Since this is the key result of this chapter, it merits some additional discussion.
First, consider the stakeholders. Who are they? The most obvious are the warfighters
themselves, but they also may be defense contractors, members of Congress, or even
participants in the acquisition programs themselves. The key is that program re-
quirements are in some sense negotiable and open to influence as each party attempts
to maximize its own objectives. For example, different groups of warfighters may
push for more advanced capabilities that benefit themselves more than others. For
instance, if we consider a multi-mission surface combatant, the Marines may desire
an improved shore bombardment capability while the Navy may desire an improved
fleet air defense capability. Or perhaps a Congressman may push for a particular
advanced technology because it will mean additional long-term employment in his
district. Regardless, the effect is the same.
We can study the behavior of non-cooperating parties using game theory. Theorem
2.2 essentially states that Nash equilibrium of the technology policy is not the same
as the optimal technology policy. This means the optimal solution is unstable even
assuming stakeholders agree to cooperate. We can imagine it this way. Let us assume
that for a particular program all of the stakeholders agree to the optimal technology
policy. But if everyone follows the optimal policy, then it is in the best interest of
any one stakeholder to deviate from the policy. That stakeholder would be better off
to push for a little more capability while everyone else follows the cooperative policy.
Of course, if one deviates, then it is in the best interest of the others to deviate as
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well. Very quickly we end up at the Nash equilibrium.
For example, let us assume that we are acquiring a surface combatant that provides
capabilities for both anti-air and subsurface warfare. Those requiring the anti-air
mission may push for additional capability, say a more advanced radar system. But
opting for the more advanced radar system will likely mean a longer development time.
This means that those requiring the subsurface warfare capability must wait longer
than anticipated. If they must wait, they might as well demand a more advanced
sonar. Of course, the interaction effect between the two technology development
efforts means that the program will likely be even longer now causing both parties
to desire even more advanced technology to compensate for the delay. Eventually, a
stable point is reached where the cost of the delay outweighs the gain from additional
capability.
This situation is quite familiar in defense acquisition. As the expected length of
an acquisition program increases, more capability is demanded to compensate for the
delay. In other words, the new system had better be worth waiting for. But really, the
most important finding of this analysis arises when we consider Theorems 2.1 and 2.2
together. That is given the characteristics of the technologies involved, the complexity
of system integration, and the structure of the program, there is an optimal technology
policy, and it may not always be the modest policy that evolutionary acquisition would
recommend. However, when there are multiple stakeholders with different objectives,
the technology policy pursued will likely be more aggressive than optimal. Thus, we
see worse performance over the long-run than we would otherwise expect. Better
performance could be achieved if all stakeholders cooperated, and each sacrificed a
small amount of capability to speed the completion of the program. This is unlikely,
however, because there is always an incentive to deviate.
There is one final feature of the model that is of interest. The following theorem
deals with the impact of additional capabilities on the gap between the cooperative
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and competitive technology policies.
Theorem 2.3 (Multimission Platforms Exacerbate the Competition Effect). As the
number of capabilities with independent stakeholders, n, increases, the gap between
the optimal and competitive policies increases.
What we find is that as the number of capabilities, n, increases, the optimal
solution is to sacrifice a little more capability to achieve better performance over
time. However, the opposite is true for the competitive policy. When stakeholders
do not cooperate, the technology policy becomes more and more aggressive because
the interaction effect is exacerbated, and all participants are increasingly worse off.
2.4 Numerical Example
To illustrate the implications of the mathematical model more concretely, a notional
example will be presented. First, we will assume that the expected duration of an
individual technology development activity, W (g), is governed by an exponential
function. In particular, we assume
W (g) = e2g − 1.
This function is depicted in Figure 2.4 as the n = 1 curve. We will also assume
that the duration of each individual technology development activity is exponentially
distributed. The exponential distribution is convenient because the distribution of the
maximum of n independent and identically distributed random variables can be found
analytically. However, the analysis would work just as well with another non-negative
distribution such as lognormal or beta. Figure 2.4 depicts the expected duration of
the technology development phase versus the number of capabilities provided by the
system, n.
We see that curves increase with n but appear to be converging to a limiting case.
This is, in fact, what is happening since extreme value theory tells us the distribution
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Figure 2.4: Expected duration of the technology development phase versus the
number of capabilities, n.
of the maximum of n normalized i.i.d. random variables converges to one of three
distribution types as n → ∞. So we see that as n increases we would, all else being
equal, expect to see the duration of our acquisition programs increase.
Given this structure for the expected duration of the technology development
phase, what is the outcome for any given technology policy, g? To determine the
relationship between the technology policy and n, we must specify an integration
time. In this example we will assume that integration time, I, is three years. When
we do so we obtain Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 reveals that the long-term effective growth rate is unimodal as was
implied by Theorem 2.1. Thus, there is a single optimal policy, g∗, for each value of
n. We also see that the effective growth rate decreases as n increases and that mode
shifts to the left. This is also consistent with Theorem 2.1.
Now we would like to compare the optimal policy to the competitive policy (i.e.,
the Nash equilibrium). This comparison is presented in Figure 2.6. Here we see that
when n > 1 there is a gap between the optimal policy and the competitive policy,
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Figure 2.5: The long-term effective annual capability growth rate versus the number
of capabilities, n.
hence the tragedy of the commons. We also see that as n increases the optimal policy
decreases slightly, but the competitive policy increases rapidly. Thus, we see the gap
widens as n increases. This example clearly illustrates how the technology policy
becomes more aggressive when stakeholders do not cooperate.
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Figure 2.6: The optimal technology policy, g∗, and the competitive technology
policy versus the number of capabilities, n.
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We can also consider the corresponding long-run effective capability growth rates.
These are depicted in Figure 2.7. In this figure we see that capability growth for the
optimal policy declines modestly as n increases, but that it rapidly approaches zero
for the competitive policy. Thus, we see that the penalty for a lack of stakeholder
cooperation can be quite severe.
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Figure 2.7: The optimal effective growth rate and the competitive effective growth
rate versus the number of capabilities, n.
What is the impact of the integration time? To find out, we fix the number of
capabilities at n = 3, and then vary I. Figure 2.8 displays the relationship between
the technology policy and I. We see that as I increases, the technology policy for
both the optimal and competitive cases increases, but at a diminishing rate. More
interesting is the impact on the effective growth rate. If we examine Figure 2.9, we
see that as I increases the effective growth rate also decreases for both, but much
faster for the optimal case. In fact, the two appear to be converging as the impact of
the integration time begins to dominate.
The above examples provide us some sense of the behavior of acquisition pro-
grams with respect to the number of capabilities provided and the time required for
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Figure 2.8: Sensitivity of the technology policy to the integration time.
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Figure 2.9: Sensitivity of the effective annual growth rate to the integration time.
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integration. More importantly, however, it demonstrates the impact of competitive
behavior on the performance of the acquisition system. Of course, all of the above
results focus on the long-term performance. What might also be of interest to policy
makers is the impact of competitive behavior over the short-term and the level of risk
associated with program performance.
To capture short-term behavior we require another metric. We will consider the
level of deployed capability, C(t), at a given time, t. Since this is a stochastic quantity
we will consider both its expected value and its variance. Unfortunately, C(t) is
difficult to describe analytically even when the underlying activity distributions are
exponential, but Monte Carlo simulation can be used to estimate both E[C(t)] and
Var(C(t)).
The first question we would like to consider is how different technology policies
affect the uncertainty in the level of capability deployed. Figure 2.10 depicts the
expected level of capability deployed in year 20 when the integration time is three
years, I = 3, and the system provides three capabilities, n = 3. The dashed lines
constitute one standard deviation above and below the expected value. Note that
the level of deployed capability is unimodal with respect to g and that the peak
corresponds with the optimal policy found in the long-run analysis above. Also, note
that the the level of uncertainty increases with g, though at a diminishing rate. In
other words, as the technology policy becomes more aggressive, the uncertainty in
the level of capability actually delivered increases.
If we take a closer look at the standard deviation in Figure 2.11, we see that, ac-
tually, the standard deviation does not strictly increase. In fact, it actually decreases
after a certain point. This is quite reasonable because as g increases eventually it
becomes unlikely that any programs will be completed within 20 years. Thus, the
uncertainty must decrease. It is important to note, however, that if a decision maker
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Figure 2.10: The level of deployed capability after 20 years when I = 3 and n = 3.
The solid line is the expected value and the dashed lines are one standard deviation
from the mean.
wanted to trade expected capability for reduced risk, he would likely choose a tech-
nology policy that is less aggressive than the optimal policy. Most of the policies
above the optimum are dominated, and thus, it would appear that the competitive
policy is also dominated.
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Figure 2.11: The standard deviation of deployed capability after 20 years when
I = 3 and n = 3 versus the selected technology policy, g.
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One feature of the model worthy of mention is that uncertainty actually decreases
as the number of capabilities, n, increases. This is illustrated in Figure 2.12 and is
not unexpected. This is a well known result in extreme value theory. As n → ∞,
the probability that at least one technology development activity takes the maximum
possible amount of time approaches one. Thus, as the number of system capabilities
increases, uncertainty decreases in that the acquisition program will undoubtedly take
a very long time.
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Figure 2.12: The standard deviation of deployed capability after 20 years when
I = 3 and g = 0.5 versus the number of system capabilities, n.
The above results would seem to suggest that even in the transient case, the long-
run optimal policy outperforms the competitive policy. This is confirmed by Figure
2.13 which shows that from beginning to end, the optimal policy outperforms the
competitive policy in terms of the expected deployed level of capability.
We can link this short-term analysis to the previous long-term analysis by calcu-
lating the effective annual capability growth rate versus time. We find that when we
do so, as t increases, its expectation approaches the value predicted in the long-run
analysis quite quickly (Figure 2.14). In fact, the standard deviation of the effective
annual capability growth rate decreases with time, so it appears to be quite reasonable
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Figure 2.13: The expected deployed capability versus time when I = 3, n = 3, and
g = 0.5.
to use the long-range results as a basis for analyzing policy implications.
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Figure 2.14: A comparison of the effective annual capability growth rate between
the short-run and the long-run when I = 3 and n = 3.
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This example has revealed that when stakeholders in the defense acquisition sys-
tem pursue independent agendas, there can be a potentially substantial negative im-
pact on the level of capability actually deployed to the field. Of course, this analysis is
fairly abstract and based on assumed parameter values and probability distributions,
and thus, we should not take the numbers literally. However, Section 2.3 revealed
that the results are fairly general and do not depend on the particular distribution
assumed. Consequently, what we can draw from this example is that the structure of
acquisition programs incentivizes participants in the acquisition system to behave in
a manner that causes the system to underperform, and this problem is exacerbated
as the number of capabilities provided by a system increases.
2.5 Policy Implications
What we can conclude from this analysis is that, from a performance standpoint, ev-
ery acquisition program has some optimal technology policy that is dependent upon
the nature of the system and technologies involved. Unfortunately, the implementa-
tion of this optimal acquisition strategy is not trivial. The DoD’s increased emphasis
on multi-mission or multi-capability platforms may lead to operational cost savings
and increased flexibility, but it creates a tension between the competing missions and
capabilities. A multi-mission platform means that some capability must be sacrificed
relative to a specialized system in order to deliver the system in a reasonable time
frame and maintain the optimal acquisition strategy. The result is that the optimal
strategy requires an unstable technology policy that incentivizes stakeholders to de-
viate from that policy. Thus, there is a tendency in the Department of Defense to
pursue an overly aggressive technology policy.
The multi-mission problem has certainly been noted before. In fact, a recent
RAND study analyzing cost growth in US Navy ships suggested acquiring smaller
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mission-focused ships over large multi-mission ships as a strategy for restraining re-
quirements growth [1]. Instead, the contribution of this work is understanding why
a multi-mission system leads to excessive capability goals, and understanding this
“why” is important to creating a rational acquisition policy. The problem is not
intrinsic to multi-mission platforms, but rather, sub-optimal performance is a result
of the rational behavior of participants within the acquisition system. Evolutionary
acquisition polices were instituted to address this problem. However, compliance is
largely voluntary.
In as much as the optimal policy tends to be more moderate than the stable policy,
we can say that the former is more evolutionary while the latter is more revolution-
ary. The implication is that while evolutionary acquisition is more appealing from a
performance standpoint, revolutionary acquisition is the more natural outcome. This
means that the Department of Defense cannot expect programs to voluntarily comply
with evolutionary acquisition procedures since the nature of the system pressures pro-
grams towards revolutionary leaps in technology. Consequently, if the DoD is serious
about evolutionary acquisition, technology maturity requirements must be strictly
enforced.
More broadly, however, the results presented in this chapter support the assertion,
at least regarding evolutionary policy, that the participants in the defense acquisition
system are disincentivized to implement or follow acquisition reforms. In the example
presented here, the DoD established a process to comply with reforms suggested by
the GAO and others, and then proceeded to ignore them in practice despite agreeing
in principle. The tragedy of the commons presented here explains, in part, why this
apparently contradictory behavior occurs, and opens the door to remediation of such
phenomena.
Unfortunately, countering such a tragedy of commons is non-trivial in a govern-
ment context. While private firms may overcome similar situations through the use
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of monetary incentives, such a solution seems less plausible for the defense acquisition
system. It is unlikely that monetary incentives would be legal or even effective. Often
stakeholders in defense have strong beliefs regarding the import of desired systems
and capabilities [41]. They are not likely to be swayed by material compensation.
It may be that strict regulation and oversight is the only solution to countering the
tendency to defy acquisition reform.
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CHAPTER III
A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF THE COST AND
PERFORMANCE IMPACT OF ACQUISITION
TECHNOLOGY POLICY
Over the past several years, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has been
attempting to transform itself from an organization designed to meet the Cold War
threat of the Soviet Union to a more flexible, adaptable organization that is ready to
meet the regional and asymmetric threats the US expects to face in the coming years.
To facilitate this transformation, several modifications have been made to the defense
acquisition system, the most important being the shift to evolutionary acquisition.
Evolutionary acquisition is an attempt to address one of the most common criti-
cisms of the defense acquisition system. As has been discussed in previous chapters,
traditional acquisition programs attempt large, revolutionary leaps in system capa-
bility through the use of immature and risky technology. Not only does immature
technology often require more time and money to develop, but it also introduces
uncertainty that may lead to significant delays and cost overruns. Consequently,
warfighters must often make due with increasingly obsolete equipment during the
long intervals between new system deployments, and there is little flexibility to adapt
to emerging threats and exploit technology opportunities.
Evolutionary acquisition, on the other hand, attempts to set more modest capa-
bility goals for each acquisition. The idea is to use more mature, and hence, less risky
technology, in order shorten acquisition cycle times. Thus, each acquisition cycle
under evolutionary acquisition should be shorter and cost less that more traditional
programs. As a result, warfighters should receive more frequent upgrades to their
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equipment and, thus, should be at less risk of going to war with obsolete hardware.
Despite the apparent motivation to implement evolutionary acquisition and com-
mitting the approach to policy, it would seem that the DoD has had limited success
in doing so [47]. In fact, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has sug-
gested that DoD reforms have not gone far enough [30, 31, 33, 36]. They advocate
adapting commercial best practices regarding technology and product development
to the defense acquisition system. Among these are a centralized portfolio approach to
managing new systems and technologies, a staged knowledge-based approach to both
acquisition and technology development, strict enforcement of technology maturity
requirements, and a more evolutionary approach to new system development.
Since these reforms are derived from the commercial world, the obvious question
is whether they will translate well to a government context. The defense acquisition
system differs from a commercial product development process in several respects.
In particular, the government essentially serves as a technology developer, system
developer, customer, and user. Furthermore, the DoD along with a few allies are
really the only customers for the systems and technologies developed within the de-
fense acquisition system. Thus, there is a more limited capacity to purchase multiple
evolutionary iterations of a system than there would be with a consumer product.
Consequently, the pertinent question is, if evolutionary acquisition were fully imple-
mented, would there be any tangible benefit for the Department of Defense? As was
asserted in Chapter 1, it appears that policy makers at the DoD and elsewhere often
do not fully understand the trade-offs inherent in altering a system as complex as the
defense acquisition system.
As a first step to better understanding the system level trade-offs of technology
policy on acquisition, the work presented in this chapter attempts to model the basic
“physics” of the acquisition system, in particular the relationship between the R&D
process and the acquisition life-cycle. The purpose is to gain insight into the most
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fundamental system-level influences on the efficacy of acquisition policies. To that
end, an idealized view of the acquisition system is adopted to which complicating
factors may be subsequently added to test their effects. The acquisition model was
implemented as a discrete event simulation with the key decision variable being the
maturity level at which a technology moves from R&D to an acquisition effort. Ex-
tensive sensitivity analyses were performed and several insights into the impact of
technology policy on acquisition were generated. The most important output of this
effort, however, is an informed set of future research directions that will facilitate
more definitive answers to major policy questions regarding evolutionary acquisition.
3.1 Background
As was mentioned previously, evolutionary acquisition is an attempt to reduce ac-
quisition cycle times by setting capability goals that are more modest than is typical
of a traditional program. This allows programs to utilize more mature technology
and, hence, reduce the amount of technology risk. In theory, this should reduce cost,
schedule, and performance uncertainty. The hope is that it will lead to less expensive
acquisition programs that proceed more quickly. Consequently, warfighters would
receive up to date equipment more frequently and at lower cost.
Evolutionary acquisition was instituted at the US Department of Defense in 2003
following a revision of DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD Instruction 5000.2 [18, 19].
In particular, the Defense Acquisition Guidebook indicates the evolutionary acquisi-
tion is the preferred acquisition approach [20]. According to DODI 5000.2, Section
3.3 [19], there are two ways to implement evolutionary acquisition, incremental and
spiral development. Essentially, one large acquisition program is created, but broken
into smaller pieces. Each of these pieces effectively functions as a small acquisition
program. Under incremental development, the sub-programs are pre-planned. There
is a target set of capabilities that the final system should provide, but it is achieved
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through a series of phased deployments, each more capable than the last. Under spiral
development, however, the phased deployments are undefined. Instead, as each spiral
is deployed, feedback is collected from the users and used to shape the capability
goals of the next spiral.
Since spiral development is nominally the preferred approach for implementing
evolutionary acquisition, several studies have been conducted on its efficacy. The
defining characteristic of spiral development in defense acquisition is concurrency. The
spirals overlap, yet are interdependent. The result, according to Dillard and Ford, is
that the first delivery of capability is achieved more quickly than under a traditional
program, but the overlapping spirals may lead to a substantial amount of rework and
backlogs that results in a slower delivery of objective capabilities [16]. Furthermore, a
RAND study of the implementation of evolutionary acquisition programs found that
spiral development introduces significant management difficulties and that the user
feedback process often resulted in confused and contradictory requirements for future
spirals [47]. As a result, many programs that started out using spiral development
ended up reverting to incremental development.
Regardless of the approach taken, the motivating issue behind evolutionary acqui-
sition is cycle time. In theory, shorter cycles mean that each is less expense and new
technologies can be moved into the field faster to meet emerging warfighter needs.
The driving issue, then, is really how big of a leap in capability should one attempt
during each acquisition cycle? Of course, the risk associated with the size of the leap
is linked to the maturity of the required technology. Thus, evolutionary acquisition
is really all about technology policy because with a large enough leap, evolutionary
becomes revolutionary.
So where does the DoD’s approach to evolutionary acquisition come in? A key
issue is that the DoD does not manage technology or “product” portfolios in same
manner as a large commercial enterprise. In part, this is due the public nature of the
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defense enterprise. Even so, the GAO asserts that the DoD should adopt additional
commercial best practices regarding the centralized management of its acquisition
and technology portfolios and the management of technology transitions from R&D
to acquisition programs [31, 36]. Under the current system, there is often a funding
gap in technology development. Early stage technologies are funded through the R&D
system (or S&T as it is known in DoD) and late stage technologies are often funded
in support of a particular acquisition effort. It is technologies in the middle stages of
maturation that are often left without obvious ownership and hence funding. Conse-
quently, if certain technologies are required by an acquisition effort, their development
through the middle stages must be funded in support of the development of a particu-
lar system. This requires early commitment to a technology when its final realization
is still uncertain. In the past, this has often led to disappointment as technologies
took longer to develop and did not perform as well as expected. Theoretically, if the
DoD adopted the commercial new product model that the GAO suggests [31, 36], it
would allow the DoD greater flexibility in how to select and mature technologies for
development in anticipation of future acquisition program needs. This would reduce
the burden and risks of technology development on acquisition programs since they
could choose from a portfolio of mature technologies.
So in the end, the two fundamental questions of evolutionary acquisition are how
mature should technologies be when they are transitioned from R&D to acquisition
efforts, and what is the best approach to mature them? All else being equal, this
essentially determines the acquisition cycle time as well as the size of the capability
improvement for each cycle. Ultimately, the answer will hinge on factors such as
the cost of technology maturation, the rate of learning from fielded systems, and the
overhead cost associated with an acquisition cycle.
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3.2 Model Setup
The motivation behind the structure of the model is to represent the set of commercial
best practices recommended by the GAO for implementation in the context of the de-
fense acquisition system. This includes both a staged, centrally managed technology
development process as well a strictly enforced acquisition program life-cycle. Given
the staged nature of both R&D and acquisition, discrete event simulation was the
logical choice to capture the behavior of the system. As was mentioned previously,
the representation of the defense acquisition system presented here is intentionally
scaled-down and idealized. The benefit of an idealized model is two-fold. First, the
scaled-down representation is more tractable and allows us to attempt multiple ex-
perimental excursions. Second, it allows us to consider the structural impacts of
technology policy unobscured by the inconsistent implementation that occurs in the
actual defense acquisition system. In particular, the modeling emphasis was on the
linkage between the movement of technologies through the R&D process to the length
and cost of the acquisition cycles. In order to represent the impact of technology pol-
icy on defense acquisition, there were three key features of the system that required
consideration: the movement of technologies through the R&D system, the movement
of programs through the acquisition process, and the rate of technological progression.
The simulation was implemented using the Arena 10.0 software package and con-
sists of three major components: the technology development process model, the
system acquisition process model, and the technical progress model. The technology
development process model describes how technologies with potential defense applica-
tion are matured through the defense R&D system. This process provides a portfolio
of technologies for use by acquisition programs. The system acquisition process model
describes the life-cycle of a defense acquisition program from concept development
to deployment. Finally, the technical progress model describes how the capabilities
provided by technologies improve over time.
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3.2.1 Technology Development Process Model
The technology development process model simulates the movement of individual
technologies through a maturation process. Ideally, a technology development pro-
cess is centrally managed and staged. Technologies are selected for development based
on their potential applicability to future products. In the commercial world, product
and technology roadmaps drive development. These roadmaps, and the organiza-
tion’s commitment to them, provide a shared vision that DoD often lacks. However,
developing the technologies to satisfy the roadmap entails a certain amount of risk. In
order to mitigate that risk, each technology must pass through a series of stage-gates.
Each gate provides an opportunity to evaluate the status of a technology and deter-
mine whether or not it should continue to receive funding. Such a system facilitates
prioritization of technology projects as well as risk mitigation. It is important to note
that the Department of Defense has not consistently implemented such a system [31].
Instead, there are a number of different organizations throughout the DoD that per-
form or fund R&D work, each with its own way of managing technology projects.
These inconsistencies preclude the effective management of technology development
and promote duplication and mismatch between the technology supplied by R&D
organizations and the technology demanded by acquisition programs. Consequently,
for this study, the technology development process was modeled in the spirit of the
GAO’s recommendation of a centrally managed and staged technology development
process.
The process starts when new but immature technologies arrive for evaluation. The
arriving technologies are prioritized and then funded until the budget is expended.
Technologies that are rejected are considered for funding in future rounds, and those
that are successfully matured move on to the next stage. The sequence repeats until
each technology is either successfully matured or discarded. The maturity of each
technology is measured by the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale.
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The TRL system is a qualitative scale for measuring technology maturity that was
developed by NASA. Technologies at the lowest level of maturity receive a score of 1
while those at the highest level receive a score of 9. It has been recently adopted by
the DoD as the standard measure of technological maturity in the defense acquisition
process. There are several known issues with the TRL scale including inconsistent
application, its inability to account for integration risk, and a hardware rather than
software focus [14,55,69,71]. Even so, the TRL scale does provide a convenient means
to roughly categorize the maturity of a technology.
Besides a maturity level, the technologies in the model have a few other attributes
relating to the cost to mature them, their expected contribution to system capability,
and the area of application. Since these attributes are assigned randomly, technologies
arriving at the beginning of the technology development process will vary considerably
in their costs, application, and performance. The purpose of a properly functioning
technology development process is to prioritize and fund these technologies by po-
tential cost and benefit. The process used in this simulation is represented in Figure
3.1.
New Technologies Arrive
Technology 
Portfolio
Required 
for 
system?
Develop 
Technology in 
Program
Yes
No
Fund for 
develop-
ment?
Develop 
Technology in 
R&D
Yes
No
Obsolete?
Technical 
Success?
Yes
Yes
Dispose
No
No
Figure 3.1: The Technology Development Process Model
The steps in the process are as follows:
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1. Technologies arrive randomly from exogenous sources and are assigned attribute
values.
2. Technologies are collected in the technology portfolio which constitutes the set
of technologies available for use in military systems.
3. On an annual cycle, each technology is considered for maturation. If a tech-
nology is required by an acquisition program, and it meets minimum maturity
requirements, it is sent to the acquisition program for further development.
Otherwise it is considered for R&D funding (or S&T funding as it is known in
the DoD).
4. The technologies are sorted by TRL level, and there is a separate budget for
maturing each level. Funding technologies for maturation at each level is a
knapsack problem. Instead of solving the computationally intensive knapsack
problem, a well-known heuristic is used. The technologies are sorted by ben-
efit/cost ratio and funded in order until the budget is depleted. In this case,
the benefit is the technology’s performance level, and the cost is the expected
development cost.
5. If a technology is not funded, it is evaluated for obsolescence. Obsolescence is
defined as having a lower performance level than the best technology currently
deployed in the same application area. If the technology is not obsolete, then
it is returned to the portfolio for future consideration.
6. If a technology is funded for development, it encounters a variable delay based
on its TRL level. Cost is accumulated at a rate determined by the TRL level
multiplied by the technology’s base cost.
7. After the development delay, it is randomly determined whether or not the tech-
nology development effort succeeded. The probability of success is determined
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by the TRL level.
8. If the development effort fails, the technology is dropped.
9. If it succeeds, the TRL level is increased by one, and it is checked for obsoles-
cence and returned to the portfolio.
It is also important to note the following assumptions regarding the technology
development process:
• Technologies assigned to a program for development must go through each de-
velopment stage in series, but it is assumed that the technology is pre-approved
for funding for all stages.
• All technologies to be used in a system must reach TRL 7. If technology devel-
opment fails at any stage, the technology is dropped, and the program must find
a replacement. If development is successful, then the technology is returned to
the portfolio at TRL 7.
• TRL 7 is the highest achievable level in this model, and no further development
is required for these technologies (This is because TRL levels beyond 7 are really
system specific [45]).
• It is assumed that a technology either achieves its predicted performance or
fails entirely. This assumption is primarily for model tractability while still
capturing the uncertainty inherent in technology development.
• There is no budget discipline for technology development. Technology devel-
opment efforts are allowed to under run or overrun their budgets. Thus, a
development effort that finishes under budget will generously return unused
funds, and an effort that overruns is provided the resources it needs to reach a
conclusion. Budget discipline in the R&D system is avoided because it allows
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for direct comparison with the cost of technology development in acquisition
programs where overruns are often allowed. Furthermore, it allows us to focus
on the true impact of evolutionary acquisition policies without the confounding
effects of budgetary politics.
3.2.2 System Acquisition Process Model
The system acquisition process model describes the life-cycle of a defense acquisi-
tion program. The nominal five stage process is depicted in Figure 1.1. There are
also three key decision points in the process called milestones. Technically speak-
ing an acquisition program does not begin until after milestone B. But in practice,
“proposed” programs develop a great deal of momentum after they are approved by
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and the acquiring service begins
programming and budgeting activities immediately [36, 41]. Furthermore, milestone
requirements are often bypassed so even though a program nominally moves through
all phases sequentially, in practice, there is often a great deal of concurrency between
the technology development, system development, and production phases. As with
the technology development process model described above, the acquisition process
model in the simulation will assume that acquisition programs follow the rules, and
consequently, programs will move through each phase in order with no concurrency.
Within the simulation model, the basic unit in the system acquisition process is
a program to acquire a system. It is assumed that DoD has several different types
of systems. Each type is continuously cycling through the acquisition process. For
example, if the Air Force deploys a new air superiority fighter, it is assumed that it
will begin concept development of its replacement shortly after. This assumption will
be relaxed later.
Each type of system is dependent upon several technologies, each from a different
application area. For example, an air superiority fighter might require a propulsion
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technology, a sensor technology, and an avionics technology. The acquisition process
model used in the simulation is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The steps in that process
are as follows:
Concept 
Development
Technology 
Development
System 
Development
Production & 
Deployment
Operations 
and support
Intersystem 
Delay
Acquisition Process Model
Figure 3.2: The System Acquisition Process Model
1. When a system enters concept development, it encounters a randomly deter-
mined delay and accumulates cost at a pre-specified rate.
2. Following concept development, the system enters technology development and
requests technologies for each of its required application areas. The technology
selection rule is as follows: a program selects the technology from a required
application area with the highest performance that meets the minimum TRL
requirement. The minimum TRL level is a simulation-wide parameter and
applies to all systems.
3. After technologies are selected, their development proceeds in the manner de-
scribed earlier (Section 3.2.1). If a technology fails, a replacement must be
selected. The same selection rule applies as before, only now the minimum
TRL level is the Fallback TRL level. The Fallback TRL level allows a program
to select a more mature technology in the event that the desired technology
failed.
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4. The system is held in technology development until it has technologies at TRL
7 for all required application areas.
5. Once a system is released from technology development, it enters system devel-
opment and, after that, production.
6. After production, the system is considered to be deployed. The system is held
for a delay period (no cost incurred) and then returned to concept development
to start the next acquisition cycle.
Some additional features of the of system acquisition process model are:
• For each phase there is a randomly determined delay and associated cost accu-
mulation.
• If multiple systems share a technology requirement and enter technology devel-
opment at the same time, they will share the technology development effort.
• The Operations and Support phase is not costed in the model since it is outside
of the acquisition system in the context of this analysis.
Ultimately, the purpose of acquiring a system is to provide military capabilities.
It is assumed that each system deployed provides a capability. Capability in the
model is an abstract representation of military utility. It is assumed that there is a
synergistic effect between the technologies employed in the system. That is the system
is greater than the sum of its parts. Thus, a multiplicative model is used to represent
capability. The capability of a deployed system is the product of the performance
levels for each of its required technologies. Thus, an air superiority fighter without
a propulsion system is useless no matter how capable its sensor is. This measure
of capability allows us to determine the cost effectiveness of a particular technology
policy.
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3.2.3 Technical Progress Model
The final key feature of the simulation is the model of technical progress. Where
do new, more capable technologies come from? It is important to note that the
technology development model in this simulation does not consider basic research. In
fact, TRL 1 signifies the transition of ideas, concepts, and technologies from basic
research to applied research. Thus, we can assume that there is a certain amount of
research occurring exogenous to the simulation. The source of this research may be
from government or commercial sources. The key is that there is a constant inflow
of new technologies and that their performance improves over time. The purpose
of the technology development process is to adapt these technologies for use in a
military system. There is one caveat, however, and that is that a purely exogenous
technology progress model neglects the learning that inevitably occurs from fielding
systems. For example, valuable information gathered from field use of a jet engine
will likely inform the development of the next generation jet engine. Thus, there is
a learning effect, and the more rapidly systems are fielded, the sooner subsequent
learning will be available for future technologies. This is especially true for military
specific technologies where the only source of user feedback is the military itself.
Consequently, the technology growth model in this simulation attempts to model
both of these features. To do so, a hybrid model was created. First, there is a
baseline technology coefficient for each application area. Whenever a technology is
fielded, the coefficient is multiplied by a learning factor (e.g., 1.1). This captures
the learning from implementation. Second, there is an exponential growth model for
each application area. This represents the learning from exogenous R&D activities.
The two are multiplied together to determine the current technology level and are
represented by the equation
Cegt
where C is the technology coefficient and g is the exogenous growth rate. Arriving
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technologies are assigned a performance as a random variation on this value. The
parameters of this model can be adjusted to accommodate the specific situation of
each application area. For example, technologies that are used commercially may have
a high exogenous growth rate and low learning factor because their progress would
continue regardless of military use. The reverse may be true for military specific
technologies since there would be little learning from commercial use.
3.3 Experimental Design
3.3.1 Simulation Parameters
As previously mentioned, the DoD has been relatively inconsistent in its implemen-
tation of its own policies, and evolutionary policies, in particular, are fairly new.
Consequently, using historical data to set simulation parameters is particularly prob-
lematic. In fact, a RAND study to assess cost growth in weapon system programs
found a number of issues in the available cost data for defense acquisition programs [2].
Some of these issues include significant aggregation of data, baseline changes, changes
in reporting guidelines, and incomplete data. The situation is worse for technology
maturation. As indicated by the GAO, the DoD does not systematically track its
technology development efforts [31]. Furthermore, the introduction of TRL levels to
the DoD is fairly recent so there is little experience with their application in a DoD
context. Since NASA has been using the TRL scale for some time, it would seem-
ingly be a logical source of information regarding the cost and risk associated with
maturing technologies through TRL levels. Unfortunately, a 2005 study at NASA to
determine just that found that poor record keeping resulted in insufficient useful data
to achieve statistically significant results [45].
Fortunately, the aim of this study is not to precisely recreate the defense acquisi-
tion system as it is, but instead to identify policy directions to determine how it should
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be. This in combination with extensive sensitivity analysis allows for a more reason-
able margin of error in setting the simulation parameters. Consequently, the actual
values used in the experiments are an amalgamation from several sources including re-
ports and studies from both government and commercial sources [6,21,22,26,37,45,72].
The baseline set of simulation parameters can be found in Appendix B, and a first
order sensitivity analysis can be found in Appendix C.
3.3.2 Basic Experiment
In order to answer the research question posed in this chapter, three cases were
developed. The three cases are variations on the key experimental variables, the
Min TRL and the Fallback TRL. As mentioned previously, the Min TRL is the
minimum maturity requirement for a technology used in an acquisition program, and
the Fallback TRL is the minimum maturity selected when the first choice technology
fails. The cases are as follows:
Base Case – The base case most closely resembles the current modus operandi of
the defense acquisition system. Technologies are selected at mid TRL levels
and final maturation occurs during the technology development phase of an
acquisition program. High performing, but immature technologies are preferred
over more mature, proven technologies. If a technology fails, however, the
program will fall back to a more mature technology.
• Min TRL = 4
• Fallback TRL = 7
Evolutionary Acquisition – In this case, programs may only use fully mature tech-
nology. Maturation of technology is funded in the R&D system, and there is
effectively no technology development phase.
• Min TRL = 7
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Revolutionary Acquisition – Programs target maximum performance at all costs
and, thus, always choose the most promising technologies. When a technology
fails, another top performer is selected in its place.
• Min TRL = 4
• Fallback TRL = 4
There are several outputs of interest. These are the cost of operating the entire
acquisition system, the cost of an individual program, the annual capability growth
rate, and the acquisition program length. Of course, we are interested in the long-run
behavior of these outputs. Consequently, to perform the experiments, the simulation
was run for a warm-up period in order to fully populate the technology portfolio, and
then statistics were collected on the outputs of interest.
In particular, each simulation was run for a warm-up period of 50 years and
then statistics were collected for another 150 years. There are 40 replications for each
experimental case. As for the acquisition programs, there are three system types each
requiring three technologies. Each of those technologies falls into one of six application
areas. It was assumed that the three acquisition programs are homogenous in terms
of cost and schedule risk, and it was also assumed that the application areas are
all homogeneous in terms of cost, schedule, and technical risk. The budget for the
technology development process was set to $3 billion, and was allocated among the
six stages so as to ensure a smooth flow of technologies through the system. It was
also assumed that all of the stages are of equal length. This is simply to focus on
the technical risk for the basic experiment. Finally, the technical progress model
is identical for all six application areas and features a mix of exogenous technical
progression and learning.
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3.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The simulation developed is quite flexible and many different scenarios can be ana-
lyzed. As mentioned previously, a first order sensitivity analysis was performed, and
the results are presented in Appendix C. It was found that the simulation outputs
were particulary sensitive to five factors: the R&D budget size, the R&D budget
distribution, the rate of technical learning, the technology development stage length,
and production costs. The impact of the size of the R&D budget was examined by
leaving the percent allocated per stage the same but varying the aggregate amount
over the range of −50% to +50%. The budget distribution was analyzed by reducing
the budget for stages 4, 5, and 6. This particular scenario was designed to represent
the status quo of the defense technology development process. Typically, funding
for maturing a technology through the middle stages comes not from Science and
Technology (S&T) organizations but through an acquisition effort in the technology
development phase. To understand the influence of the rate of technical learning, the
learning factor from the technical progress model was varied between 1 (no learning)
and 2. In the basic experiment, all technology development stages are one year in
length. To understand the impact of stage length, the scenarios were run with stage
lengths of two years and three years. Finally, the influence of production costs was
analyzed by varying the cost rate from −100% to +100% of the baseline value.
3.4 Results and Analysis
3.4.1 Results of the Basic Experiment
First, we will consider the results of the basic experiment. The average values of each
of the output statistics are displayed in Table 3.1. Note that for compactness, system
specific outputs are only shown for system 1. The results are similar for the other two
systems. The most obvious question is how do these program outputs compare to real
acquisition programs. As far as program duration, the distributional parameters for
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concept development, system development, and production were derived from Fox,
p. 29 [26] with an average program duration of 15 years. We see from Table 3.1
that the base case has an average duration of 14 years, which is fairly close. As for
cost, Fox does not provide cost data, but a recent GAO report provides the cost and
schedule performance of 62 current weapons system programs [37]. An analysis of
these data reveals that the average program cost is approximately $16 billion. An
important caveat is that these data cover a wide range of programs. Some are small
upgrade programs that are short and inexpensive while others are major system of
systems acquisitions that will take 30 years and cost hundreds of billions of dollars.
Even so, we can see from Table 3.1 that the average program cost for the base case is
approximately $16 billion. Thus, we can say that the simulation outputs are within
the right order of magnitude for an “average” acquisition program.
Table 3.1: The average output values over 40 repetitions for the scenarios of the
basic experiment.
Output Base Case Evolutionary Revolutionary
Total Acquisition System
Operating Cost
($ million, annualized)
5807 6410 5169
Capability Growth Rate
(System 1)
0.16 0.179 0.138
Program Duration
(System 1, years)
14.3 11.8 17.2
Program Cost
(System 1, $ million)
16091 14668 16736
In order to understand these results fully, we will address each of the four outputs
in turn. Figure 3.3a depicts the 95% confidence intervals for the average annual
cost to operate the acquisition system. Clearly, evolutionary acquisition is the most
expensive and revolutionary acquisition is the least expensive. If the technology policy
is less aggressive with evolutionary acquisition, why would it be more expensive? To
better understand this outcome, let us consider the average cost of the individual
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programs.
Figure 3.3b shows the confidence intervals for the average program cost to acquire
a system of type 1. Here we see that the average program cost is actually lower with
evolutionary acquisition than revolutionary acquisition. So as evolutionary acqui-
sition supporters suggest, using mature technology must lower program cost. Then
why does the acquisition system cost more to operate under evolutionary acquisition?
The answer is revealed when we examine the average program duration or cycle
time. In Figure 3.3c, we see that the program length is much shorter with evolu-
tionary acquisition. With a shorter cycle time, acquisitions happen more frequently.
Each cycle imposes overhead costs including system development, production, and
deployment costs. Since these overhead costs are far greater than any savings that
would result from more efficient management of the technology portfolio, the overall
cost rises.
But does the additional cost of evolutionary acquisition buy the DoD anything?
Figure 3.3d reveals that evolutionary acquisition results in a superior annual capabil-
ity growth rate. The annual capability growth rate is the “average” annual rate of
capability improvement. Much like an interest rate, even small differences in the rate
can result in a huge difference in the level of deployed capability over the long-run.
Thus, we see that there is a cost/performance trade-off governed by the technology
maturity requirement. Allowing more immature technology hurts system performance
because it takes longer to move technologies into the field, but since it incurs large
production costs less often, it is also less expensive. Strictly enforcing maturity re-
quirements, on the other hand, means shorter, less expensive programs that achieve
high performance by moving technologies into the field more quickly. Unfortunately,
this incurs production costs more frequently and results in increased operating costs
for the acquisition system as a whole.
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This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 3.4. In fact, by varying the technology pol-
icy one can move along a roughly linear frontier of cost/performance combinations.
Figure 3.5 shows the cost and performance for all possible technology polices such
that 1 ≤ Min TRL ≤ 7 and Fallback TRL ≥ Min TRL. At first, this result would
seem to suggest that technology policy should not be strictly enforced as budgetary
restrictions would force changes in technology policy to meet cost goals. Fortunately,
this is not the case.
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Figure 3.4: Cost/Performance trade-off for the basic experiment
In order to maintain a consistent, evolutionary technology policy but retain the
ability to trade performance for cost, all that is required is to insert a delay between
acquisition cycles. Figure 3.6 depicts the cost/performance combinations for the
evolutionary policy with inter-cycle delays ranging from 0 to 7 years. Also shown is
the linear trend line from Figure 3.5. Clearly, the introduction of a delay allows the
evolutionary policy to replicate the cost/performance combinations achieved through
shifts in technology policy. Thus, for any given cost target, an efficient policy can be
found by imposing the evolutionary maturity requirements in combination with the
appropriate inter-acquisition cycle delay.
70
Cost Performance Tradeoff
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Figure 3.5: Cost/Performance trade-off for all possible technology policies with a
linear trend line.
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Figure 3.6: Cost/Performance trade-off replicated through the evolutionary policy
with an inter-cycle delay
71
3.4.2 Sensitivity Results
The previous section presented the basic results of the experiment, but there remains
a question of robustness. How stable are results? Are there any cases where the
evolutionary policy is not the best performing? Through the five scenarios described
in Section 3.3.3, we will examine the factors that ultimately drive the behavior of the
system.
The first scenario we will consider relates to the size of the R&D budget. The
size of the R&D budget impacts the rate that new technologies proceed through the
development process. The R&D budget was varied over a range of −50% to +50%
of the budget in the basic experiment. Obviously, this has an impact on the cost of
operating the total acquisition system, but it was found that all policy scenarios were
affected evenly. Where differentiation occurred was in the capability growth rate. In
Figure 3.7, we see that for small budgets, all of the policies perform poorly. There are
simply not enough new technologies moving through the the pipe to support a healthy
growth in system capability. As the budget increases, however, the performance of
the policies begins to diverge. When the R&D process is well funded, the evolutionary
policy is clearly superior in terms of capability growth.
There is one other important point to note regarding the R&D budget. It is ap-
parent from Figure 3.3d that the evolutionary policy has the greatest variability in the
realized capability growth rate. This would seem to imply that while the evolutionary
policy performs the best on average from a capability standpoint, it also appears to
be the most risky. The higher variability is a result of the the evolutionary policy’s
dependence upon the R&D system. Unlike the other two policies, the evolutionary
policy must make due with whatever technology is mature even if it is not a signif-
icant improvement on the existing capability. The other two policies, on the other
hand, can fund a higher performing but immature technology to compensate. Thus,
it would seem that the variability of the capability growth rate would be dependent
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Figure 3.7: The annual capability growth rate versus the size of the R&D budget
upon the likelihood of high performing technologies being matured quickly. Figure
3.8 shows this to be the case. As the R&D budget increases, the standard deviation
of the capability growth rate decreases rapidly for the evolutionary policy. The other
two polices appear to be more robust. Thus, the riskiness of the evolutionary policy
is highly dependent upon the health of the defense R&D system.
So what should the R&D budget be? Figure 3.9 displays the benefit/cost ratio
(capability growth rate divided by the annual operating cost) versus the size of the
budget. The results are quite revealing. First, we see that the policy that produces
the most performance on the dollar is actually the revolutionary policy in combination
with a 30% to 50% reduction in the R&D budget. Of course, this efficiency comes at
the cost of fielded capability. The maximum benefit/cost ratio for the evolutionary
policy is achieved by the original budget while the base case falls in between. Thus,
pushing the budget beyond the $3 billion figure used in the basic experiment will
increase performance and reduce risk but at a rising cost.
The next scenario also relates to the R&D budget, but in this case it is the
distribution of the budget among the stages that is of interest. In particular, this
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Figure 3.8: The standard deviation of the capability growth rate versus the size of
the R&D budget
Benefit/Cost Ratio vs R&D budget
2.00E-05
2.10E-05
2.20E-05
2.30E-05
2.40E-05
2.50E-05
2.60E-05
2.70E-05
2.80E-05
2.90E-05
3.00E-05
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
R&D Budget ($ million/year) 
G
r o
w
t h
 R
a t
e  
/  O
p e
r a
t i n
g  
C
o s
t
Base Case
Evolutionary
Revolutionary
Figure 3.9: The ratio of the capability growth rate to annual operating cost versus
the size of the R&D budget
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scenario is designed to represent a situation that is often referred to as crossing
the chasm. Crossing the chasm describes the difficulty that technology development
efforts often encounter in moving through the middle stages of technology maturation
because of a scarcity of funding. To simulate this scenario, funding for stages 4, 5,
and 6 was varied over a range of 25% to 100% of the baseline value. Figure 3.10
reveals that the best policy from a performance standpoint is quite sensitive to the
level of middle stage funding.
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Figure 3.10: The capability growth rate when middle stage R&D funding is is cut
As we would expect, the evolutionary policy is the most sensitive since it is de-
pendent upon a constant supply of mature technologies. On the opposite end, the
revolutionary policy is the most robust since it can provide its own middle stage
funding, and once again, the base case falls in between. Given the varied rates of per-
formance decay among the three policies, there are domains where each is dominant.
When R&D is well funded, the evolutionary policy provides superior performance.
As middle stage funding is reduced by more than 25%, the performance of the base
case policy begins to exceed the performance of the evolutionary policy. As funding
declines further, the revolutionary policy becomes the top performing policy.
Of all of the scenarios presented in this chapter, the crossing the chasm scenario
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is probably the most similar to business as usual at the DoD. Typically, S&T funding
covers early stage technology development, but once technologies reach the middle
stages, the only readily available source of funding is through an acquisition effort.
The base case policy is also fairly similar to the risk mitigation strategy that many
acquisition programs use: try to utilize the most promising technology, but if that
fails, fall back to the existing, mature technology. Thus, it would seem that given the
circumstances that most acquisition programs operate under, the business as usual
policy is quite rational. Of course, it should be pointed out that all of the acquisition
policies perform better when middle stage R&D is well funded.
Another critical factor that influences policy outcomes is the rate of technical
learning. As was mentioned previously there are two components to the rate of
technical progress in this model, the exogenous performance growth rate and the
internal learning factor. When the exogenous growth rate is varied, all of the polices
are affected equally because the exogenous technical progression occurs regardless
of any actions taken in the defense acquisition system. When the learning factor is
varied, however, the impact is significant.
Figure 3.11 shows the change in the capability growth rate for system 1 as the
learning factor varies between 1 and 2. Clearly, the larger the learning factor, the
greater the separation between the policies. It is apparent that the evolutionary
policy achieves the superior capability growth rate as the learning factor increases.
The driving force behind this behavior is the acquisition cycle time. Evolutionary
acquisition exhibits the shortest acquisition cycle time, and thus, knowledge gained
from fielding a system is accumulated more rapidly. The learning factor represents
the impact that this knowledge has on new technology development. Consequently,
as the value of learning increases, the gain from faster acquisition cycles increases.
The implication here is that evolutionary acquisition is more important for mili-
tary specific technologies. When the military is the only user of technology, it is also
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Figure 3.11: The capability growth rate versus the size of the learning factor
the only source of feedback to support future improvements. Consequently, the speed
at which the feedback occurs affects the speed at which technology can improve. On
the other end of the spectrum, Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technologies will
likely improve regardless of the military actions. Thus, there is no real benefit to
faster acquisition cycles from a performance improvement standpoint.
Another scenario that is of particular interest is the amount of time it takes to
move a technology through each stage of the technology development process. In the
basic experiment, stage length was deliberately deterministic and equal to one year
for every stage. The rationale behind one year per stage was derived from a NASA
study that determined that it takes about ten years on average to move through all
nine TRL levels [45]. So one year per stage is a reasonable estimate for the average
case. However, in reality, there is a great deal of variation in the maturation time of
technologies. Some technologies mature extremely rapidly as in the semiconductor
industry while others can take a very long time as in the pharmaceutical industry. It
turns out that stage length has a major impact on the performance of the acquisition
system.
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In this scenario, the length of a stage in the technology development process
was varied from 1 to 3 years. As Figure 3.12 demonstrates, the capability growth
rate diminishes as the technology development cycle time increases. The key is the
relationship between the acquisition cycle time and technology development time.
When the time it takes to develop a technology increases beyond the length of a
standard acquisition cycle, it means that the latest technologies are not making it
through the process fast enough to be ready and mature for the next system under
development. Thus, we are left with two policy choices. We can either select the
most promising technology and finish maturation under the guise of an acquisition
program, or we can simply utilize the same technology used in the last system that
was deployed. In either case, the capability growth rate is diminished. In the first
case, the acquisition cycle time is effectively extended as it must await the conclusion
of a more lengthy technology development phase (Figure 3.13). This both delays
deployment of the new capability as well as any learning that might occur from using
the new technology in the field. In the second case, we maintain the same cycle time,
but we in some sense deploy a new system that is identical in capability to the last.
Effectively, the acquisition cycle time increases because it takes more cycles to get a
new technology.
The final scenario represents the impact of production costs on the affordability of
evolutionary acquisition. The production cost rate was varied from zero to $8 billion
per year. Figure 3.14 reveals that as procurement cost increases the spread between
the operating costs of the three policies increases. The shorter the acquisition cycle,
the more frequently production costs are incurred and, consequently, the greater the
impact of an increase in production costs. Conversely, the lower production costs are,
the more cost effective evolutionary acquisition becomes.
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Figure 3.12: The average capability growth rate as a function of the time to complete
a technology development stage
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Figure 3.13: The average acquisition program duration as a function of the time to
complete a technology development stage
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Figure 3.14: The annual acquisition system operating cost as a function of the
production cost rate
3.5 Discussion
The production cost scenario raises several issues regarding evolutionary acquisition.
Clearly, the more expensive it is to produce and deploy the next iteration of a system,
the less affordable evolutionary acquisition becomes. But, of course, that is depen-
dent upon the nature of the system under consideration, and this is a key difference
between evolutionary practices in a commercial setting versus a defense setting. A
commercial firm does not purchase its own product. In fact, if we take the example of
a car manufacturer, there is always substantial portion of the customer base that is
looking to buy a new car. Thus, the car manufacturer is going to build and sell cars
continuously. The costs of upgrading a model might include the costs of any technol-
ogy development, the cost of changing the design, and the cost of any retooling that
must be done at production facilities. If the manufacturer is particularly successful, it
may gain market share from its competitors, and thus, the investment pays for itself.
Consequently, a commercial firm can actually make more money from cycling faster
and using an evolutionary approach. When the DoD would like to buy a new weapon
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system, it must pay for all of the same development costs plus it must purchase the
product. Furthermore, if through more rapid acquisition cycles the DoD improves the
performance growth rate of its systems, it may outperform its adversaries, but it does
not generate a monetary return to help fund the faster pace of system development.
Thus, the cost of evolutionary acquisition is critically dependent upon the length
and cost of stages in the system acquisition life-cycle. The simulation model presented
in this chapter was generic in the sense in that it assumed that something was acquired
in each cycle but it did not differentiate between say a new system design or a product
upgrade. Representing either case could be achieved by simply changing the cost and
duration parameters in the model. The key outcome of the evolutionary policy was
that the acquisition cycle was shortened and the cost of each cycle was reduced
simply by employing mature technology. In the examples above, however, the decline
in cycle costs from more efficient technology development alone was not sufficient
to compensate for the increase in the cycle rate. Thus, total acquisition costs rose
with evolutionary acquisition. Some have suggested, however, that the length and
cost of other phases of the acquisition life-cycle would decline under evolutionary
acquisition as well. The idea is that if acquisition programs are less ambitious and
shorter, development will be easier and there will be fewer problems with unstable
funding. Thus, we should expect lower system development and procurement costs
as well. Consequently, the question becomes, if the costs of system development and
production decline under evolutionary acquisition, does evolutionary acquisition then
become less expensive than more traditional methods?
To consider this question let us develop a very simple model for the cost of oper-
ating the defense acquisition system. First, we define the following symbols:
rij ≡ the acquisition cycle rate for system i under policy j in cycles per year.
Cij ≡ the cost per acquisition cycle for system i under policy j.
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Kj ≡ the total cost per year for operating the defense R&D system under policy j.
Aj ≡ the annual cost of operating the defense acquisition system under policy j.
We can define the cost rate to operate the acquisition system under policy j as
Aj =
n∑
i=1
rijCij +Kj
where n is the number of systems begin acquired. Thus, if policy e represents evolu-
tionary acquisition and policy t represents traditional acquisition, then evolutionary
acquisition would be less expensive if Ae < At. For the moment, let us assume that
all systems being acquired have identical cost and cycle rates. This leaves us with
the relationship
nreCe +Ke < nrtCt +Kt.
Furthermore, if we assume that we keep our R&D budget fixed we can simplify even
further to yield
Ce
Ct
<
rt
re
.
Of course, since the rate of acquisition is slower under the traditional acquisition
policy, the right hand side will be strictly less then one. This implies that a simple
decline in program costs from evolutionary acquisition is not sufficient to reduce the
total cost to operate the acquisition system. Instead, program costs must to decline
sufficiently to offset the increase in the rate of acquisition.
To better illustrate this point, imagine that the cycles were weekly and cost $10.
The operating cost would be $10 per week. Now let us assume that we institute a
new policy that reduces cycle costs to $8 per cycle but the cycles now occur twice
as fast. That means that under the new policy the operating cost would be $16 per
week. Thus, even though the cost per cycle decreased, the total cost increased.
When we consider defense acquisition cycles, if the system development and pro-
curement costs also drop under evolutionary acquisition, that might seem to suggest
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that we could overcome this deficit. If, however, the durations of system develop-
ment and technology development also decrease, then the equivalent cost threshold
becomes even more difficult to reach. Furthermore, if we consider spiral development
where there are several short, overlapping cycles, we see that we would require fairly
low development, production, and deployment costs to compensate for the speed of
the cycles.
Thus, the critical question becomes, how does evolutionary acquisition affect the
length and cost of development and procurement activities versus a traditional single-
step to capability approach? This is not a trivial question, and the answer will likely
depend on the type of system being acquired. Upgrades to complex, integrated sys-
tems can lead to substantial design modifications to accommodate even seemingly
simple changes and using more mature technologies does not correlate to easier inte-
gration [71]. In fact, experiences at Westland Helicopters indicate that even when a
system such as a military helicopter is designed with modularity and upgradability
in mind, changes can unexpectedly propagate through large portions of the system
design [12, 24]. At the other end of the spectrum, systems with very loose coupling
between system components may be quite amenable to rapid upgrade and change.
Perhaps the most extreme example of this type of system is the Internet where the
system architecture changes continuously without any supervision or control.
Thus, this issue merits substantial additional research and is really the determining
factor regarding evolutionary acquisition’s potential for cost savings. This is not
to suggest that if the costs of acquiring a particular system type do not decline
under evolutionary acquisition that the approach is useless. The results of this study
suggest that evolutionary acquisition delivers other benefits such as a boost in the
capability of systems actually deployed in the field. Instead, it simply means that
additional capability will continue to come at additional cost. Consequently, cost and
performance may be traded off by simply appropriately spacing acquisition cycles.
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3.6 Conclusions and Further Research
The results from this simulation study lead to some highly suggestive findings and
critical avenues for future research. First and foremost, even with a first-order rep-
resentation of the acquisition system, the results suggest that the adoption of evolu-
tionary acquisition policies has the potential to improve the performance of deployed
systems. However, lower operating costs for the defense acquisition system are not au-
tomatic. While each individual program should be less expensive under evolutionary
acquisition policies, the faster acquisition cycle time means that development, pro-
duction, and deployment costs are incurred more frequently. This may overwhelm any
cost savings from managing technology development more efficiently. As discussed in
Section 3.5, these cycle costs must decline sufficiently under evolutionary acquisition
to achieve net cost savings. Thus, depending on the type of system being acquired,
evolutionary acquisition may actually be more expensive than traditional means of
acquiring military systems. This is a critical issue for future research. However,
this should not be interpreted as an endorsement of traditional acquisition methods.
Instead, acquisition cycle time can be used to control the costs of an evolutionary
policy without reverting to a traditional approach that employs immature technol-
ogy. A requirement for mature technologies can be consistently imposed with the
next acquisition cycle beginning only when it is affordable.
There are some important caveats on this conclusion, however. First, the above
results are more significant for military specific technologies than commercial tech-
nologies. Commercial technologies will continue to develop and improve regardless
of the actions of the DoD because the DoD is actually a small player in the market.
One example is microprocessor technology. On the Commanche helicopter program,
the mission processing technology was changed three times because Intel introduced
newer processor models faster than the DoD could develop an advanced combat heli-
copter [61]. For military specific technologies, however, forward progress is dependent
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upon actually testing and fielding a technology and gathering user feedback. Thus,
the faster acquisition cycles are, the faster learning can be incorporated into new
technologies under development. Of course, faster acquisition cycles also mean that
exogenously developed commercial technologies can also be moved into the field faster.
Second, evolutionary acquisition policies do not function well when the R&D pro-
cess is underfunded. Evolutionary acquisition depends on a steady stream of mature
technologies. When the research pipeline is “starved”, not only does the performance
of deployed systems decline on average, but it also becomes more unpredictable. More
traditional acquisition methods mitigate this this risk by using an acquisition effort
to secure funding for technology development.
Third, the underfunding of middle stage technologies, as is typical for government
technology development [14], also adversely impacts evolutionary acquisition policies.
Under these circumstances, traditional approaches to acquisition are actually superior
to evolutionary methods since they mitigate the risk of technologies failing to cross
the chasm. Thus, it would seem that business as usual is quite reasonable under the
current funding environment for military R&D activities. Though, it is important to
point out that traditional acquisition policies under this scenario still underperform
evolutionary policies when R&D is fully funded.
Fourth, the relationship between the time required to develop a technology and
the acquisition cycle time is crucial. Essentially, the pace of technology development
dictates the pace of acquisition. When technology development is slow, acquisition
must slow down to accommodate. Thus, if the acquisition cycle time is already close
to the technology development cycle time, there may be little, if any, advantage to
shortening the acquisition cycle time through the application of evolutionary acqui-
sition policies.
Finally, there are several features of the current defense acquisition system that
were not considered in this analysis. First and foremost among these is concurrency.
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For major acquisition efforts there is often substantial overlap between the technol-
ogy development, system development, and production phases. While this is often an
attempt to compress an otherwise long acquisition cycle, the resulting rework often
increases costs and leads to performance shortfalls. This problem has been exten-
sively documented elsewhere, and there is no need for it to be recapitulated here. If,
however, the imposition of evolutionary acquisition and its shorter acquisition cycles
reduced the temptation to use a concurrent acquisition strategy, it is possible that
there could be a net cost savings through the reduction of rework, but that determi-
nation must be relegated to future work. Other features of defense acquisition not
considered in this model are operations and maintenance costs, basic research funding,
non-centralized acquisition management, program cancellation, program budgeting,
the capacity of the industrial base, the capacity of the government to consume, and
system integration issues. Each of these factors certainly influence the behavior and
cost effectiveness of the defense acquisition system and may be examined in future
work.
What we can ultimately derive from this study is that, at least to a first or-
der, there are definite benefits to the better management and development of new
technologies implied in evolutionary acquisition. The outstanding question raised is
whether or not there is a net reduction in cost when we consider the entire acqui-
sition system, not just a single program. What this study revealed is that net cost
savings are not automatic, and additional research is required to determine under
what circumstances they are possible. Furthermore, when we consider acquisition
policy in general, this study reveals the importance of considering the entire system
when evaluating a policy. As in Chapter 2, we see that the implications of a reform
were not fully understood by those who advocated it. Only by treating the defense
acquisition enterprise as a system can one hope to understand the implications of
alternative acquisition policies. The model presented in this chapter provides one
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example of how this type of problem can be approached in a systematic fashion to
inform policy decisions.
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CHAPTER IV
A METHOD FOR VALUING DEFENSE ACQUISITION
PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS
While Chapters 2 and 3 primarily dealt with evaluating the most recent acquisition
reform initiative, evolutionary acquisition, this chapter deals with the more general
problem of quantitatively valuing changes to the defense acquisition system. As indi-
cated in Chapter 1, there is often no means to objectively value changes to the defense
acquisition system. This is because national defense is a public good, and there is
no market price to treat as a consensus value. Thus, it becomes quite challenging to
objectively compare and trade off among acquisition reform policy options.
When monetary valuation is not possible, utility theory is often a convenient
means of evaluating policy alternatives. Unfortunately, utility theory is difficult to
apply in the defense acquisition context since there is such a diverse set of stakehold-
ers. Consequently, the traditional approach to valuing improvements to an acquisition
process is to assume that the quantity and type of systems acquired remain fixed.
Thus, there is no change in military utility. In that case, only costs change, and a
Net Present Value (NPV) analysis can be performed on the resulting cost savings.
This approach has three major shortcomings. First, cost savings will lead to
changes in how many systems are purchased and/or what type are purchased. Thus,
the change in value is more than just cost savings. Second, risky initiatives may
be staged, and NPV analysis fails to account for resulting downside loss mitigation.
Consequently, NPV may significantly understate the value of reform opportunities.
Third, there is no systematic means to account for risk aversion.
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In this chapter, a method is presented to address all three of these issues1. First,
a pricing index will be used to measure changes in buying power. Conceptually
analogous to measuring inflation, the use of a pricing index allows us to capture
monetarily changes in what is acquired. This monetary valuation allows modern
financial analysis tools to be applied to what is effectively an investment opportunity.
Options analysis, in particular, will be used to properly account for the risk mitigation
inherent in a staged investment. Finally, to allow decision-makers to trade-off risk
and return, a risk/return portfolio method is developed to assist risk-averse decision-
makers.
To illustrate these methods, they are applied to a notional process change in the
area of military shipbuilding. What was found was that a traditional approach to
valuing acquisition process improvements can, in some circumstances, significantly
understate value and lead to rejection of an otherwise valuable opportunity.
4.1 The Valuation of Acquisition Reform
How does one value national defense? What is the value of adding one more aircraft
carrier to the fleet? The answers to questions such as these probably depend upon
the person asked, and there is likely a great deal of variation among individuals.
Since changes to the defense acquisition system are ultimately intended to improve
the quality of national defense provided by the US military, an inability to value
national defense would seem to inhibit a systematic means to evaluate defense policy
alternatives. And, as Cancian noted, there is decided lack of objective means to
evaluate defense outcomes [9]. All is not lost, however, because transforming the
defense acquisition enterprise is really about efficiency. The question is not what
should be bought, but instead, how can the government buy systems with highest
possible quality at the lowest possible cost.
1An earlier version of the ship production model contained in this chapter was presented in
Pennock, et. al., 2007 [57]. That model was a special case of the more general model presented here.
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If we assume that the US defense policy apparatus is at least reasonably capable
at determining which military systems are needed (and there is some evidence to
suggest that it is [41]), then the evaluation of acquisition reform policy is somewhat
simplified. Since demand always exceeds the available resources, it is not necessary to
assess the ultimate value of national defense realized by a particular policy. Instead,
one only needs to determine which policy allows the acquisition system to meet more
needs within the available resource constraints. This is in contrast to the somewhat
dubious method of tying military value to market comparables advocated by Housel
and colleagues [42].
At first, it might seem that simple cost savings would be sufficient. Unfortunately,
simple cost savings as a measure of value implicitly assumes that the government is
a price taker in the market for military systems. This is certainly not the case. The
market for military systems, at least in the United States, is effectively a monopsony.
Consequently, virtually every decision that the US government makes regarding the
acquisition of military systems affects the health and well-being of the defense indus-
try. In particular, the US defense industry maintains a significant excess of production
capacity. This is intentionally encouraged by the government to provide surge capa-
bility in the event of a major war [28,66]. This is compounded by the fact that most
military systems are acquired in short, intermittent production runs. The combina-
tion of these two factors means that defense production exhibits increasing returns
to scale.
The most immediate consequence of increasing returns to scale is the compounding
effect of cost overruns. Nearly every acquisition program experiences cost overruns
due to the systematic underestimation of costs by both industry and government [2,10,
23]. Thus, over the course of acquisition programs, the per unit cost of systems such
as aircraft and warships typically rise far higher than what was originally planned.
As a result, the available budget is often insufficient to pay for the entire planned
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production run, and the size of the production run is cut. Unfortunately, in an
increasing returns to scale situation, cutting the number produced actually increases
the per unit cost even further. This means that the production run must be reduced
even further. Thus, an acquisition program is hurt not only by the initial cost overrun
itself but also by the subsequent adverse impacts on production efficiency. This is
exactly the situation that programs such as the F-22 have experienced [35].
The flip side to increasing returns to scale is that cost savings trigger a compound-
ing effect in benefits. Thus, when program costs decline and free up more resources,
the size of the production run can be increased or at least remain closer to the in-
tended size. This means that the overhead associated with the excess productive
capacity can be shared over a greater number of units, and it allows producers the
opportunity to invest in new plant equipment and more efficient means of produc-
tion. Thus, the per unit production costs actually drop, and the compounding effect
means that the size of the production run can be increased even further. This is the
phenomenon that simple cost savings fails to capture. Thus, the net effect of a change
to the defense acquisition system is a change in buying power, and buying power is
measured via price indices.
4.2 Price Indices
A price index is a way of assessing the value of a bundle of goods and services. As
the price of goods and services change over time, the cost of the bundle changes.
An increase in the cost of the bundle indicates a decrease in buying power since a
consumer would be able to afford fewer instances of the bundle. In the converse, a
drop in cost means an increase in buying power. While price indices are normally used
to measure inflation, they have a logical analog in the valuation of defense acquisition
reforms.
To illustrate this point, let us consider the case of deflation. Deflation occurs when
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there is a general decline in the price level of goods and services. Let us assume that
there there is a decline in a price index between two time periods. That means that
under a fixed budget one could purchase more goods and services in the second time
period than the first. Thus, buying power has increased. One should note however,
that the same buying power could also be achieved by increasing the budget in the
first period such that an equivalent amount of goods and services can be purchased
in the first and second periods. Thus, we could say that the value of the deflation is
the difference between this increased budget and the original budget. One would be
indifferent between having either the increased budget or deflation. In the abstract,
there is no difference between deflation and an increase in the government’s buying
power through acquisition reform. The only difference is that deflation measures a
change in buying power over two time periods while the government’s buying power
is measured over two scenarios, acquisition with the reform and acquisition without
the reform. This concept will be explored further in Section 4.5.
There is a well-developed body of theory in economics regarding the use of price
indices. For the purposes of this exposition, however, only its most basic tenants
are required. Probably two of the most common price indices are the Laspeyres and
Paasche indices [58].
PL =
p1 · x0
p0 · x0 ,
PP =
p1 · x1
p0 · x1 .
These indices assess the change in the cost of a pre-specified bundle of goods, but in
reverse time order. The Laspeyres index assesses the cost of buying a bundle of goods
from the starting time in a future time while the Paasche index considers the cost of
buying the bundle of goods from the end time in a previous time. The two bundles
may differ because of substitution and income effects. This means that the two price
indices can differ. The Fisher price index [58] attempts to split the difference by
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taking the geometric mean of the two
PF =
√
PLPP .
The substitution issue merits some additional discussion. When consumers face
relative price shifts in goods and services, they may alter the composition of the
bundle that they purchase. For example, if the price of natural gas increases and the
price of electricity declines, consumers may substitute electrical heating for natural
gas heating. Likewise, in the defense context, a shift in the cost of one military
system may prompt a shift in the force structure. For example, if the cost of air
superiority fighters rises relative to the cost of surface-to-air missiles, the military
may opt to substitute surface-to-air missiles for fighters, since there is some overlap
in their role. Practically speaking however, this is unlikely in most circumstances.
Given the nature and momentum of acquisition programs, it is unlikely that any cost
savings realized in one program will be transferred to another, at least in the short-
term and for relatively small improvements. For that reason, the analysis presented
in this chapter will assume that there is no substitution effect or income effect, and
consequently, all three of these price indices will be identical. Be that as it may, it
would be difficult to deny that substitution can and does occur over the long-run for
large changes in the acquisition enterprise. When substitution is a concern, a more
sophisticated index such as the Konus index may be used, but doing so would require
an extensive assessment of how policy makers would alter the force structure in the
event of major cost shifts.
There is one final caveat to note regarding the use of price indices in this analysis.
The Laspeyres and Paasche price indices do not account for changes in the quality
of goods procured. For example, the cost of a good such as an automobile may
increase, but the quality may also increase. Thus, consumers may not decrease their
consumption of automobiles because they are getting more for their money. Since
it is generally agreed that there have been dramatic increases in the quality of US
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military systems since World War II, it might at first seem that this would be an
issue. Fortunately, with the assumption of sticky substitution and the tendency of
the military to maximize performance regardless of cost, it is not. If an acquisition
process improvement allows the DoD to increase procurement quantities, it simply
means that the DoD will be able to procure more systems at each increase in quality
level than it would have previously. If quality based substitution is an issue however,
it would have to be addressed using a more sophisticated price index such as the
Konus index mentioned earlier.
4.3 Applying Investment Analysis to Defense Acquisition
If the application of a price index allows one to assess shifts in buying power mone-
tarily, then, logically, changes in buying power over time are effectively a cash flow
stream. Of course, cash flow streams form the basis of investment analysis. Thus,
the question then becomes how much should one be willing to pay in order to obtain
a particular cash flow stream? If the value of a cash flow stream exceeds the cost
to obtain it, then it is a worthwhile investment. Applied to the defense context, the
value of the increase in buying power from an acquisition process improvement must
exceed the cost of implementing it.
4.3.1 Net Present Value Analysis
As mentioned previously, the traditional approach to valuing cost savings in the DoD
is Net Present Value (NPV) analysis. NPV is calculated by discounting benefits and
subtracting the discounted costs. Under traditional capital budgeting, when NPV is
applied to a commercial investment opportunity, the discount rate should be the cost
of capital of the firm [54]. More commonly, however, the discount rate is set to an
arbitrary hurdle rate felt to be commensurate with the level of risk. Risk is really the
driving force in the valuation of investments. If risk were not an issue, investment
valuation would be trivial, as one would only have to account for the time value of
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money. In reality, however, there can be a great deal of uncertainty in realized cash
flows.
In the context of this analysis there are really two types of risk: market risk and
technical risk. Market risk is the uncertainty that results from random fluctuations
in the marketplace. If one were considering investing in an exchange traded stock,
market risk would be the uncertainty in the future price of the stock. In the context
of defense acquisition, market risk would be the uncertainties in the prices of inputs
that are purchased in the course of developing and producing military systems. For
example, uncertainties in the price of steel or in the labor costs of shipyard workers
would constitute market risks for defense acquisition.
Technical risk is the uncertainty in the execution of a project. For example, in a
commercial setting, technical risk might manifest itself as the uncertainty regarding
the efficiency of a new manufacturing process. It is quite similar in the defense
acquisition context. Budgets and priorities at the DoD can shift from year to year,
and changes in appropriations that may seem insignificant to Congress may seriously
imperil a program [26]. Beyond programmatic issues, there is always a risk that the
process improvement idea simply does not work. Intuitively, as the level of market or
technical risk increases, an investment becomes less appealing. Greater risk requires
greater return. In an NPV analysis, this is captured through the discount rate.
For simple now or never decisions, NPV is a perfectly adequate tool. The problem
arises when NPV is applied to investments that occur over time and present opportu-
nities to change course. When an investment contains embedded options, NPV may
undervalue that investment. Since most real, as opposed to financial, investments
occur over time, decision-makers often have the opportunity to terminate, ramp up,
scale down, or otherwise alter the course of the investment based on new informa-
tion that becomes available over time. For example, if during the development of a
new product there is a significant technical failure, it is likely that management will
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terminate the project. While the money already invested is lost, future losses from a
failed product are avoided. Thus, the option to terminate effectively limits downside
risk. In fact, most complex projects are staged for this reason. The shortcoming of
NPV as an investment evaluation tool is that it does not account for such options.
It assumes that once an investment decision is made, there is no turning back no
matter how dismal the failure. For that reason, NPV has been heavily criticized as
a business decision making tool, and it has been accused of leading to significant
underinvestment [39,40].
4.3.2 Options Analysis
In many cases, innovative approaches to acquisition are implemented in stages. Take,
for instance, the case of the Arsenal Ship. The program to develop the Arsenal
Ship employed several unorthodox approaches to ship acquisition including setting
only a few broad performance goals, giving design responsibility to the contractor
teams, and setting affordability as a requirement [46]. While the Arsenal Ship was
ultimately canceled, it provided an opportunity to test new approaches to warship
acquisition without jeopardizing the entire US Navy shipbuilding program. Thus, it
would be na¨ıve to employ NPV to value acquisition process improvements when the
DoD attempts to mitigate the risk of new initiatives through testing and staging.
To properly account for such staging, options analysis is required. Sometimes
referred to as real options, the options approach employs the stock option as its
motivating metaphor. Consider a call option. Purchasing a call option gives the
option holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase shares of a stock at
predetermined price. The holder would never exercise the option at a loss, and this
feature of the contract limits exposure to downside risk. In a similar fashion, applying
innovative acquisition methods to the Arsenal Ship program gave the government
the right, but not the obligation, to employ those same methods on future warship
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acquisition programs.
Options analysis traces its origins to the seminal paper by Black and Scholes that
presented a closed-form equation for the price of a European call option [5]. Since
then, an entire profession has evolved around the pricing of options contracts. In all
cases, options derive their value from the behavior of an underlying asset, hence the
often used term, derivative. The term “real options” was coined by Stewart Myers [53]
in recognition of the similarities between many real investment opportunities and
financial options contracts. In the case of real options, the underlying asset is not
traded in financial markets. Examples include a natural resource such as an oil
reserve, a production asset such as a factory, or intellectual property such as a patent.
The canonical example of a real option is a lease on a petroleum reserve. The lease
provides the holder the option to drill and extract oil if it proves profitable to do so.
Of course, the value of real assets are subject to market fluctuations just like any
other economic variable, and if the stochastic fluctuations in value can be replicated
through a portfolio of market traded assets, then an option on a real asset can be
valued just like a financial option.
Finding the value of an option is tantamount to solving a dynamic programming
problem. The key issue is the discount rate. When an investment problem is solved
using a traditional dynamic program, the discount rate is specified exogenously. As
indicated in Section 4.3.1, the appropriate discount rate is dependent upon the level
of risk, but risk changes with time and actions taken. Options analysis avoids this
problem through the use of a replicating portfolio of market traded assets. The
value of the replicating portfolio implicitly determines the discount rate. According
to modern investment theory, this implied discount rate is consistent with the risk
aversion exhibited by the shareholders of a publicly traded firm.
More specifically, shareholders require compensation for systematic risk. System-
atic risk is risk that is inherent to the marketplace and cannot be eliminated through
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diversification of investments. The higher the level of systematic risk exhibited by
an investment, the greater the rate of return required by shareholders or, equiva-
lently, the greater the discount rate. Technical risk would be non-systematic, and
thus, shareholders would not require an adjustment to the discount rate to compen-
sate for technical risk. They could simply diversify this risk away by holding other
investments in their portfolio. Market risk, on the other hand, is part systematic
and part non-systematic. The level of systematic risk is determined by the degree
to which price movements of the underlying market-traded asset correlate with the
market as a whole. The more correlated an asset is to the entire market, the more
non-diversifiable risk it introduces into an investor’s portfolio. As a result, risk-averse
investors demand a greater return to compensate. If, on the other hand, an investor
is risk-neutral, he or she is indifferent to risk, and the risk-free rate of return is a
sufficient discount rate.
Considering the nature of the defense acquisition enterprise, it would be question-
able to extend the shareholder metaphor to government decision-makers. There is no
extant market with which to compare or evaluate defense acquisition reform efforts.
Furthermore, with the vast resources of the Federal government, acquisition decision-
makers should theoretically be risk-neutral, though this is not likely true in practice.
Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, defense acquisition process improvements are
evaluated as options but assuming risk-neutral decision-makers. This means that val-
uation only requires the risk-free discount rate. While this in some sense reduces the
problem to a traditional dynamic program, the options metaphor is convenient, and
the valuation method developed in this chapter utilizes the mathematics and tools
developed to evaluate options. The risk attitudes of acquisition decision-makers are
handled separately through the portfolio approach described in the Section 4.7. For a
more extensive exposition on options analysis applied to real investment opportunities
see Dixit and Pindyck [17].
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4.4 A Model of Military Ship Acquisition
The concepts of applying price indices and options analysis to value acquisition pro-
cess improvements have thus far only been presented in the abstract. In order to make
them more concrete, they will be applied in the context of military ship acquisition.
Since the start of the Cold War, the growing cost of US Navy warships has outpaced
inflation and posed serious challenges to meeting the Navy’s force structure goals [1].
Since the cost of an individual ship grows faster than the shipbuilding budget, each
year the Navy can afford to procure fewer and fewer ships. While the decline in
numbers has been partially offset by the rapid increase in the quality or capability of
Navy ships, the situation is not sustainable, and if nothing changes, eventually the
Navy will not be able to afford any ships at all.
Many have suggested that military shipyards are inefficient, and the application
of commercial shipbuilding techniques could substantially reduce costs. According
to a RAND study, however, labor, material, and equipment costs only account for
about half of the cost growth in ships and have been roughly in line with inflation [1].
The remaining cost growth is attributed to customer-driven factors. Furthermore,
another study points out several key differences between naval and commercial ships
including [4]:
• Commercial ships are large and simple while military ships are relatively small
and complex.
• The process for buying a commercial ship is much simpler than the government’s
approach to buying a warship.
• Design and construction of commercial ships is much simpler. They are essen-
tially large steel boxes while warships are very complex with a high density of
integrated, sophisticated equipment.
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• Military shipbuilding employs much more engineering support than commercial
shipyards. This results in a more expensive workforce.
Because of these differences, it is likely that commercial shipbuilding practices will
not yield the same levels of efficiency that they do in commercial yards. For example,
the hull cost is a much smaller percentage of the total cost for a warship than a
commercial ship. Most of the cost is driven by the equipment installed on the ship
rather than the ship itself. This would suggest that any efficiency improvements
in ship construction will result in a smaller percentage cost savings than would be
realized in a commercial context. Instead, additional cost savings must come from
elsewhere in the ship acquisition enterprise. As Figure 4.1 indicates, there is more to
the enterprise of shipbuilding than just the shipyards.
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Figure 4.1: The US Navy Shipbuilding Enterprise [57].
As indicated by Rouse, enterprise transformation is driven by experienced or ex-
pected value deficiencies, and is enabled by changes in work processes [62–64]. Clearly,
the Navy is experiencing a value deficiency, but what are the work processes that
should be changed? A consideration of the ship acquisition enterprise suggests two
categories that are candidates for reform: organizational processes and technical pro-
cesses. Organizational processes consist of the methods by which the government
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monitors, controls, and executes acquisition. These would include processes for au-
thorization, appropriation, development, procurement, and deployment. Technical
processes are related to the design, production, operation, and maintenance of ships.
For our notional example, we will assume that the Navy has proposed several changes
that will streamline the development and design process and reduce rework. In or-
der to evaluate the impact of these process changes, we will require a model of ship
production.
To that end, let us define the following:
B(t) ≡ rate of cash flow from the shipbuilding budget at time t,
X(t) ≡ rate of consumption of shipbuilding inputs at time t,
C(t) ≡ cost of shipbuilding inputs at time t,
Y (t) ≡ rate of ship production at time t.
Several assumptions were made to maintain simplicity and interpretably. These are
summarized in Table 4.1. First, we will assume that all state variables are continu-
ous. Since we are concerned with the long-run effects of process changes, short-run
discontinuities will have a minimal impact. As for building the ships themselves, it
is assumed that ship construction requires only one type of input. This is not an
inherent limitation of the approach, but rather, this is merely to avoid complicating
this notional example. Substitutability of inputs would require consideration in a
more detailed analysis, but here we will assume that required inputs such as labor
and materials are used in fixed proportions. Thus, we can treat all inputs as a single
package.
Next, we must model the cost of our input package. As noted earlier ship costs
have risen exponentially, and this is due to several factors including shipyard costs
and increasing complexity. Since these trends show no sign of abating, it is fairly safe
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Table 4.1: Summary of Modeling Assumptions.
Assumption Justification
Shipbuilding budget follows
geometric Brownian
motion.
Allows us to consider the
impact of growing or
declining volatile budgets.
Ship construction input
costs follow geometric
Brownian motion.
Models the exponential
growth in ship cost while
accounting for economic
noise in prices.
Ship production process is
governed by a
Cobb-Douglas production
function.
Allows us to consider the
impact of economies of
scale on the quantity of
ships produced.
Ship production is
continuous.
Allows us to focus on the
long-term trends in ship
production sustainability.
to assume that input costs for ships will continue to rise exponentially. Of course,
input costs are governed by economic forces, and consequently we would expect the
cost of our input package to fluctuate in price over time. Geometric Brownian motion
is a standard way to model prices that grow exponentially, so the cost of the input
package will be modeled with the following stochastic differential equation,
dC = αCCdt+ σCCdZ,
where αC is the expected growth rate of input cost, σC is the volatility of input cost,
and dZ is an increment of standard Brownian motion (i.e., a Wiener process).
Next, we must consider the shipbuilding budget. The shipbuilding budget is
not entirely predictable, yet not purely stochastic. While planning and budgeting
for particular programs begins years before the funds are actually appropriated and
spent, costs may change unpredictably and Congress may make adjustments as it
sees fit. Furthermore, laws governing appropriations require that major acquisitions
such as aircraft carriers be funded out of a single year’s budget, and this can result in
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significant jumps in the shipbuilding budget from year to year. To complicate matters
further, changes in world events, most notably wars, can lead to major swings in
defense spending. As indicated by Gansler, historically, the defense budget has been
quite volatile [28]. Consequently, this volatility should be considered in any model
of the shipbuilding budget. To that, end we will assume that the defense budget
also follows geometric Brownian motion. This leads us to the following model for the
annual shipbuilding budget,
dB = gBdt+ σBBdZ,
where g is the expected growth rate in the shipbuilding budget, and σB is the volatil-
ity of the budget. This model allows us to capture the general growth trend in the
defense budget, but at the same time capture its volatility. Now there are some
important caveats that must be mentioned regarding the use of geometric Brownian
motion to model the budget. First, budgets are appropriated annually (though there
is a limited ability to shift around funds within a budget year) while Brownian motion
varies continuously. This would suggest that a stochastic process over a discrete time
domain would be more appropriate. Admittedly, Brownian motion was largely se-
lected for analytic convenience, but since we are considering the long-run, the relative
impact of discrete time steps diminishes. Second, there are some cyclic features to
the shipbuilding budget. For example if an aircraft carrier is procured every seven
years, there will be a corresponding spike in the shipbuilding budget. However, as
we look beyond the current budget planning cycle, this becomes less of a concern
because there is a great deal of variability in the rate of acquisition since programs
may be stretched out or accelerated to suit the particular needs of the time. So once
again, the long-run view taken in this analysis diminishes the impact of this feature.
It was mentioned previously that defense production exhibits increasing returns
to scale. To represent this behavior, we require a production function. A production
function translates the rate of input consumption into a rate of output production,
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in this case ships. A standard production function in economics is the Cobb-Douglas
production function (see Varian, Chapter 1 [73]):
Y = AXa.
The Cobb-Douglas production function facilitates the representation of economies
of scale. When the parameter a is greater than 1, the production function exhibits
increasing returns to scale. Constant returns to scale may be represented by setting
a = 1 and decreasing returns to scale by setting 0 < a < 1.
Since the entire shipbuilding budget is expended on building ships, the rate of
input consumption is simply the ratio of the budget to the input cost.
X =
B
C
Thus, we can define the output, Y (t), as a function of input cost, C(t), and the
budget, B(t).
Y = A
(
B
C
)a
(4.1)
Unfortunately, since B and C are governed by geometric Brownian motion, we cannot
use Equation (4.1) as is. Instead, stochastic calculus is required to derive a model for
Y (t). Applying Ito’s Lemma to Equation (4.1)(see Shreve, Chapter 4 [70]), we obtain
the following stochastic differential equation for Y (t)
dY =
(
ag − aαC + a(a− 1)
2
σ2B − a2ρBCσBσC +
a(a+ 1)
2
σ2C
)
Y dt
+aσBY dZB − aσCY dZC (4.2)
(see Appendix D for the derivation). Note that ρBC is the coefficient of correlation
between the stochastic processes B(t) and C(t) such that E[dZBdZC ] = ρBCdt. While
it may not be obvious from Equation (4.2), the stochastic process Y (t) is also governed
by geometric Brownian motion with expected growth rate
αY = ag − aαC + a(a− 1)
2
σ2B − a2ρBCσBσC +
a(a+ 1)
2
σ2C (4.3)
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and volatility
σY = a
√
σ2B − 2ρBCσBσC + σ2C .
The proof of this is provided in Appendix D. Now, there is no reason to believe that
the budget process, B(t), is in any way correlated with the cost of ship input factors,
C(t). Thus, for much of this analysis it is assumed that ρBC = 0, but it is included
here for completeness.
To determine the total number of ships produced over a given time interval, we
must integrate Y (t) over t. Let YT be the number of ships produced over the interval
[0, T ]:
YT =
∫ T
0
Y (t)dt.
To find the expected number of ships produced over the interval, we simply find the
expected value of YT :
E[YT ] = E
[∫ T
0
Y (t)dt
]
=
Y0
αY
(eαY T − 1).
Thus, we now have a basic model of the ship production process that describes the
future output of navy ships, and this will serve as a basis for evaluating the efficacy
of any potential acquisition process improvements.
One immediate consequence of the model is that if αY < 0, then the rate of pro-
duction is decreasing over time. This would occur if costs are increasing faster than
the shipbuilding budget. Thus, we see that the model represents the phenomenon
described earlier in the section where, in the absence of change, the Navy will eventu-
ally be unable to procure any ships at all. To make this more concrete, let us assume
the notional parameter values listed in Table 4.2.
Note that we have initially set the the volatility parameters to zero. This consti-
tutes the deterministic case and will serve to illustrate the basic impact of economies
of scale. Note that costs are growing faster than the budget by 1% per year. How-
ever, if we examine the resulting output rate, we find that it is initially one ship per
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Table 4.2: Notional Parameter Values
Parameter Symbol Value
Initial Annual Budget Rate B0 $1 billion
Budget Growth Rate g 2%
Budget Volatility σB 0
Initial Input Unit Cost C0 $1 billion
Expected Cost Growth Rate αC 3%
Cost Volatility σC 0
Budget/Cost Correlation ρBC 0
Cobb-Douglas Production Parameter a 1.3
Cobb-Douglas Scaling Parameter A 1
year, but that it is declining by 1.3% per year. As a result, only 17.6 ships will be
built over the next 20 years. Note that since a = 1.3, the production function is
exhibiting increasing returns to scale. Thus, even though the difference between the
budget growth rate and the cost growth rate is 1%, the production level is declining
at faster rate. This occurs because reductions in order quantity force the use of more
inefficient production methods. The resulting waste means that there is an increase
in the amount of input required to build a single ship. If ship production exhibited
constant returns to scale (a = 1), the loss of production would mirror the budget
shortfall at 1% per year. Consequently, 18.1 ships would be produced over 20 years
as opposed to 17.6. This example clearly illustrates the dilemma faced by the ship
acquisition enterprise. Cost growth actually accelerates the force structure shortfall
when increasing returns to scale are present.
Of course, the reverse is true when we consider cost savings. Let us assume that
the acquisition process improvements proposed by the Navy would instantaneously
reduce input costs by 20%. Increasing returns to scale means that the ship production
rate increases by 34%. Contrast that with constant returns to scale which would only
boost the production rate by 25%. To put it more concretely, over the next 20
years, the Navy would be able to acquire 23.5 ships under increasing returns to scale
compared to 22.7 under constant returns to scale.
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Now what happens when there are fluctuations in the budget and input costs.
An examination of Equation (4.3) reveals that the dependency of αY on the budget
and cost growth rates, the budget and cost volatilities, and the production function
exponent can be quite complex. We see that when there is no uncertainty in the
input costs or budget, the growth rate behaves exactly as expected under increasing
returns to scale. It is merely the difference between the budget and cost growth
rates scaled by the production function exponent. When either the input costs or the
budget is volatile, however, we see that the volatilities alter the production growth
rate via quadratic functions of a. Budget uncertainty decreases the growth rate under
decreasing returns to scale but increases it under increasing returns to scale. Cost
uncertainty always increases the growth rate regardless of the economies of scale.
Thus, we see that somewhat contrary to expectations, volatility in the input costs
or budget can somewhat dampen the adverse impacts of increasing returns to scale
when cost growth outpaces budget growth. Of course, this result should not be taken
as absolute. Further examination of Equation (4.3) reveals that positive correlation
between the cost and budget streams will rapidly erode the volatility induced boost in
the production growth rate. Just to illustrate the point, if we increase the volatilities
of both the cost and the budget streams to 0.02, then we find that the production
rate is now only declining at 1.2% per year.
The model of shipbuilding developed in this section provides a means of evaluating
the impact of cost savings or efficiency improvements on the production of Navy
warships. But what is a change in production worth? To answer that question, the
the price index approach described in Section 4.2 will be applied to the output of the
acquisition model.
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4.5 Valuing a Process Improvement to the Ship Acquisition
Enterprise
The value of a process improvement is tied to the change in buying power that it
entails. To assess the buying power both before and after a process improvement, we
must a employ a price index. In the example problem presented in this analysis, we
are concerned with the number of ships that the Navy may purchase. Therefore, the
index must relate the price and number ships the Navy purchases with and without
the process improvement in place.
First, we require the production rate under the current acquisition process. This
will be designated as YC(t). Next, we need the production rate after the process
improvement is implemented, YN(t). The price per ship is determined by simply
dividing the budget rate by the production rate.
pC =
B
YC
,
pN =
B
YN
.
Using the Laspeyres index, we get
PL =
pNYC
pCYC
=
YC
YN
.
Since there is no substitution for ships with other military systems in our example,
computing the other two indices discussed in Section 4.2 reveals that all are equivalent
as expected:
PL = PP = PF =
YC
YN
.
Since the implemented process improvement should increase the production level,
the price index will be less than 1. Thus, ship prices have deflated, and the buying
power of the shipbuilding budget has increased. To value this increase, we must trans-
late it into monetary terms. This is accomplished by finding the amount of budget
increase required under the current process to achieve a level of buying power equiv-
alent to the reformed process. In other words, for a decision-maker to be indifferent
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between the process improvement and the status quo, he would require an augmented
budget stream. The size of the augmented budget rate is found by dividing the budget
rate by the price index.
B
PF
= B
YN
YC
.
The monetary gain in buying power is determined by simply subtracting out the
original budget rate.
B
YN
YC
−B.
To facilitate further analysis, let G(t) represent the augmented budget stream.
G = B
YN
YC
.
Of course, this expression can be simplified given the definition of Y (t).
G = B
(
CC
CN
)a
For analytic convenience, let us define a new process, K(t), such that K = CC/CN .
Applying Ito’s Lemma yields
dK = (αCC − αCN − ρCNσCCσCN + σ2CN )Kdt+ σCCKdZCC − σCNKdZCN
where ρCN is the correlation coefficient between the current and new cost streams.
Applying a logic similar to that presented in Appendix D, one can show that K(t) is
a geometric Brownian motion process with expected growth rate
αK = αCC − αCN − ρCNσCCσCN + σ2CN
and volatility
σK =
√
σ2CC − 2ρCNσCCσCN + σ2CN .
K(t) will prove useful later in the analysis, but for now it can be substituted back in
to the definition of G to obtain
G = BKa.
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Applying Ito’s Lemma to G results in
dG =
(
g + aαK + aρBKσBσK +
a(a− 1)
2
σ2K
)
Gdt
+σBGdZB + aσKGdZK . (4.4)
Of course, this too, is a geometric Brownian motion process with expected growth
rate
αG = g + aαK + aρBKσBσK +
a(a− 1)
2
σ2K
and volatility
σG =
√
σ2B + 2aρBKσBσK + a
2σ2K .
If we again assume that the fluctuations in the budget are uncorrelated with the
fluctuations in the cost of shipbuilding inputs (i.e., ρBK = 0), and we substitute for
αK and σK , we obtain
dG = αGGdt+ σGGdZG (4.5)
where
αG = g + a(αCC − αCN ) +
a
2
(σ2CN − σ2CC ) +
a2
2
(σ2CN − 2ρCNσCNσCC + σ2CC ) (4.6)
and
σG =
√
σ2B + a
2
(
σ2CN − 2ρCNσCNσCC ,+σ2CC
)
.
Thus, the model of G(t) provides a means of evaluating the value of an acquisition
process improvement provided that we can characterize the subsequent change in the
cost stream. Consequently, within the context of our model, we must consider changes
in acquisition costs in three ways: a change in the base cost level, a change in the
cost growth rate, and a change in the cost volatility. Eventually, we will consider
the impact of each of these changes, but first, to demonstrate the output of the
valuation model, we will assume that there is a one time drop in the base cost level.
Thus, the new cost structure is a fraction of the current [i.e., CN(t) = sCC(t), where
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0 < s < 1]. This means that the two cost streams have identical volatility and are
perfectly correlated. In this case G(t) simplifies dramatically to
dG = gGdt+ σBGdZG.
If we let r be the risk-free discount rate, then the expected net present value of the
increase in buying power when one switches from the current acquisition process to
the improved acquisition process is
NPV = E
[∫ ∞
0
[G(t)−B(t)]e−rtdt
]
=
B0
r − g
[(
1
s
)a
− 1
]
. (4.7)
when r > g. Note that the volatility of the budget and the cost streams has no
impact on the expected value for this special case, and thus, it devolves into the form
presented in Pennock, et. al., 2007 [57].
In order to make this result more concrete, it would be helpful to assign values to
the model parameters. To that end, let us first consider the US Navy shipbuilding
budget. Figure 4.2 depicts the US Navy shipbuilding budget from fiscal year (FY)
1980 to FY 2007 adjusted for inflation. The most obvious feature is that the budget
is quite volatile. This is in part due to the previously mentioned legal requirement
that the full procurement cost of a ship must be appropriated in a single budget year,
but the impact of world events and political prerogatives are certainly evident as well.
Notable features include the force structure buildup under the Reagan administration,
as well as the drop in ship construction following the end of the Cold War. For the
purposes of this analysis, we will focus on the post-Cold War trend in shipbuilding
where the average inflation adjusted budget growth rate has been approximately 2.8%
per year with a log-volatility of approximately 28%.
Since one of the assumptions of this model is that cost changes do not lead to
substitution among military systems, we will focus on a single class of Navy ships,
surface combatants. The primary surface combatant currently being procured by
the Navy is the Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer (DDG-51). They are
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Figure 4.2: The US Navy shipbuilding budget over the period 1980 to 2007 in FY
2000 dollars
being commissioned at a rate of about 3 per year and cost about $1 billion apiece.
Consequently, we will set the starting budget at $3 billion per year and the starting
cost at $1 billion per unit. As far as cost growth, Arena and colleagues indicate that
the cost of surface combatants has grown at a rate of 9.1% per year from 1965 to
2005 although approximately half of this cost growth is attributable to inflation [1].
Therefore, we will assume a cost growth rate of 4.5%. Unfortunately, Arena does
not characterize cost volatility. As a proxy we will consider the defense price index
published by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. An analysis of this index over
the period from 1947 to 2007 yields a log-volatility of approximately 3%. Since this
index should in some sense capture the fluctuations in the cost of procuring defense
systems, its volatility will serve as the proxy, albeit imperfect, for the cost volatility
of ship procurement.
Finally, we must consider the production function. Unfortunately, production ef-
ficiencies in the manufacture of military systems are typically discussed in terms of
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Table 4.3: Model Parameter Values
Parameter Symbol Value
Initial Annual Budget Rate B0 $3 billion
Budget Growth Rate g 2.8%
Budget Volatility σB 0.28
Initial Current Cost Rate CC0 $1 billion
Current Cost Growth Rate αCC 4.5%
Current Cost Volatility σCC 0.03
Cobb-Douglas Production Parameter a 1.3
Cobb-Douglas Scaling Parameter A 0.719
Discount Rate r 5%
learning curves rather than economies of scale, though the notion of efficient pro-
duction rates is certainly recognized. Consequently, there is little data regarding
the returns to scale in military shipbuilding. However, a GAO report regarding the
F-22 program provides data correlating order size with unit cost [35]. When a Cobb-
Douglas production function is fit to this data, the resulting production exponent is
1.35. To ere on the conservative side, a value of a = 1.3 will be used for the con-
struction of surface combatants. Since the current production rate is 3 per year, the
scaling coefficient A must be 0.719. Last but not least, we require a discount rate.
The standard 5% discount rate will suffice. The assumed parameters are summarized
in Table 4.3.
Returning to our model, if we apply these parameter values to Equation (4.7) and
assume a 5% decrease in acquisition costs (s = 0.95), we find that the net present
value of the increase in buying power is approximately $9.4 billion. Thus, through this
model, we can monetarily value a process improvement. But how does this compare
to cost savings? If we set a = 1, meaning constant constant returns to scale, we
obtain the NPV of the nominal cost savings. For this example the cost savings are
$7.2 billion, a 31% understatement of the true gain from implementing the process
improvement. Clearly, using cost savings as the sole criterion for valuing acquisition
process improvements can be quite misleading.
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4.6 Valuing an Option to Improve the Ship Acquisition En-
terprise
The previous section provided a method for valuing an improvement to the acquisition
enterprise, but what if the efficacy of the improvement is uncertain? What if it turns
out that the streamlining initiatives discussed in our example do not work in practice?
In most reform efforts, there is a certain amount of technical risk. Technical risk is
usually mitigated by staging the implementation of the new process. Each stage
provides an exit point that allows decision-makers to terminate the effort if adverse
information comes to light.
In our example, we will assume that there is a three stage process to implement a
process improvement for ship acquisition2. The first stage is concept development and
feasibility analysis. Since there are no actual acquisition programs involved in this
stage, it should be relatively short and inexpensive. If the concept is determined to be
infeasible or not cost effective, the process improvement project may be terminated
at no additional cost. The second stage is a pilot test of the process improvement on
the acquisition of a single ship. Failure in this stage will likely mean problems in the
acquisition of the ship in question. In that event, we will assume that the Navy will
still want to acquire the ship, and, consequently, rework will be required to complete
the acquisition. Finally, the third stage is the enterprise-wide implementation of the
acquisition process improvement. If there is a failure in this stage, substantial costs
will be incurred because the acquisition of multiple ships will be adversely impacted.
Since a low-risk, high-return project fares well under any decision criterion, the true
value of the options approach lies in the evaluation of risky projects. Consequently,
the values of the staging parameters were deliberately chosen to create a high risk of
failure, and they are presented in Table 4.4.
2It should be noted that while the staging setup presented here is similar to that presented in
Pennock, et. al., 2007 [57], the differences in the underlying shipbuilding model require a more
sophisticated means of evaluation.
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Table 4.4: Stage Parameter Values
Stage Stage Cost P(Success) Rework Cost Duration
($ billions) ($ billions) (years)
1 0.001 0.4 0 0.5
2 0.01 0.6 1 3
3 0.1 0.8 10 N/A
“Stage Cost” is the funding required to execute each stage, and “Rework Cost”
is the cost incurred if the process improvement fails during the associated stage.
“P(Success)” is the probability that the process improvement is successfully imple-
mented in a given stage. Finally, “Duration” is the length of each stage. Note that
the program costs are borne external to the shipbuilding budget.
The three stage implementation process essentially provides acquisition decision-
makers with a series of options. At each stage they must decide whether or not it
is worthwhile to continue the project. This is analogous to a compound call option,
where buying the first option gives one the right to buy another option. What we
would like to know is the value of this compound option. While the analytic valua-
tion of compound options can be challenging, fortunately, straightforward numerical
methods exist to evaluate complex options. Most are based on the principle that
geometric Brownian motion can be approximated using a random walk, and one of
the most popular is the binomial lattice method developed by Cox, Ross, and Ru-
binstein [15]. It functions by employing a random walk in which the state variable
can only move discretely up or down. The moves are multiplicative, and the down
move is the reciprocal of the up move. Thus, the resulting achievable state space
forms a lattice, hence the name. With a discrete state space, the option is effectively
a decision tree and can be solved using backwards induction. The binomial lattice
method can achieve an arbitrary level of accuracy by reducing the size of the time
step.
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If we consider our previous example that valued a proportional drop in shipbuild-
ing costs (See Equation (4.7)), we note that the net present value depended only on a
single stochastic process, B(t). However, when we took the expectation of the NPV,
the volatility of B(t) did not affect the value. Of course, that assumed there was no
cost and no risk to achieve the process improvement. If, on the other hand, there are
costs and risks, it would be prudent to implement the described three-stage process.
This provides decision makers with the opportunity to exit the improvement effort
prior to completion because of technical failures or unfavorable fluctuations in the
shipbuilding budget. Therefore, we must consider the stochastic behavior of B(t) in
the valuation of the option. Fortunately, the binomial lattice method (or any other
lattice method for that matter) can be used to account for this behavior. When we
apply a lattice method to this option, we find that the net option value (NOV) of
the option to implement the acquisition process improvement is approximately $1.09
billion. One may note that this is a considerable drop in value from the $9.4 billion
calculated before we included the technical risk.
For comparison, the NPV of this improvement opportunity is approximately
−$5.88 billion. Thus, NPV would imply that the Navy should expect to incur a
loss if it initiates the acquisition reform project. The difference between the NPV
and the NOV is attributable to NPV’s failure to consider the value of staging. Thus,
a decision-maker who utilized NPV as a decision criterion in the context of our ex-
ample would incorrectly reject this reform opportunity.
Of course, it seems unlikely that the stochastic behavior of the cost stream would
be exactly the same after the acquisition process improvement is implemented. In
the following example, we will relax this assumption. Now, the new cost stream will
have a higher volatility and only partial correlation with original cost stream. For
the time being we will keep the cost growth rates identical in order to focus on the
impact of the volatility. Unfortunately, relaxing these assumptions means that G(t)
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Table 4.5: Market Risk Parameter Values
Parameter Symbol Value
Initial New Cost Rate CN0 $0.95 billion
New Cost Growth Rate αCN 4.5%
New Cost Volatility σCN 0.04
Cost Stream Correlation ρCN 0.9
Budget/Cost Correlation ρBK 0
is dependent upon the stochastic fluctuations in input costs. This means that its
behavior is described by the stochastic differential equation (4.5), and the value of
the process improvement is now dependent upon three stochastic state variables B(t),
CC(t), and CN(t).
Since the binomial lattice method can only accommodate a single stochastic state
variable, another method is required to evaluate the process improvement option.
A generalization of the binomial lattice method by Kamrad and Ritchken expands
the lattice concept to handle an arbitrary number of stochastic state variables [44].
Like any dynamic programming method, however, Kamrad and Ritchken’s method
suffers from the curse of dimensionality. That is the state space becomes more and
more unmanageable as the number of states increases. Thus, while we could certainly
use the method to evaluate a three-state lattice, it would be more computationally
efficient if we could reduce the dimensionality of the problem. It was observed earlier
that the value of the process improvement depends on the ratio of the cost processes,
and that this ratio is also governed by a geometric Brownian motion process, K(t)
(See Equation (4.4)). Therefore, we may evaluate the option to implement a process
improvement with a two-state lattice over B(t) and K(t).
To evaluate the option where there is a volatility shift in the cost stream, we will
use the previous parameter set (Tables 4.3 and 4.4), plus the additional parameters
listed in Table 4.5 to model the market risk. There is still a drop a 5% drop in the
base cost, but now each cost stream has its own volatility. Of course the cost streams
will still be sensitive to many of the same economic perturbations, so the coefficient
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of correlation was set to 90%. When we calculate the net option value, we find that
it has jumped to $2.08 billion. Why such a large increase? It is a well known result
that volatility increases the value of an option. This is because of the downside risk
mitigation provided by staging. Each stage provides decision-makers the opportunity
to cancel the project due to an unexpected change in the input costs. Imagine if input
costs declined precipitously. The savings realized through the increased efficiency of
the acquisition process reform may no longer be sufficient to justify the costs to
implement the reform. It should also be noted that since G(t) is a function of the
two cost streams, there is also an interaction effect at work. An examination of
Equation (4.6) reveals that differences in the stochastic behavior of the old and new
cost streams can also increase the growth rate of G(t). This is evident in the NPV
which has increased to −$4.9 billion because of the difference in volatilities.
For the last example in this section, we will relax the assumption that the cost
growth rate is unchanged after the acquisition process reform is implemented. In the
end, the cost growth rate is really what matters. A drop in the base cost level of
ship acquisition is certainly worth something, but as long as costs continue to grow
faster than the shipbuilding budget, it is simply delaying the inevitable. Fortunately,
even small decreases in the cost growth rate can have a major impact. If the cost
growth rate drops below the budget growth rate, the shipbuilding enterprise becomes
sustainable. To illustrate this point, let us reduce the input cost growth rate for the
improved acquisition process a tenth of a percent (i.e., αCN is reduced from 4.5% to
4.4%). This results in an NOV of $3.95 billion, a substantial increase. If the process
improvement were to achieve a cost growth rate of 3%, the net option value explodes
to $323 billion. Considering that the outlay for the first stage is only $1 million, it is
quite an attractive investment.
In order to better understand the general behavior of the model, sensitivity anal-
ysis was performed on the key model parameters, and the results are provided in
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Figures 4.3 and 4.4. First, we consider the sensitivity of the NOV to the cost growth
rates. Figure 4.3a reveals that as the growth rate of the new cost stream, αCN , ap-
proaches the growth rate of the budget, the option value increases rapidly. This is
because when the cost growth rate and the budget growth rate are the same, the
production rate is sustainable. Similarly, as the budget growth rate, g, approaches
the new cost growth rate, the same behavior is observed (Figure 4.3c).
Figure 4.3d reveals that changes in the two correlation coefficients yield opposing
shifts in option value. As the correlation between the current and new cost streams,
ρCN , increases, the value of the option decreases slightly. This is because when ρCN
is high, the current and new cost streams tend to move together. Consequently, there
are fewer opportunities to exploit favorable relative movements in cost. The reverse
is true, however, for correlation between the budget and the cost ratio, K(t). This
occurs because the value of the process improvement is dependent upon the product
of B(t) and K(t). Thus, correlated movements exaggerate the volatility of the value
of the process improvement and create more exploitable opportunities. As mentioned
previously, it is a well known result from options theory that an increase in volatility
leads to an increase in the value of an option.
Finally, we consider the sensitivity of the NOV to the volatilities. Figure 4.4a
reveals that increasing the volatilities of the current and new cost streams leads to
opposite outcomes. This occurs because an increase in the volatility of the new
cost stream has a positive impact on the growth rate of the value of the process
improvement, αG, while an increase in the volatility of the current cost stream has
the opposite effect (See Equation (4.6)). If we consider an increase in the volatility
of the budget, σB, Figure 4.4b reveals that it has a negligible impact under our
assumption that the budget is uncorrelated with costs. If, however, we assume that
the budget is correlated with the cost ratio (ρBK = 0.5), increasing budget volatility
results in increasing NOV. The rationale is the same as for the impact of changing
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ρBK .
Through the series of examples presented above, it has been demonstrated that
it is possible to value acquisition process improvements monetarily while still con-
sidering the fact that efficiency improvements change what is bought. Furthermore,
the application of the options approach reveals that failure to consider the risk mit-
igation inherent in staged investments can cause decision-makers to reject otherwise
valuable opportunities. It is important to note that all of the examples thus far have
assumed risk-neutrality on the part of the decision-maker. While this should theoret-
ically be true in a government context, in practice, most individual decision-makers
are risk-averse. Since it would be impractical and possibly detrimental to include risk
aversion in the option valuation, the next section will present a portfolio method for
evaluating possible acquisition process improvements that will allow decision-makers
to trade-off risk and return.
4.7 A Portfolio Approach to Investment Selection
The portfolio approach accounts for risk attitudes by evaluating an investment in
terms of both the expected return as well as the uncertainty in the return3. By
considering the whole portfolio of possible investment options, decisionmakers are
able to explicitly trade-off risk and return. Return in this context would be the net
option value calculated using the method developed in this chapter. As for risk, there
are many possible metrics, but here we consider two, the probability of a loss and the
conditional expected loss. The probability of a loss is the likelihood that any loss at
all occurs, and the conditional expected loss is the expected loss assuming that one
occurs. These are both characterizations of downside risk. The portfolio concept is
illustrated in Figure 4.5. Alternative investments, denoted by the Ps, are plotted in
3It should be noted that the portfolio concept for acquisition improvements was first introduced
in Rouse, et. al., 2006 [65] and was subsequently expanded in Pennock, et. al., 2007 [57]. This section
represents a further evolution of that concept.
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terms of expected return and risk. In this case, the risk is expressed as the conditional
expected loss.
NOV
Conditional Expected Loss
P1
P2
P3
P4 P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
P10
NOV = $3.95B
CEL = $1.2B
Figure 4.5: Notional portfolio of acquisition reform projects.
One may note that this is conceptually somewhat similar to Markowitz portfo-
lio theory [49–52]. Under Markowitz portfolio theory, securities investments are also
plotted based on their risk and return, and individual securities may be combined in
portfolios to create new investment options with different risk and return character-
istics. The risks and returns of these new portfolios are simply linear functions of the
risks and returns of the constituent securities. The non-dominated set of portfolios
constitutes the efficient frontier, and an investor would only ever purchase a portfolio
from this frontier.
Where the analogy breaks down is in the combination of process improvements.
More than likely, the simultaneous implementation of multiple process improvements
will lead to some interaction effects. If two process improvements were to have a syn-
ergistic effect, then the return from combination of the two would be greater than the
sum of the individual returns. Alternatively, the two process improvements could in-
terfere with each other and actually reduce the realized benefit from implementation.
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Thus, the evaluation of combinations of process improvements is not as straightfor-
ward as in Markowitz portfolio theory. Even so, it is still possible to consider a set of
process improvements, but it would require modeling the set altogether and reevalu-
ating the risk and return. This would essentially constitute a new project that would
be placed in the portfolio plot.
Returning to the portfolio plot, we can see that the set of acquisition process
improvements has an efficient frontier just as in Markowitz theory. This is indicated
by the solid lines in Figure 4.5. A decision maker evaluating acquisition process im-
provements for possible investment would only want to choose one from this frontier.
Take, for instance, P4 and P5. Both provide the same return, but clearly P5 is more
risky. Consideration of the efficient frontier allows a decision-maker to find a project
that provides the appropriate balance of risk versus return.
In order to understand the motivation for the portfolio approach to acquisition
reform investments, it is necessary to provide some discussion of risk attitudes. The
previously described option valuation method implies that the decision-maker is risk-
neutral. A risk-neutral decision-maker is one who is indifferent between the expected
value of a risky return and the equivalent lump sum. In contrast, a risk-averse
decision-maker would prefer the certainty of the lump sum. Generally speaking,
one would expect a large organization with sufficient resources to safely absorb any
potential loss to be risk-neutral. However, the decision-makers within the government
are not likely to view a failed initiative as very favorable for their careers, and thus,
they would probably exhibit risk aversion. The standard way to handle risk aver-
sion in real options analysis is through market mechanisms, but as explained earlier,
this is not feasible in a government context. Another way to handle risk attitudes
is through multi-attribute utility theory. Utility theory involves assessing a decision-
maker’s preferences quantitatively and translating them into a dimensionless measure
through utility functions. This is impractical in this context for two reasons. First,
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since these decisions are being made in the public domain, they are subject to scrutiny
by elected officials and the public. A decision-maker’s personal utility score will not
likely satisfy either group as sufficient justification for a decision with implications
for the well-being of US national security. Second, utility would effectively eliminate
the monetary valuation we just developed and would complicate assessment of any
return on investment.
The portfolio approach provides a compromise position. Projects to improve ac-
quisition processes are still assessed using a risk-neutral approach, but we may also
assess the probability distribution of their outcomes. This will allow us to extract
measures of uncertainty for consideration by decision-makers. There is a latent in-
consistency in this approach, however. There is an implicit assumption that after the
initial investment decision, the decision-maker will behave in a risk-neutral manner
for the subsequent stages. With that caveat, it is fairly safe to say that most decision-
makers would likely prefer some description of the risk, albeit imperfect, to none at
all.
Assessing the distribution analytically would be difficult if not impossible in most
practical situations. Instead, Monte Carlo simulation may be used to approximate
the distribution of an option’s value. Since the lattice method employed previously
is essentially a random walk combined with a decision tree, it is trivial to generate
sample paths over the lattice. The value received when the final stage of the project is
implemented is more challenging. If there is no analytic solution for the distribution of
the terminal value, it must be simulated as well. For the example problem presented
in Section 4.7, we must simulate the Brownian motion paths of the gain in buying
power. Once again, a random walk is the most straightforward means to approximate
Brownian motion, and this can be accomplished by simply extending the lattice. Since
the extended lattice must still have a finite horizon, the expected present value of the
remaining cash flow serves as a terminal value. Thus, the longer the lattice horizon,
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the more accurately variation will be captured.
To illustrate this method, we will return to our acquisition process improvement
example from Section 4.7. In particular, we will consider the case were αCN = 4.4%
and αCC = 4.5%. The Monte Carlo simulation was run for 1 million iterations with an
extended lattice horizon of 100 years. Of course, the expected value of the resulting
distribution is the same as the NOV calculated in the last example of Section ($3.95
billion). The variation in the NOV is substantial, however, with a standard deviation
of $134 billion. Why such a large spread? First, the discrete nature of the staging
combined with significant technical risk means that there is a mode corresponding
to the losses incurred from failure at each stage. Second, if the process improvement
is successfully implemented, the high volatility of the budget means that there is a
large spread in the realized increase in buying power. Consequently, we are faced
with a fairly complicated probability distribution that would be quite difficult for
decision-makers to interpret. Thus, the motivation for the risk measures described
earlier is apparent.
Returning to the example, the probability of a loss for this acquisition process im-
provement is approximately 83%, and the conditional expected loss is approximately
$1.2 billion. We may use the net option value in conjunction with the conditional
expected loss to place the project in the portfolio depicted in Figure 4.5. Further-
more, the two risk measures also tell us that there is a very high probability that this
project will fail, but if it does fail, the expected cost is relatively low compared with
the potential returns.
While the portfolio approach is not a perfect means to consider risk, it does provide
decision-makers with a method for harnessing a monetary valuation of acquisition
reform initiatives in conjunction with a justifiable means of risk valuation. This
will lend significantly more credibility to acquisition reform decisions. It is much
more likely that elected officials will accept a high probability of loss as a reason for
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dismissing an otherwise high-value project than a low utility score.
4.8 Summary and Policy Implications
The lack of objective criteria for evaluating defense outcomes has long been a stum-
bling block in defense policy debates. When we consider the domain of defense acqui-
sition reform, the problem is somewhat simplified. It is not necessary to determine
what to buy, only how to buy it more efficiently. To that end, the traditional ap-
proach to evaluating process improvements is to consider nominal cost savings. The
analysis presented in this chapter, however, has demonstrated that cost savings can
significantly understate the value of an acquisition process improvement. Economies
of scale within the acquisition enterprise induce a non-linear response to cost reduc-
tions. Thus, the government does not buy the same things for less, it changes what
and how much it buys. To account for the change in buying power that results from
an acquisition process improvement, price indices similar to those used to track in-
flation were introduced. Price indices allow for the determination of an augmented
budget that is equivalent to the increase in buying power. This augmented budget
provides the basis for valuing an acquisition process improvement monetarily.
Of course, there is always risk involved in any process change. Market risk and
technical risk can reduce the value of an investment opportunity. Fortunately, stag-
ing an investment can mitigate downside loss and restore some value. The traditional
means of investment valuation, NPV, fails to account for the staging effect and, thus,
can significantly under value investments. Options analysis, on the other hand, over-
comes the shortcomings of NPV and appropriately values staged investments. Cou-
pling the monetary valuation of buying power with options analysis yields a valuation
method that remedies the shortcomings of past approaches.
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Even with staging, some risk remains. Thus, it is imperative to provide decision-
makers with a means to trade between risk and return. The portfolio method devel-
oped in this chapter does just that. By plotting potential acquisition reform projects
by their return and a risk metric, decision-makers may compare alternatives and find
one that presents the best balance of risk and return. Most importantly, the basis of
the decision is justifiable, a crucial characteristic in government policymaking.
The method presented here not only makes strides to remediate the lack of objec-
tive decision criteria to support defense acquisition policymaking, but it also leads to
some policy implications. The first is that even small changes can have tremendous
value. Such opportunities may have been overlooked in the past due to the shortcom-
ings of traditional valuation methods or the lack of any valuation method at all, but
when economies of scale and the risk mitigation effects of staging are properly con-
sidered, their value becomes apparent. Second, to achieve a sustainable acquisition
program, it is necessary to look beyond just production. Concepts such as six sigma
and lean manufacturing are certainly beneficial, but they will not solve the affordabil-
ity problem of military systems. Instead, one must consider the entire enterprise from
defense authorizations in Congress to the management of the supplier base. Thus,
this chapter echoes the theme presented in Chapter 3. Only by treating the entire
acquisition enterprise as a system will it be possible to find effective solutions to the
problems that have plagued defense acquisition for over 50 years.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Despite over 50 years of effort and hundreds, if not thousands, of additions and
alterations to the laws and regulations governing defense acquisition, most concerned
participants are not satisfied with the operation of the defense acquisition enterprise.
There is a general sense that military systems take too long and cost too much to
develop and acquire. While certainly some of this disappointment can be attributed
to unrealistic expectations, nearly every single defense acquisition program finishes
over budget and behind schedule. Numerous studies and audits have revealed that
the normal operation of the acquisition system leads to waste and delay. Among the
causes are the extensive use of immature technology, significant concurrency between
program phases, and unstable funding and requirements.
In Chapter 1, three possible contributors to the failure of acquisition reform were
identified: misalignment of incentives, a lack of systems view, and a lack of objective
evaluation criteria. This dissertation considered each of these three factors in turn. In
Chapter 2, the acquisition system was modeled as a game where stakeholders in mili-
tary acquisition competed to meet their respective objectives for deployed capability.
The game revealed that a tragedy of the commons is at work where participants in
the defense acquisition system are incentivized to act in contradiction to regulations.
In Chapter 3, a simulation of the defense acquisition system was developed to eval-
uate the latest acquisition transformation initiative, evolutionary acquisition. The
simulation revealed that proponents of evolutionary acquisition have been overly fo-
cused on individual programs rather than the system as a whole. While evolutionary
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acquisition should reduce the cost and increase the performance of individual acquisi-
tion programs, it could potentially raise the cost of operating the acquisition system
as a whole.
Finally, in Chapter 4, an assessment method was developed to monetarily value
and compare improvements to the defense acquisition system. A comparison of the
developed method to traditional means of evaluation revealed that failure to consider
the full set of economic forces at work can lead to a significant underestimation of
the impact of a process improvement. It also demonstrated that it is possible to
quantitatively asses the impact of acquisition reform.
These results indicate that there is some validity to the suggested causes of ac-
quisition transformation failure. There is an incentive for stakeholders in the defense
acquisition system to push for technology that is more immature than recommended
by DoD best practices, and clearly, the lack of a systems view has lead to unrealistic
expectations from evolutionary acquisition policies. Finally, the traditional means of
assessing cost savings tends to undervalue improvements to defense acquisition and
potentially leads to erroneous assumptions regarding the validity of process improve-
ments.
5.1 Recommendations for Improving the Efficacy of De-
fense Acquisition Transformation
A contemplation of the results presented in the previous chapters naturally leads to
several recommendations to improve the efficacy of efforts to transform the defense
acquisition system. While it is not expected that the implementation of these rec-
ommendations will cure all that ails defense acquisition, the sheer size and import of
the enterprise means that even small improvements can have significant payoffs.
First, before any change in acquisition policy is instituted, policymakers should
consider whether the incentives are aligned with the objectives of the policy. Often,
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acquisition policy changes are declarations of what should be without any consid-
eration of the context in which the declaration is imposed. One must assume that
all participants will act in their own best interests. This is not to suggest that all
participants in the defense acquisition system are selfish. Rather, different stakehold-
ers will have different views on the priority and import of the various outputs of the
acquisition system. For example, an Air Force officer may perceive that global preci-
sion strike from air or space assets is the key to realizing US national security goals.
A Navy officer, on the other hand, may feel that the access and power projection
provided by sea basing is the imperative. Consequently, both will seek to pursue
what they believe is in the best interests of the United States, possibly in opposition
to each other. The result is that participants in the defense acquisition enterprise
may harm the realization of their own goals even when behaving rationally. Such
outcomes constitute a classic tragedy of the commons where acquisition programs
serve as common resources to be exploited by multiple stakeholders. The result is
over-exploitation of the resources to the detriment of all.
Consequently, this type of behavior may reduce the efficacy of acquisition reform
policies. There are really only two potential solutions to this problem. The first is
oversight and enforcement. Compliance with rules and regulations would be closely
monitored and strictly enforced. Unfortunately, this tends to lead to a significant
amount of overhead, and participants may still find ways to “game” the system.
Second, design the policy such that participants are incentivized to comply. In other
words, with the proper incentives, actors in the defense acquisition system will behave
in the desired manner even without enforcement. In the commercial world this can
be achieved by establishing ownership or tying compensation to the desired outcome.
The second option is really preferable, but it may be challenging to craft incentives
in a public sector environment. In reality, some combination of the two approaches
will likely be required.
131
The next major recommendation is that potential acquisition policies should be
analyzed in the context of the entire defense acquisition system before they are imple-
mented. Chapter 1 discussed the vacillation between extremes in defense acquisition
reform initiatives (e.g., increased oversight versus streamlining and COTS versus MIL-
SPEC). The defense acquisition enterprise is a large and complex system. Any change
to that system is likely to entail unintended consequences, and consequently, there
are tradeoffs to consider regarding the imposition of any acquisition policy. The vac-
illation in acquisition policy is in large part attributable to a failure by policy makers
to consider the tradeoffs inherent in their decisions. Only through systems modeling
and analysis is there any hope of understanding the extent of a policy’s impact.
An example of the application of systems modeling was presented in Chapter 3
where evolutionary acquisition technology policies were examined in the context of
the entire defense acquisition system. The analysis revealed that what was expected
to be an all-around improvement in terms of the cost, performance, and speed of
acquisition programs through the use of evolutionary policies is actually a tradeoff.
One can use evolutionary acquisition to improve performance and speed but possibly
at additional cost. Similar analyses should be performed on every acquisition reform
considered by the DoD, Congress, or the President.
Finally, the third major recommendation is that policymakers should systemati-
cally consider the full economic impacts of their decisions. The DoD is in the unique
position that it is involved in nearly every piece of the defense value chain and is
virtually the only customer. As a result, it cannot share the burden of maintain-
ing the defense industry with others. Any decision that it makes affects the health
and efficiency of the defense industry and can have wide-ranging implications. For
example, a decision to cancel a program could cause a supplier of key components
to go bankrupt. The next time those components are required, the DoD must es-
sentially rebuild that competency at considerable cost in time and money. This is
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not to suggest that these factors are not considered by policymakers. They certainly
are. Rather, a lack of appropriate analysis tools has hindered their ability to fully
understand the impacts, and the tools developed in this dissertation constitute at
a step toward remediating that problem. A more systematic approach to assessing
value using appropriate economic and investment tools could lead to more objective
and interpretable measurements of outcomes. Objective measurement of outcomes
means that policy alternatives can be compared and contrasted as was demonstrated
in Chapter 4.
5.2 Recommendations Regarding the Implementation of Evo-
lutionary Acquisition
Since a significant portion of this dissertation dealt with evolutionary acquisition,
there are recommendations specific to that initiative that logically follow from the
findings presented in this dissertation. They are as follows:
First, technology maturity requirements should not be optional. The intent of evo-
lutionary acquisition is to create shorter acquisition cycles that make more modest, or
evolutionary, increases in system capability. Immature technology introduces signifi-
cant cost and schedule risks that preclude short acquisition cycles. Chapter 2 revealed
that for systems that provide multiple capabilities, stakeholders are incentivized to
push for immature technology. Thus, the DoD should not expect compliance with
evolutionary acquisition technology recommendations when either maturity require-
ments are optional or exemptions are routinely granted.
Second, evolutionary acquisition is more appealing for programs with low devel-
opment and procurement costs. While evolutionary acquisition has the potential
to increase the average performance of systems in the field, this performance gain
may come at additional cost. Shorter acquisition cycles mean that development and
procurement costs are incurred more frequently than under traditional acquisition
methods. Of course, the lower these costs are, the more cost effective evolutionary
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acquisition becomes. Additional research is required to definitively understand how
shifting to evolutionary acquisition affects these cycle costs.
Third, the costs of evolutionary acquisition can be controlled by increasing the
time between acquisition cycles. If deploying new systems at the fastest possible rate
is too expensive, simply insert a delay between cycles. This results in some sacrifice of
average performance in the field, but allows for a stable acquisition technology policy
while still managing costs. A possible trade-off, however, is that periods of inactivity
may adversely impact the industrial base.
Fourth, evolutionary acquisition is more important for military specific technolo-
gies. Technology development is dependent upon experimentation, testing, and learn-
ing. For technologies that are unique to the military, the only sources of information
on the performance and shortcomings of technologies is through the deployment and
use of military systems. Slower acquisition cycles mean slower learning. Consequently,
evolutionary acquisition, through its faster acquisition cycles, has the potential to in-
crease the rate of improvement of military technologies.
Fifth, evolutionary acquisition depends on a well-funded R&D system. Since
acquisition programs require mature technology under evolutionary acquisition, it
is incumbent upon the defense R&D system to oversee the timely maturation of
technologies. If this process is starved of funding, the DoD would be better off
employing traditional acquisition approaches.
Finally, as the speed of acquisition cycles increase, the rate of technology devel-
opment becomes the limiting factor. When acquisition cycles proceed faster than the
development of new technologies, there is no gain to deploying a new system. Thus, if
evolutionary acquisition successfully reduces acquisition cycle time, the full benefits
may not be realized if the technology development process serves as a bottleneck.
Therefore, a well-managed technology development process that aligns technologies
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and funding with needs is imperative to successfully implementing evolutionary ac-
quisition.
5.3 Future Work
The results presented in this dissertation suggests several avenues for future work.
As stated in Chapter 1, there is a decided lack of academic research in the field of
defense acquisition, and consequently, there is a plethora of research questions that
merit a substantial amount of attention from researchers.
The first and perhaps most pressing need, is the application of game theory to
additional areas in the defense acquisition enterprise. There have been some instances
of its application in the past, but not nearly to the extent merited by the magnitude
of the problem. Chapter 2 revealed a tragedy of the commons at work regarding
technology policy, but there are many other problem areas that merit further study.
Among these are competition both between programs and between the services for
funding, the behavior of program managers, and the bidding by and competition
between defense contractors. A closer examination of these topics will likely reveal
the underlying mechanisms that drive the undesirable behavior often exhibited by
participants in defense acquisition. Understanding these mechanisms is a prerequisite
to designing effective policies to combat such behavior.
The importance of this research topic is evident in the history of defense acqui-
sition. Countless policy reforms have resulted in little or no change in the behavior
of participants in the defense acquisition enterprise. No policy, no matter how well
conceived, can be effective when it is ignored or circumvented. Consequently, a better
understanding of the motives of participants in defense acquisition is imperative to
successful transformation.
Second, the analysis of evolutionary acquisition presented in Chapter 3 is really
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a first step in analyzing a complex problem. The simulation model of defense ac-
quisition, in particular, could be extended to answer additional questions regarding
evolutionary acquisition and the operation of the defense acquisition system. First
and foremost, further investigation into the relationship between the targeted level of
capability improvement of an acquisition cycle and the cost and duration of system
development, production, and deployment is required. Understanding this relation-
ship is critical to fully understanding the cost implications of evolutionary acquisition.
Additionally, the simulation could be modified to consider concurrency among pro-
gram phases, acceleration of technology development, operations and maintenance
costs, system integration issues, acquisition program budgeting issues, alternative
technology management schemes, and the inclusion of the JCIDS and PPBE. While
it is unlikely that the inclusion of any of these factors will alter the basic findings
of Chapter 3, a better understanding of these issues will lead to a more detailed
understanding of the tradeoffs inherent to evolutionary acquisition. Furthermore,
understanding how the pieces of the defense acquisition enterprise interact would
hopefully lead to more effective acquisition policies on the whole.
Finally, the process improvement valuation method developed in Chapter 4 is a
proof-of-concept. Since it is fairly theoretical, substantial additional work would be
required to transform it into a practical tool for decision-makers. Among the required
improvements would be the addition of discrete state variables where appropriate,
more complex production functions, and consideration of force structure reallocations.
The monetary valuation of an improvement program significantly enhances the ability
to justify its implementation. The value of such justification in public policy cannot
be overstated. Quantitative assessments of value significantly improve the ability
of policy makers to objectively compare and contrast policy alternatives as well as
garner support for their implementation.
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5.4 Summary
The defense acquisition enterprise is a unique institution, and it is often criticized for
its inefficiencies. However, citizens, elected officials, and even members of the defense
department itself must realize that defense acquisition will never be as efficient as the
private sector. The economics of the situation simply preclude it. The government
essentially funds and manages an entire industry by itself. In order to retain certain
capabilities that have no other commercial application, the government must pay a
premium to preserve the required expertise and equipment even when they are not
in use. Furthermore, the public nature of defense funding precludes the efficient
budgeting and management of acquisition programs. Even so, there are certainly
ways for the Department of Defense to get more for its money within the constraints
in which it operates.
Acquisition reform has been a popular issue with politicians for over 50 years,
yet repeated attempts to transform the acquisition enterprise have yielded little ben-
efit. In fact, reform initiatives often impose the same policy changes as previous
attempts without any consideration of why the previous effort failed. The logical
question then is why have so many transformation efforts failed? Three contributing
factors to transformation failure were identified and analyzed in this dissertation, and
recommendations were made to remediate these issues. It is expected that these rec-
ommendations, if implemented, may help, but they are not likely to produce drastic
changes in the cost of military systems. The drivers of system cost increases involve
far more than just inefficiency. Ultimately, there are no easy answers, but the impor-
tance of the defense acquisition enterprise and the proper stewardship of public funds
are sufficient justification to merit the continued expenditure of effort to achieve the
best possible performance.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 2
This appendix contains the proofs of the theorems presented in Chapter 2. The
following lemma is required for the proofs and so is presented first.
Lemma A.1. Given the assumptions of the model and symmetric technologies, Y (g, n) =
A(n)W (g) + I where 1 ≤ A(n) ≤ n and A(n) is strictly increasing in n.
Proof. First, we will prove that Y (g, n) = A(n)W (g) + I. We know from the model
assumptions that Y (g, n) = E[XM ] + I, so we must show that E[XM ] = A(n)W (g).
Recall that XM = max(X1, X2, . . . , Xn), and that the distribution of Xi will vary
with g (i.e., Xi ∼ FX(x; g)). As indicated in Section 2.2, given the distribution of
Xi for any one value of g, we can determine the distribution of Xi for every other
value of g through an affine transformation on Xi. Thus, we only need to specify
one distribution to obtain the rest. To that end, let g1 be the value of g such that
W (g1) = 1. Let us assume that we know distribution of Xi for the case g = g1 (i.e.,
FX(x; g1)). For notational purposes let us designate Xi for this particular of value
of g1 as D with the the distribution of FD(d) = FX(x; g1). Consequently, E[D] = 1,
and the value of Xi for any value of g can be found through the affine transformation
Xi = W (g)D. Thus, we can state that
XM = max(W (g)D1,W (g)D2, . . . ,W (g)Dn),
XM = W (g) max(D1, D2, . . . , Dn),
XM = W (g)DM ,
E[XM ] = W (g)E[DM ].
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Since E[DM ] is a function of n but not g, we can state that E[XM ] = A(n)W (g). It
follows directly that since E[DM ] is strictly increasing in n that A(n) must be as well.
Finally, we prove that 1 ≤ A(n) ≤ n. From the first part we know that
A(n) =
E[XM ]
E[X]
= n
∫∞
0
xF n−1(x; g)f(x; g)dx∫∞
0
xf(x; g)dx
.
Since E[XM ] is greater than E[X], A(n) ≥ 1. Since 0 ≤ F n−1(x; g) ≤ 1 the integrand
of the numerator must be less than the integrand of the denominator. Therefore, the
fraction must be less than 1 and A(n) ≤ n
Proof of Theorem 2.1. This proof consists of two parts. First, we must prove the
existence of a unique optimum. Second, we must prove that the optimal solution
decreases as n increases.
Since the policy is symmetric, we can assume that g = g1 = g2 = · · · = gn. Thus,
the optimization problem reduces to
max
g
(1 + g)V (g,n) − 1.
Without impacting the optimal solution we can transform the objective function by
dropping the −1 and taking the natural log.
max
g
V (g, n) ln (1 + g)
Applying the first order optimality condition we obtain
∂V (g, n)
∂g
ln (1 + g) +
V (g, n)
1 + g
= 0.
Substituting for V (g, n) yields
−Y ′ (g, n) ln (1 + g)
Y 2 (g, n)
+
1
Y (g, n) (1 + g)
= 0.
Rearranging terms we obtain
Y (g, n) = Y ′ (g, n) ln (1 + g) (1 + g) . (A.1)
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Using Lemma A.1 we know that Y (g, n) = A(n)W (g)+I. Substituting into Equation
(A.1) yields
A(n)W (g) + I = A(n)W ′(g) ln(1 + g)(1 + g).
If we rearrange terms we obtain
W ′(g) ln(1 + g)(1 + g)−W (g) = I
A(n)
. (A.2)
Taking the first derivative of the left hand side yields
W ′′(g) ln(1 + g)(1 + g) +W ′(g) ln(1 + g) > 0.
Given the modeling assumptions made previously, the left hand side is strictly in-
creasing over the domain g ≥ 0. Since the right hand side is a constant, then there
exists at most one solution g∗ over the domain g > 0. If the first order condition
is not satisfied over the domain, then the optimal solution is g∗ = 0. To prove that
g∗ > 0 achieves the maximum we must apply the second order condition.
−Y
′′(g, n)
Y 2(g, n)
ln(1+g)(1+g)+2
(Y ′(g, n))2
Y 3(g, n)
ln(1+g)(1+g)−2 Y
′(g, n)
Y 2(g, n)
− 1
Y (g, n)(1 + g)
Substituting the solution of the first order condition into the second order condition
yields
− Y
′′(g∗, n)
Y ′(g∗, n)Y (g∗, n)
− 1
Y (g∗, n)(1 + g∗)
< 0.
for g∗ ≥ 0. Thus, we see that g∗ is the optimal solution. This proves the first part.
To prove the second part, we return to the first order condition found in Equation
(A.2). From Lemma A.1 we know that A(n) increases with n. Therefore, the right
hand side decreases with n. Since the left hand side is strictly increasing in g but
constant with respect to n, then we know that g∗ decreases with n. Since the long-run
arrival rate, 1/Y (g, n), of the renewal process decreases as n increases for all values
of g, then the long-run effective growth rate must also decrease for all values of g.
Therefore, the effective growth rate for g∗(n+1) must be less than that for g∗(n).
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Proof of Corollary 2.1. Using the first order optimality condition from the proof of
Theorem 2.1
W ′(g) ln(1 + g)(1 + g)−W (g) = I
A(n)
,
we see that as I increases the right hand side increases. Since the left hand side
is strictly increasing in g, g∗ must also increase. Since the arrival rate decreases
for all g when I increases, the long-run effective annual growth rate decreases as I
increases.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. The best response for any given stakeholder is
max
gi
(1 + gi)
V (g,n) − 1.
Following arguments similar to the proof of Theorem 2.1 we obtain
∂V (g, n)
∂gi
ln (1 + gi) +
V (g, n)
1 + gi
= 0.
Substituting yields
Y (g, n) =
∂Y (g, n)
∂gi
ln (1 + gi) (1 + gi) .
Note that the difference between this condition and the FOC from Theorem 2.1 (Equa-
tion (A.1)) is the derivative term. More specifically, for the optimization problem the
derivative is taken with respect to the common decision variable g. Whereas for the
competitive best response, the derivative is taken with respect to the decision variable
under the control of the individual player, gi. First, we consider the derivative term
for the optimal case.
Y (g, n) =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F n(x; g))dx,
∂Y (g, n)
∂g
= −n
∫ ∞
0
∂F
∂g
F n−1(x; g)dx.
Now we consider the derivative term for the competitive case
Y (g, n) =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x; g1)F (x; g2) · · ·F (x; gn))dx,
∂Y (g, n)
∂gi
= −
∫ ∞
0
∂F (x; gi)
∂g
F (x; g1)F (x; g2) · · ·F (x; gi−1)F (x; gi+1) · · ·F (x; gn)dx.
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Since the technologies are all symmetric, we know that g = g1 = g2 = · · · = gn. So,
∂Y (g, n)
∂gi
= −
∫ ∞
0
∂F
∂g
F n−1(x, g)dx.
Thus,
∂Y (g, n)
∂gi
=
1
n
∂Y (g, n)
∂g
.
Consequently, the best response function is now
Y (g, n) =
1
n
Y ′(g, n) ln (1 + g) (1 + g) .
If we substitute for Y (g, n) based on Lemma A.1 we obtain
1
n
W ′(g) ln(1 + g)(1 + g)−W (g) = I
A(n)
.
Clearly, the presence of the 1/n term will shift the left hand side downward from the
optimal case. Since the left hand side is strictly increasing in g (see proof of Theorem
2.1), the best response, g, for the competitive case must be greater than the optimal
solution, g∗. Since the competitive policy deviates from the optimal solution, the
long-run effective annual capability growth rate must be lower for the competitive
case.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. We know from Theorem 2.1 that the optimal policy decreases
with increasing n. If we consider the best response function from the competitive
case
1
n
W ′(g) ln(1 + g)(1 + g)−W (g) = I
A(n)
we see that both sides decrease with increasing n. Rearranging terms we obtain
n
(
W (g) +
I
A(n)
)
= W ′(g) ln(1 + g)(1 + g).
It is trivial to show that the right hand side is strictly increasing. Since A(n) ≤ n from
Lemma A.1, the left hand side increases with n. Therefore, the competitive policy
must increase as well, and the gap between the optimal and competitive policies must
increase with n.
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APPENDIX B
BASELINE INPUT PARAMETERS FOR CHAPTER 3
This appendix contains the simulation parameter values used for the base case sim-
ulation presented in Chapter 3. The parameter values are contained in the following
tables.
Table B.1: General Simulation Parameters
System Types 3
Application Area Types 6
R&D Budget ($ million per year) 3000
Intersystem Delay (years) 0
Exogenous Technology Growth Rate 0.01
Internal Learning Factor 1.5
Table B.2: Technology Development Stage Parameters
Stage Stage Costs Stage Budgets Success Probabilities Stage Length
($ million/year) ($ million/year) (%) (years)
1 1 100 50 1
2 2 100 50 1
3 10 200 50 1
4 20 200 60 1
5 200 1000 70 1
6 400 1400 80 1
Table B.3: Application Area Requirements by System
Application Areas
Systems 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 X X X
2 X X X
3 X X X
143
Table B.4: Acquisition Life-Cycle Phase Cost Parameters($ million/year)
System Concept Development System Development Production
1 20 1000 4000
2 20 1000 4000
3 20 1000 4000
Table B.5: Triangularly Distributed Parameters
Parameter Min Mode Max
Base Cost Multiplier 0.5 1 2
Performance Gain Multiplier 0.8 1 1.2
Concept Development Duration (years) 2 4.9 7.5
System Development Duration (years) 1.5 2.125 8
Production Duration (years) 1.5 2 4.7
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APPENDIX C
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR CHAPTER 3
A first order sensitivity analysis was conducted on the baseline parameters of the
simulation presented in Chapter 3. The following figures depict the results of that
analysis. Each parameter was increased and decreased by 10% from its baseline
value, so the extent of each line indicates the output variation in response to that
parameter. The vertical dashed lines indicate a plus 10% and minus 10% variation
from the baseline output value to provide a sense of scale.
The simulation is relatively insensitive to any one parameter. The most sensitive
relationship is the system operating cost to production cost. Of course, production
is the largest cost in the simulation, and so it has the greatest impact. One other
observation worthy of note is that, in general, capability growth rate is the most
sensitive output.
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APPENDIX D
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 4
D.1 The Application of Ito’s Lemma
In stochastic calculus, any transformation on an Ito process requires the application
of Ito’s Lemma. Since Equation (4.1) is a function of two stochastic processes, we
will apply the two-dimensional version of Ito’s Lemma.
dY =
∂Y
∂t
dt+
∂Y
∂B
dB +
∂Y
∂C
dC +
1
2
(
∂2Y
∂B2
dB2 + 2
∂2Y
∂B∂C
dBdC +
∂2Y
∂C2
dC2
)
(D.1)
One may note that Ito’s Lemma is just the chain rule from ordinary calculus with
the addition of the second derivative term. This term is required to account for the
fact that Brownian motion has nonzero quadratic variation. If we substitute for dB
and dC, we obtain
dY =
∂Y
∂t
dt+
∂Y
∂B
(gBdt+ σBBdZB) +
∂Y
∂C
(αCCdt+ σCCdZC) +
1
2
(
∂2Y
∂B2
σ2BB
2 + 2
∂2Y
∂B∂C
ρBCσBσCBC +
∂2Y
∂C2
σ2CC
2
)
dt (D.2)
For the case of Equation (4.1) the derivative terms are
∂Y
∂t
= 0,
∂Y
∂B
= AaBa−1C−a,
∂Y
∂C
= −AaBaC−(a+1),
∂2Y
∂B2
= Aa(a− 1)Ba−2C−a,
∂2Y
∂B∂C
= −Aa2Ba−1C−(a+1),
∂2Y
∂C2
= Aa(a+ 1)BaC−(a+2).
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Substituting these into Equation (D.2) and simplifying yields
dY =
(
ag − aαC + a(a− 1)
2
σ2B − a2ρBCσBσC +
a(a+ 1)
2
σ2C
)
Y dt
+aσBY dZB − aσCY dZC .
D.2 Proof that Y (t) is a geometric Brownian motion pro-
cess
Here we will show that Y (t) is a geometric Brownian motion process. First, we define
the following:
αY = ag − aαC + a(a− 1)
2
σ2B − a2ρBCσBσC +
a(a+ 1)
2
σ2C ,
σY = a
√
σ2B − 2ρBCσBσC + σ2C ,
dZY =
aσBdZB − aσCdZC
σY
.
Next, we need to show that dZY is an increment of Brownian motion, and we can do
this by finding the quadratic variation of ZY :
dZY dZY =
a2
σ2Y
(σ2BdZ
2
B − 2σBσCdZBdZC + σ2CdZ2C),
dZY dZY =
a2
σ2Y
(σ2B − 2ρBCσBσC + σ2C)dt,
dZY dZY =
σ2Y
σ2Y
dt,
dZY dZY = dt.
This result implies that the quadratic variation is [ZY , ZY ](t) = t. Thus, by the one-
dimensional Le´vy Theorem (see Shreve, Chapter 4 [70]), ZY is a Brownian motion
process. Substituting terms into Equation (4.2), we obtain
dY = αY Y dt+ σY Y dZY ,
and we see that Y (t) is governed by geometric Brownian motion.
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APPENDIX E
THE TRL SCALE
The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale is a qualitative measurement of the
maturity of a technology. It has nine levels with 1 being the least mature and 9 being
the most mature. The scale was originally developed by NASA [48], but has since
been adopted by the Department of Defense. The following table presents the defense
version of the scale.
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Table E.1: DoD Technology Readiness Levels (Source: Defense Acquisition Guide-
book, Chapter 10.5.2 [20])
Technology Readiness Level Description
1. Basic principles observed and
reported.
Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research be-
gins to be translated into applied research and development.
Examples might include paper studies of a technology’s basic
properties.
2. Technology concept and/or
application formulated.
Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practi-
cal applications can be invented. Applications are speculative
and there may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the
assumptions. Examples are limited to analytic studies.
3. Analytical and experimental
critical function and/or charac-
teristic proof of concept.
Active research and development is initiated. This includes
analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically validate
analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative.
4. Component and/or bread-
board validation in laboratory en-
vironment.
Basic technological components are integrated to establish that
they will work together. This is relatively “low fidelity” com-
pared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of
“ad hoc” hardware in the laboratory.
5. Component and/or bread-
board validation in relevant envi-
ronment.
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The
basic technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so it can be tested in a simulated
environment. Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory in-
tegration of components.
6. System/subsystem model or
prototype demonstration in a rel-
evant environment.
Representative model or prototype system, which is well be-
yond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. Rep-
resents a major step up in a technology’s demonstrated readi-
ness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environ-
ment.
7. System prototype demonstra-
tion in an operational environ-
ment.
Prototype near, or at, planned operational system. Represents
a major step up from TRL 6, requiring demonstration of an
actual system prototype in an operational environment such
as an aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the
prototype in a test bed aircraft.
8. Actual system completed
and qualified through test and
demonstration.
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under
expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents
the end of true system development. Examples include de-
velopmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended
weapon system to determine if it meets design specifications.
9. Actual system proven through
successful mission operations.
Actual application of the technology in its final form and under
mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational
test and evaluation. Examples include using the system under
operational mission conditions.
153
REFERENCES
[1] Arena, M. V., Blickstein, I., Younossi, O., and Grammich, C. A., Why
has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen?: A Macroscopic Examination of the Trends
in U.S. Naval Ship Costs Over the Past Several Decades. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 2006.
[2] Arena, M. V., Leonard, R. S., Murray, S. E., and Younossi, O., “His-
torical cost growth of completed weapon system programs,” Tech. Rep. TR-343-
AF, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2006.
[3] Baldwin, W. L., The Structure of the Defense Market, 1955–1964. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 1967.
[4] Birkler, J., Rushworth, D., Chiesa, J., Pung, H., Arena, M. V.,
and Chank, J. F., Differences Between Military and Commercial Shipbuild-
ing. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005.
[5] Black, F. and Scholes, M., “The pricing of options and corporate liabilities,”
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 81, pp. 637–654, 1973.
[6] Bodner, D. A. and Rouse, W. B., “Understanding R&D value creation with
organizational simulation,” Systems Engineering, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 64–82, 2007.
[7] Boudreau, M. W., “Acousitc rapid COTS insertion-case study,” in Proceedings
of the Third Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, (Monterey), pp. 185–186,
Naval Postgraduate School, 2006.
[8] Burgess, G. M., A Management Analysis and Systems Model of Department
of Defense Acquistion Structure and Policy. PhD thesis, The Florida State Uni-
versity, 1988.
[9] Cancian, M., “Acquisition reform: It’s not as easy as it seems,” Acquisition
Review Quarterly, pp. 190–192, Summer 1995.
[10] Christensen, D. S., Searle, D. A., and Vickery, C., “The impact of the
Packard Commission’s recommendations on reducing cost overruns on defense
acquisition contracts,” Acquisition Review Quarterly, pp. 252–256, Summer 1999.
[11] Clark, Jr., T. J., Whittenberg, E. L., and Woodruff, A. H., “A policy
analysis of defense weapons acquisition,” Policy Studies Journal, vol. 14, no. 1,
pp. 21–46, 1985.
154
[12] Clarkson, P. J., Simons, C., and Eckert, C., “Predicting change propa-
gation in complex design,” Transactions of the ASME, vol. 126, pp. 788–797,
2004.
[13] Cook, C. R. and Graser, J. C., Military Airframe Acquisition Costs: The
Effects of Lean Manufacturing. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.
[14] Cornford, S. L. and Sarsfield, L., “Quantitative methods for maturing
and infusing advanced spacecraft technology,” in IEEE Aerospace Conference
Proceedings, pp. 663–681, IEEE, 2004.
[15] Cox, J. C., Ross, S. A., and Rubinstein, M., “Option pricing: A simplified
approach,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 7, pp. 229–263, 1979.
[16] Dillard, J. and Ford, D., “Too little too soon? Modeling the risks of spiral
development,” in Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Acquisition Research Sympo-
sium, (Monterey, CA), pp. 484–500, Naval Postgraduate School, May 2007.
[17] Dixit, A. K. and Pindyck, R. S., Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994.
[18] DoD, “DoD Directive 5000.1,” May 12 2003.
[19] DoD, “DoD Instruction 5000.2,” May 12 2003.
[20] DoD, “Defense acquisition guidebook.” http://akss.dau.mil/dag/welcome.asp,
2006. Retrieved November 12, 2007.
[21] DoD, “Seleced acquisition report(SAR) summary tables,” April 6 2007.
[22] DoD, “Seleced acquisition report(SAR) summary tables,” August 14 2007.
[23] Drezner, J. A., Jarvaise, J., Hess, R., Hough, P., and Norton, D.,
An Analysis of Weapon System Cost Growth (MR-291-AF). Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1993.
[24] Eckert, C., Clarkson, P. J., and Zanker, W., “Change and customization
in complex engineering domains,” Research in Engineering Design, vol. 15, pp. 1–
21, 2004.
[25] Fox, J. R., Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons. Boston: Harvard
University Press, 1974.
[26] Fox, J. R., The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition. Boston:
Havard Business School Press, 1988.
[27] Gansler, J. S. and Lucyshyn, W., “A strategy for defense acquisition re-
search.” Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, University of Maryland,
August 2005.
155
[28] Gansler, J. S., The Defense Industry. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1980.
[29] GAO, “Acquisitions: DoD’s defense acquisition improvement program: A status
report.” United States Government Accountability Office, GAO/NSIAD-86-148,
July 1986.
[30] GAO, “Defense acquisitions: DoD’s revisied policy emphasizes best practices,
but more controls are needed.” United States Government Accountability Office,
GAO-04-53, November 10, 2003.
[31] GAO, “Best practices: Stronger practices needed to improve DOD technology
transition processes.” United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-
06-883, September 5, 2006.
[32] GAO, “Defense acquisitions: Actions needed to get better results on weapon
systems investments.” United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-
06-585T, April 5, 2006.
[33] GAO, “Defense acquisitions: Major weapon systems continue to experience cost
and schedule problems under DoD’s revised policy.” United States Government
Accountability Office, GAO-06-368, April 13, 2006.
[34] GAO, “Defense contracting-questions for the record.” United States Government
Accountability Office, GAO-07-217R, December 21, 2006.
[35] GAO, “Tactical aircraft: Questions concerning the F-22A’s business case.”
United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-991T, July 25, 2006.
[36] GAO, “Best practices: An integrated portfolio management approach to weapon
system investments could improve DOD’s acquisition outcomes.” United States
Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-388, March 30, 2007.
[37] GAO, “Defense acquisitions: Assessments of selected weapons programs.”
United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-406SP, March 30
2007.
[38] Hanks, C. H., Axelband, E. I., Lindsay, S., Malik, M. R., and Steele,
B. D., Reexamining Military Acquisition Reform: Are We There Yet? Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2005.
[39] Hayes, R. H. and Abernathy, W. J., “Managing our way to economic de-
cline,” Harvard Business Review, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 67–77, 1980.
[40] Hayes, R. H. and Garvin, D. A., “Managing as if tomorrow mattered,”
Harvard Business Review, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 70–79, 1982.
[41] Holland, L., Weapons Under Fire. New York: Garland Publishing, 1997.
156
[42] Housel, T., Mun, J., and Tarantino, E., “AEGIS and ship self-defense
system (SSDS) platforms: Using KVA analysis, risk simulation and strategic
real options to assess operational effectiveness,” in Proceedings of the Fourth
Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, (Monterey, CA), pp. 122–162, Naval
Postgraduate School, May 2007.
[43] Johnson, W. M. and Johnson, C. O., “The promise and perils of spiral
acquistion: A practical approach to evolutionary acquisition,” Acquisition Review
Quarterly, pp. 175–188, Summer 2002.
[44] Kamrad, B. and Ritchken, P., “Multinomial approximating models for op-
tions with k state variables,” Management Science, vol. 37, no. 12, pp. 1640–1652,
1991.
[45] Kirn, M., “Examining NASA’s use of technology readiness levels,” tech. rep.,
NASA, August 2005.
[46] Leonard, R. S., Drezner, J. A., and Sommer, G., The Arsenal Ship Ac-
qusition Process Experience. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.
[47] Lorell, M. A., Lowell, J. F., and Younossi, O., Evolutionary Acquisition:
Implementation Challenges for Defense Space Programs. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 2006.
[48] Mankins, J. C., “Technology readiness levels: A white paper,” April 6, 1995.
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/trl/.
[49] Markowitz, H. M., “Portfolio selection,” Journal of Finance, vol. 7, no. 1,
pp. 77–91, 1952.
[50] Markowitz, H. M., “The optimization of a quadratic function subject to linear
constraints,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 1-2, pp. 111–133,
1956.
[51] Markowitz, H. M., Mean-Variance Analysis in Portfolio Choice and Capital
Markets. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
[52] Markowitz, H. M., Portfolio Selection. New York: Wiley, 1987.
[53] Meyers, S. C., “Determinants of corporate borrowing,” Journal of Financial
Economics, vol. 5, pp. 147–175, 1977.
[54] Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H., “The cost of capital, corporate finance,
and the theory of investment,” American Economic Review, vol. 48, no. 3,
pp. 261–297, 1958.
[55] Moorhouse, D. J., “Detailed definitions and guidance for application of tech-
nology readiness levels,” Journal of Aircraft, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 190–192, 2002.
157
[56] Peck, M. J. and Scherer, F. M., The Weapons Acquisition Process: An
Economic Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962.
[57] Pennock, M. J., Rouse, W. B., and Kollar, D. L., “Transforming the
acquisition enterprise: A framework for analysis and a case study of ship acqui-
sition,” Systems Engineering, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 99–117, 2007.
[58] Pollak, R. A., “The theory of the cost of living,” in Price Level Measurement
(Diewert, W. E., ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1990.
[59] President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense, “A quest for excel-
lence,” 1986. accessed: http://www.ndu.edu/library/pbrc/pbrc.html.
[60] Reed, T. S., Cowdrey, J., and Pike, W., “Monsters in the closet? The
impact of collective bargaining agreements in A-76 sourcing decisions,” in Pro-
ceedings of the Fourth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, (Monterey, CA),
pp. 314–329, Naval Postgraduate School, May 2007.
[61] Rogers, E. W. and Birmingham, R. P., “A ten-year review of the vision
for transforming the defense acquisition system,” Defense Acquisition Review
Journal, pp. 37–61, January-April 2004.
[62] Rouse, W. B., “Enterprises as systems: Essential challenges and approaches
to transformation,” Systems Engineering, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 138–150, 2005.
[63] Rouse, W. B., “A theory of enterprise transformation,” Systems Engineering,
vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 279–295, 2005.
[64] Rouse, W. B., ed., Enterprise Transformation: Understanding and Enabling
Fundamental Change. New York: Wiley, 2006.
[65] Rouse, W. B., Pennock, M. J., and Kollar, D. L., “Transforming the
enterprise of acquiring public sector complex systems,” in Proceedings of the
Third Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, (Monterey, CA), pp. 113–127,
2006.
[66] Sammet, Jr., G. and Green, D. E., Defense Acquisition Management. Boca
Raton: Florida Atlantic University Press, 1990.
[67] Sandler, T. and Hartley, K., The Economics of Defense. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995.
[68] Scherer, F. M., The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964.
[69] Shapiro, A. A., “Technology infusion for space-flight programs,” in IEEE Are-
ospace Conference Proceedings, pp. 653–662, IEEE, 2004.
[70] Shreve, S. E., Stochastic Calculus for Finance II: Continuous-Time Models.
New York: Springer, 2004.
158
[71] Smaling, R. and de Weck, O., “Assessing risks and opportunities of tech-
nology infusion in system design,” Systems Engineering, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1–25,
2007.
[72] Stevens, G. A. and Burley, J., “3,000 raw ideas = 1 commerical success!,”
Research Technology Management, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 16–27, 1997.
[73] Varian, H. R., Microeconomic Analysis. New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
3rd ed., 1992.
[74] Weida, W. J. and Gertcher, F. L., The Political Economy of National
Defense. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.
159
